(Long thread)
When it is pretended that values determine foreign policy (a propos of the forthcoming "Summit of Democracies").
At the Versailles Peace Conference one among young & idealistic British diplomats was Harold Nicolson. 3y younger than Keynes, he shared his unbounded
enthusiasm & believed the conference would bring the rule of law (based on general principles) in international affairs. He idolized Wilson. But as conference went on & those who pretended to be guided by principles began to break each and every one of them...
(like the self-determination that did not apply to Africans and Asians, equality of races that was found abhorrent by Wilson) his mood, like Keynes', soured. Keynes wrote The Economic Consequences, a devastating portrait of the main protagonists and Wilson in particular.
Nicolson wrote a more political book ("Peace Making") equally bitter & full of disappointment. Most sordid political interests were dressed up in the language of rights and values. An atmosphere of mendacity and hypocrisy pervaded the colloquy.
When Europeans were pressed by Wilson and the US they were quick to see under these solemn Wilsonian principles an entirely different reality.
Nicolson writes:
"It was this divergence of habit, this gap between reason and emotion, which induced the Latins [the French and the Italians] to reexamine the revelations of Woodrow Wilson in a manner more scientific, and therefore more critical, than we did ourselves.
They observed, for instance, that the United States in the course of their short but highly imperialistic history had constantly proclaimed the highest virtue while as constantly violating their professions and resorting to the grossest materialism.
They observed that all Americans liked to feel in terms of Thomas Jefferson but to act in terms of Alexander Hamilton. They observed that such principles as the equality of man were not applied either to the yellow man or to the black.
They observed that the doctrine of self-determination had not been extended either to the Red Indians or to the Southern States. They were apt to examine American principles and American tendencies not in terms of the Philadelphia declaration but in terms of the Mexican war,
of Louisiana, of these innumerable treaties with the Indian tribes which had been violated shamelessly before the ink was dry. They observed that, almost within living memory, the great American empire had been won by ruthless force."
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Consider income composition in socialism and developed capitalism. They are fairly similar. The differences are in the lack of income from K, greater family-related transfers, and quasi-absence of direct taxes (other than proportional flat wage taxes) in socialism.
Then extremely low skill premium of 3-5% vs 18-70% for West European countries (and even more in the US).
Then, much less redistributive social transfers. While UK/Ireland had very pro-poor transfers, socialist countries had flat transfers. Thransfers depended on family composition and were about the same regardless of underlying income.
This is the second year that in my teaching I spend two hours discussing income inequality under socialism, the way it was, not normative stuff. The most important thing is to tell students that socialism is not capitalism with less inequality. The logic of the system was entirely different.
The salient points.
Nationalization of capital & end of incomes from K reduces inequality directly.
Wage compression: very low skill premium. Explained both by free schooling and ideological preference for less skilled workers.
Relatively large (but not larger than in modern capitalism) social transfers directed toward families and old-age persons.
Large but almost totally flat direct taxes, mostly in the for of a wage tax.
After reading @pseudoerasmus excellent thread on the evolution of devt thinking and the role of institutions and @ingridharvold, Kesar, Dutt paper on the same topic (both published within the past 48 hours) I asked myself the following Q: Why did I like AJR early work so much & then lost interest?
I liked both their "Origins.." and "Reversal..". The reason is that I found in these papers the themes with which I was already familiar from reading neo-Marxist literature, including S Amin and G Arrighi. But I always felt dissatisfaction with that literature's "sporadic" use of empirical evidence.
What AJR provided was the same story with much more data and modern methodology. So it was a big step forward.
The problems started afterwards: their inability to explain communism (political inequality but economic equality), and the turn away from understanding of capitalism
We shall never know if the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was intentionally targeted or not.
Here are some arguments why I find accidental bombing highly unlikely.
-This was the only building targeting mistake in 78 days of very precise bombing.
-The ostensible target was a financial institution (bank giving loans, for, among other things, old SRFY's sales of armament). But that bank no longer worked; Serbia was bankrupt; it was not giving loans to anyone.
-It is the only fin institution having been ostensibly targeted.
-The Chinese emb & the Bank 2 very different buildings. Not only when you face them. Even if you have a 2-dimensional map, emb was facing, at an angle, towards the river, a solitary building w/a fence. The bank is 150m away across a 6-lane highway, adjoining another building.
In 1974, it made sense to speak of the Three Worlds, as among themselves, and treating China that never belonged to the Third World apart, they accounted for 98% of world GDP (in PPP terms).
Capitalist core 62%
Socialist countries 13%
Third World 24%
China 2%
But now we have a different situation. The capitalist core has shrunk despite its geographical extension to E Europe. The socialist world has disappeared. The 3rd world is more important thanks to the rise of Asia.
Core 44%
China 22%
Politically heterogen. periphery 31%
RUS 3%
In political sense, we have a unified West with 44%, China with ½ of that amount, politically heterogeneous periphery with almost 1/3 of global GDP (but its political power is low because of that heterogeneity) and Russia that is obviously trying to punch above its weight.