1: Thread ... I've spent much of the pandemic building programs at @CarnegieEndow but I've done a good bit of writing too, and a boatload of podcasts and talks. Some highlights: five on Taiwan, two on Korea, four on U.S. statecraft in Asia, three on China, two for the historians.
2: Taiwan #1 ... In the first of three big studies of Taiwan's competitiveness, I argued that its innovation advantage is in danger of eroding without a revitalized strategy and much more diverse investments in human capital and next-generation industries: carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/29/ass…
3: Taiwan #2 ... In the second of these studies, I turned with Jen-yi Hou to how Taiwan's traditional energy market risks are being eclipsed by a "trilemma" of new challenges: how to assure future energy security, affordability, and sustainability: carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/27/ove…
4: Taiwan #3 ... In the third of these studies, I explore with my friend @MikeNelson Taiwan’s supply chain opportunities in two industries—life sciences and safer software. We try to refine competitive choices and highlight unique comparative advantages: carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/24/tai…
5: Taiwan #4 ... The U.S.-Taiwan trade agenda often seems to revolve around a bilateral trade agreement or bust. With Barbara Weisel, America's former chief TPP negotiator, I offered up a few other shovel-ready initiatives that could be ready sooner: carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/04/dee…
6: Taiwan #5 ... There's growing debate about competition in intergovernmental standards bodies that exclude Taiwan from membership. But @MikeNelson and I see plenty of opportunities because private-sector actors will increasingly play the dominant role: carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/09/how…
7: Korea #1 ... Too many think the future of technology is about the "U.S. vs. China." But third and more players are shaping serious alternatives. I led an initiative with @MikeNelson that produced this pathbreaking volume on "The Korean Way With Data": carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/17/kor…
8: Korea #2 ... Why does Korea matter? In an intro chapter, I argued with Mike that Korea offers a third way, built on experiences incubated in a successful democracy that has balanced public and private interests and state and market-based approaches: carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/17/int…
9: American statecraft #1 ... To succeed in Asia, I argued in this little rant that Washington is going to need to whine less, compete more, and leverage its strengths in the Asia that actually exists, not the one of its wishes, dreams, and fantasies: nationalinterest.org/feature/meetin…
10: American statecraft #2 ... I argue that the U.S. and China suffer from the same bipolar delusion. Actually, Asia's future may be fragmentation, not hegemony or bipolarity, with shifting coalitions and a discombobulated patchwork of rules and standards: carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/09/asi…
11: American statecraft #3 ... The many "Quadologists" among us insist that this group will be the key to future U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. But I argued with my pal @JamesSchwemlein that this won't happen without learning from some past failures: carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/11/how…
12: American statecraft #4 ... In another piece for the Trump-to-Biden transition, I noted America's toughened approach to China but argued that it is long on attitude and short on strategy. What Asians want is a more systematic approach from Washington: carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/09/bid…
13: China #1 ... We're supposed to be in an era of U.S.-China "strategic competition." Actually, it's "managed enmity." But countries don’t need to be “friends” to get meaningful things done. I explored here why the U.S. and China forgot how to cooperate: carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/why…
14: China #2 ... So what happened between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping - and what *should* have happened? In this podcast with my friend @DouglasLFarrar, I took a dive into what the two sides are getting right - and what, to be blunt, is just ass backwards: the-world-unpacked.simplecast.com/episodes/biden…
15: China #3 ... The @SinicaPodcast is a great venue for longform discussion. When @KaiserKuo had me on the show, I got to dive deep into what's happened to U.S.-China relations, the "securitization" of everything, and how to navigate a fractured future: supchina.com/podcast/vetera…
16: History #1 ... Mid-pandemic, I recorded 5+ hours of oral history on George W. Bush and Asia for @Miller_Center. Part 1 covers strategic dynamics with China, efforts to enlist China as a contributor on Afghanistan and Iraq, and some strategic concepts: millercenter.org/the-presidency…
17: History #2 ... In Part 2 of my @Miller_Center oral history, I covered a bureaucratic reorganization to connect Central and South Asia; pre-Belt and Road connectivity initiatives; Central Asia; and relations with India around the civil nuclear deal: millercenter.org/the-presidency…
18: These highlights from COVID Times aren't exhaustive. If you're curious for more, my website evanfeigenbaum.com has books, essays, blogs, audio, and video on things I've written or said, from Korea to Kazakhstan, China to India. The pandemic has been awful but productive.
19: But putting my stuff aside, I'm so proud of what we've done at #CarnegieAsia during the pandemic. Our team is incredible. And if each did a similar thread, you'd just be dazzled. Stellar research. Awesome convening. A raft of new hires. The After Times will look even better!
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1: Thread ... Today, the US launched a new economic initiative with Taiwan. Good news. The US benefits from robust economic ties with Asia’s seventh- largest economy, America’s tenth-largest trading partner in goods, and an important link in global high-technology supply chains.
2: And Taiwan benefits too from robust economic ties to the United States—one of its top five export markets and an essential technology partner. Taiwan, incidentally, discovered Silicon Valley decades before much of the rest of the world did, driving entrepreneurial growth.
3: For years, debate about a bilateral trade agreement has sucked the oxygen out of this dialogue. Taiwan's goals were mismatched with US priorities, which emphasized longstanding market access barriers in Taiwan and a reluctance to divert focus from higher priority negotiations.
1: Good piece on competition in Central Asia with quotes from a #CarnegieAsia scholar and external author. My two cents: If the US wants to compete, it had best treat countries as subjects of their own stories, not objects of America's own competition with another external power.
2: Central Asian elites are nobody's fools about Chinese power. But they aren't naive about American power either. And with Taliban victory, much of what's happening in the region has, frankly, been de-Americanized and is instead being regionalized. They, not we, drive the play.
3: And their objectives include straightforward ones: employment, growth, development, increased bargaining power with external sources of pressure, more options, more value-added left in the region. US hectoring about China can be an abstraction; nobody is ostriching or naive.
1: A quick thread on China's policy evolution, tactical positioning, and strategic choices in the face of the Russian invasion and the dramatic events now unfolding in Ukraine. Beijing will not want Washington to frame its alternatives and choices but balance its own interests.
2: Not suprisiungly, in my view, the Chinese will be selfish about their own interests. They are in a difficult spot because they are attempting (both rhetorically and substantively) to balance three goals that, quite simply, *cannot* be reconciled ...
3: ... (1) a strategic relationship with Russia; (2) commitment to longstanding foreign policy principles around “noninterference,” and (3) a desire to minimize collateral damage to Chinese interests from economic turmoil and potential secondary sanctions from the US and EU.
1/5: For those of you speculating about what the Chinese will now say about Donetsk/Luhansk, you might look at what China said in 2008 about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For example: fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceit/ita/fy…
2: Her paper closely examines Chinese investment and loan activities in Argentina’s solar and wind power sectors. An adaptive partnership has evolved among key actors and institutions, strengthening alignment between Argentina's own development objectives and Chinese investments.
3: She also explores how Argentinian players can better assess and classify whether putative Chinese projects actually support Argentina’s economic growth and sustainable development needs, especially through technology transfers and/or joint development of energy technologies.
1: I’m absolutely thrilled to launch my new volume with colleague @MikeNelson—“The Korean Way With Data: How the World’s Most Wired Country is Forging a Third Way.” It’s part of our big buildout underway at @CarnegieEndow on technology futures in Asia: carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/17/kor…
2: I’m deeply grateful to @KoreaFoundation for its support of the project, and to our fabulous Korean colleagues: Jang GyeHyun, Lim Jong-in, So Jeong Kim, Nohyoung Park, Sunha Bae, and Kyung Sin “KS” Park. @KoreaFoundUSA.
3. Many argue that the world is fracturing into two spheres—either a Sinocentric or US-centric order. As we move into the next phase of the digital transformation, what was once viewed as a commercial and technological competition is now framed as an existential geopolitical one.