The situation is even clearer when plotted on a log scale:
UK is broadly a flat line, with European countries cutting up steeply through it. France, Italy & Spain all on course to pass UK for cases. Germany now above UK for daily deaths and Netherlands set to follow.
So why these exponential surges across Europe but not in the UK?
There’s increasingly little difference in social mixing behaviour between the countries, and where we do see differences e.g in mask-wearing, they’re generally more virus-friendly in the UK 🤔
The answer:
UK’s July reopening led to much more of its population being infected than elsewhere in western Europe. Between vax and infection-acquired immunity, UK has more protection, Europe has more susceptible people.
Despite UK having lower vax coverage than e.g Belgium & France, the difference in share of people previously infected is larger (UK 30%, FRA 15%), meaning that going into this winter, the UK had fewer people still exposed to the virus, less scope for a wave of hospitalisations.
This filled gaps in the UK’s vax coverage, leaving very few completely unprotected.
In Germany, lower vax rates and less infection-acq immunity mean far more ongoing exposure.
In Romania, despite huge numbers of past infections, gaps in elderly vax coverage left huge exposure.
But of course, that infection-acquired immunity comes at a grim cost. The UK has recorded more than 15,000 new Covid deaths since reopening no July 19.
That’s more over that period than any European country except Romania in absolute terms, and now around 10th highest per-capita
The big question is how that number will compare once winter is done?
In July UK’s running toll was highest in Europe. Several eastern European countries have since overtaken, and plotting the same on a log scale shows that others further west are heading the same way
But will the UK’s western European peers pass that same grim toll, or could they still avoid the worst?
A big part of the answer lies in boosters, where we now have extremely clear signals from the UK...
Let’s start with cases in England.
Look at the first half of October: all age groups rising in lockstep.
November? Not so much. Cases have risen among under-60s, but fallen fast among older groups.
Let’s take a closer look...
Here we focus only on the two mini-waves — first half of Oct, and middle of Nov. Spot the difference...
In Oct rates rose in the elderly just like everyone else. In recent weeks, there is a stark divergence.
But what makes me say that this is boosters and not behaviour? Well...
This is a new chart format I’ve been working on for a few days. Lines still show age-groups, but they now change colour as people get boosters.
In October booster coverage was still low even in elderly. But by late Nov you can clearly see how boosters drive cases down 💉📉
And if you thought that was impressive, take a look at the same thing for hospital admissions:
Admissions in England have been relatively stable among people aged 18-64 in England over recent weeks, but they’re falling precipitously in the mostly-boosted over-65s 💉🏥📉
To reiterate, cases among under-60s in England have risen in recent weeks, but among mostly-boosted elderly they have not merely risen more slowly, they’ve *fallen*.
Strong evidence that with a fast rollout, boosters can change the slope of a wave, especially for severe outcomes
Here’s a reworking of a brilliant @PaulMainwood chart using the same format:
As boosters roll out, lines turns red, and then arc upwards as waning immunity is reversed.
You can already see early signs of 50-69s beginning to turn as they go from blue to ... I wanna say lavender?
Good news for western Europe is there are early signs of a booster effect there too 🎉
Compare Belgium (started boosters in Sept) to Netherlands (started last week):
Cases among Belgium’s mostly-boosted elderly are no longer tracking younger groups. Netherlands? Not so much...
So good reason to think that with fast booster rollouts, western European countries should see:
• Cases begin to flatten and fall among the most vulnerable
• Meaning a steep rise in cases no longer necessarily translates into a steep rise in hosp/death
But there are caveats...
Specifically, boosters can only help those who’ve already had two doses, and in many countries that number is too low.
Austria illustrates this well:
Almost everyone second dosed 6 months ago has had a booster...
But its high unvaxxed rates mean that this booster surge has merely taken its share of people without vaccination protection down from being far higher than all of its peers, to only far higher than *some*.
Plus rollout was too late to get ahead of the wave.
There’s a stark warning here for the US, too.
Whilst the US’ summer wave will have — like the UK — generated a lot of infection-acquired immunity, that is offset by very poor vaccination rates (both second doses and third).
One key tool for accelerating uptake could be to do what @nicolamlow said to @samgadjones: "we should stop calling them boosters, and start calling them third doses".
As @PaulMainwood has demonstrated, there is a growing body of evidence for that view
So to conclude (1/2)
• UK’s July reopening likely generated enough infection-acquired immunity to shield it from continent’s winter wave
• But that came at a cost of thousands of deaths, far higher rate than peer countries [so far]
• Boosters also key to UK’s current successes
(2/2)
• If western European countries can accelerate booster rollout they can blunt the wave, esp in terms of hospitalisations & deaths
• But some, like Austria, are hamstrung by low uptake of the primary course. You can’t boosted the unvaxxed, and Austria has a lot of them.
My wish for the next election is that poll trackers look like the one on the right 👉 not the left
This was yet another election where the polling showed it could easily go either way, but most of the charts just showed two nice clean lines, one leading and one trailing. Bad!
Pollsters and poll aggregators have gone to great lengths to emphasise the amount of uncertainty in the polls in recent weeks...
But have generally still put out charts and polling toplines that encourage people to ignore the uncertainty and focus on who’s one point ahead. Bad!
The thing about human psychology is, once you give people a nice clean number, it doesn’t matter how many times you say "but there’s an error margin of +/- x points, anything is possible".
People are going to anchor on that central number. We shouldn’t enable this behaviour!
We’re going to hear lots of stories about which people, policies and rhetoric are to blame for the Democrats’ defeat.
Some of those stories may even be true!
But an underrated factor is that 2024 was an absolutely horrendous year for incumbents around the world 👇
Harris lost votes, Sunak lost votes, Macron lost votes, Modi (!) lost votes, as did the Japanese, Belgian, Croatian, Bulgarian and Lithuanian governments in elections this year.
Any explanation that fails to take account for this is incomplete.
Many of the NHS’s difficulties can be traced back to the deep cuts in manager numbers.
Fixing this doesn’t just unblock waiting lists, it also gives doctors more time to be doctors, and alleviates the stress and poor morale that come from having to do things that aren’t your job
Here’s another fun NHS low hanging fruit example:
A trial last year found that by running two operating theatres side by side, they cut the time between operations from 40 minutes to 2, and were able to do a week’s worth of surgeries in one day thetimes.com/uk/article/lon…
In what might be one of the most significant trends I have ever charted, the US obesity rate fell last year.
My column this week is about this landmark data point, and what might be behind it ft.com/content/21bd0b…
We already know from clinical trials that Ozempic and other GLP-1 drugs produce sustained reductions in body weight, but with mass public usage taking off — one in eight US adults have used the drugs — the results may now be showing up at population level.
It’s really striking how the Corbynite left has migrated to the Greens.
The result is a curious coalition between the older and more Nimby environmentalist base, and the new hard left/progressive influx.
These are quite different people with quite different politics!
In 2019, one in ten Green voters was from the most progressive/left segment of voters; now that’s one in four.
Big difference in policy preferences, priorities and pressure on the leadership, as we’ve seen in e.g reaction to Denyer’s Biden statement.
The most glaring tension between these two types of Green is on decarbonisation, where the older Nimby base doesn’t want pylons *or even onshore wind farms* but many of the new progressive Green vote do.
Greens are actually less keen on wind farms than Labour and Lib Dem voters!