Thread by @alexhallhall

This week I shall try to give more substance to my thread last week about US views on Brexit. But first, some background on why it was so difficult to convince American sceptics that Brexit was a good idea. [Partly in response to critics that I was obviously lousy at my job].

First, the talking points simply lacked substance. Our top lines would be bland assurances (eg "we're committed to the GFA; no hard border;"; "We'll get a new free trade, no tariffs, no quotas deal with EU etc with little detail on how this would be delivered.

Second, the messages were primarily aimed for UK domestic audience, and highly political, so eg contained numerous barbs at the EU, which jarred with assurances Ministers would give to US contacts that of course we would always remain friends and allies of the EU.

Third, the lines implicitly dismissed any concerns about potential negative consequences of Brexit as just coming from "elites"' or "embittered Remainers"; etc, even though many Americans shared those concerns . They gaslit our top ally, as well as us; that did not go down well.

Fourth, also, given that the govt always denied there were any potential negative consequences, it meant we never had any substantive answers or points to deliver on how we might handle those consequences, - even in a No Deal scenario.

Fifth, it was hard to convince Americans we had everything under control and a good plan, when there was visible evidence of chaos and dysfunction in the UK. [Americans read newspapers, watch tv, have friends and family, and businesses in the UK too].

Sixth: America has been involved in Europe for a long time. They have EU experts, trade experts, migration experts; scientists; legal experts; security experts; Irish peace process experts etc too. Many understood the implications of Brexit well, better than many of our own MPs.

Seventh: we constantly tried to get Ministers to appear on US media or call their US counterparts to offer reassuring messages...but Ministers were either unavailable in time (because their prime focus was always UK), or unable to adjust their messages and tone for US audiences.

Eighth: when Brexiteers did engage, it was often with the same narrow group of Brexit supporters in the US - such as at Heritage (where Owen P (yes, that Owen P), David Davis, Liz Truss etc) were frequent visitors. So, their own misconceptions were reinforced, not challenged.

Ninth, their perceptions were also shaped by over-confidence about US support, because of the Brexit cheerleading from Trump, some (but by no means all) of his advisors in the White House, and the then US Amb in London.

I vividly recall a respected member of a right leaning think tank in DC telling me that we must NOT assume that just because Trump supported Brexit, most Republicans supported Brexit. In fact, many Repns were equally dismayed - not least because of the strategic implications.

It's also actually quite hard for someone politely to challenge a visiting British Minister face to face. Protocol; diplomatic tact; as allies; respect for Ministerial rank etc meant that any sceptical US messages were rather gently delivered, and thus perhaps failed to register.

Tenth, while we were gaslighting the Americans and dismissing their concerns, the EU was very active in briefing American contacts, giving their perspective, often in more professional and convincing terms, and not dismissing US questions.

The Irish Embassy and visiting Irish Ministers were particularly effective, and assiduously courted Congress; while when Speaker Pelosi met ERG members in London, her questions about Ireland were brushed aside. (She was reportedly very p'd off.)

British Embassy officials worked tirelessly to try to put across reassuring, positive narratives. My colleagues in Washington and London were amazing. But we could only work with the material we had. And the Ministers we had.