1/ Walsh v Network Rail: A rare EAT outing for the flexible working provisions. An agreement to attend a flexible working request appeal outside the decision period wasn't an agreement to extend the decision period. bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT… #ukemplaw
2/ W submitted a flexible working request under the ERA Part 8A on 11.2.19. It was rejected on 7.3.19 & his employer gave him the right to appeal. Whilst the 3-month statutory decision period was due to end on 10.5.19, the parties agreed to hold the appeal on 1.7.19.
4/ Notwithstanding that schedule, a week before the appeal hearing W presented an ET claim on the basis that the flexible working request hadn't been dealt with reasonably, had been determined on incorrect facts & hadn't concluded within the statutory decision period.
5/ The ET concluded that the claim had been presented prematurely given that the agreement to hold the appeal hearing on 1.7.19 involved an agreement between the parties to extend the decision period, such that the claim was wrongly brought before the decision period expired.
6/ In giving judgment allowing the appeal, HHJ Tayler went carefully through the statutory provisions under ERA Part 8A. He suggested the reader would do well to have them to hand, so here they are for thread readers:
7/ The EAT notes that whilst the statutory procedure doesn't require a hearing or an opportunity to appeal, where the employer provides for an appeal it must be finished within the decision period - a period of 3 months or any longer period agreed between employer & employee.
8/ The agreement to extend the 3-months can be either up front or retrospective.
s.80H(3) ERA precludes the making of a complaint prior to expiry of the decision period (which can end either on the decision having been made (including on any appeals) or expiry of the period.
9/ It was the ET's position that agreement (without reservation) between the parties for the appeal to be heard on 1.7.19 must, by implication, have included at least an agreement to extend the decision period to that point, & hence the claim was brought prematurely.
10/ In appealing, W asserted it was wrong to imply agreement to extend the decision period without more, & in any event it was contrary to the evidence that there's been any such implied agreement here.
11/ The EAT was unconcerned about whether any agreement to extend the decision period was express or implied, noting the ERA's silence on this. However, it held that agreement to extend the decision period & agreement to attend an appeal after it expired were 2 separate things.
12/ Noting a host of sensible reasons an employee might agree to attend an appeal notwithstanding it falls outside of the decision period, HHJ Tayler was clear that agreement to extend the decision period must include the length of extension agreed.
13/ On a policy-based level, HHJ Tayler noted the consistency between seeking compensation for a flexible working request not being dealt with as swiftly as the ERA anticipates, whilst also resolving the requested change at a belated appeal.
14/ Thus in W's case there was no statutory agreed extension of the decision & the ET claim was not brought prematurely. The matter was thus remitted back to the ET for substantive consideration.
🧵SSBT v Mercer: Supreme Court issues declaration of incompatibility re the lack of protection from sanction short of dismissal for workers taking part in strike action. The current position breaches Art 11 ECHR.
2/ M was a support worker in the care sector & a UNISON workplace rep, who planned & participated in a lawful strike at her workplace. She was suspended, receiving normal pay but no overtime. Suspension removed her from the workplace during the period of industrial action.
3/ M was also given a first written warning, though that was overturned on appeal.
M brought an ET claim reliant on s.146 TULR(C)A, which provides protection against detriments for taking part in trade union activities. The statutory provisions are below:
🧵 R (TTT) v Michaela Community Schools Trust - High Ct finds it was neither a breach of Art 9 nor indirectly discriminatory for the school to prohibit prayer rituals in response to Muslim pupils seeking to pray during their lunch break.
2/ The facts of this case will be familiar. Michaela is the school run by Katherine Birbalsingh, which has superb results but some incredibly strict rules & practices, including restricting discussion topics & limiting break time socialisation to groups of 4.
3/ The school, which is 50% Muslim, places considerable stock not only in its disciplinary regime, but also in what it calls its Team Ethos by which it seeks 'aggressively' to promote integration and to disrupt separation.
🧵Mathur v HMRC: UT (Tax & Chancery) decides to broadly construe s.401 ITEPA so that a settlement including for claims re dismissal but also re unrelated pre-termination discrim is taxable where the trigger for bringing the claim is dismissal.
2/ M worked for Deutsche Bank. Her employment was ended when the bank entered settlement with the New York State Dept of Financial Services re manipulation of interbank offered rates. DFS ordered the bank to terminate 7 employees, including M, said to be complicit in misconduct.
3/ She was offered c.£80k in a draft settlement agreement for that termination but declined to accept. Instead she brought ET proceedings for an equal pay claim, harassment, direct sex discrim, victimisation, s.47B & s.103A claims & ordinary unfair dismissal.
🧵The Supreme Court's judgment in Tui Ltd v Griffiths is one of those rare non-employment law cases that all employment lawyers (& all other civil practitioners) really must read.
It's about whether you can impugn a witness without putting the point in XX. supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uks…
2/ The case concerned the court's treatment of an expert report prayed in aid of a claim by Mr Griffiths for the serious stomach upset & longer term stomach problems he suffered following an all-inclusive Tui package holiday at a Turkish resort.
3/ Mr G relied on an expert report from a microbiologist, Prof P. Tui didn't rely on any expert report (they sought unsuccessfully to apply to rely on one at too late a stage) & called no witnesses to give evidence. They didn't require Prof P to attend court to be cross-examined.
🧵Garcha-Singh v BA: It wasn't unfair for BA to repeatedly extend the termination date in a medical incapacity dismissal - it was to G's advantage. There was also no need to provide an appeal against the final refusal to extend that date.
2/ G worked as long haul cabin crew. He was off for a year, 1st for physical health reasons & then stress reasons, at which point his employment was terminated with a little more than 4 months' notice.
3/ During the notice period. G returned to work, performing some duties albeit not his contractual role. BA decided to extend his notice period to allow him to demonstrate an ability to sustain a full flying roster, implying that if he did so the termination might not go ahead.
🧵Jackson v Uni Hospitals of North Midlands: EAT holds ET erred in law in finding a Hogg v Dover dismissal wasn't a Hogg v Dover dismissal. The EAT clarified that there's no special repudiatory breach threshold for a Hogg v Dover dismissal.
2/ J was a specialist research nurse, entitled to 4 weeks' notice of termination. In a restructure, she was placed in a lower grade research practitioner role, against her will (she'd refused to sign T&Cs). Those deciding on this hadn't appreciated this was a redundancy situation
3/ Because of that, J hadn't been offered a trial period in the new role, nor redundancy on enhanced contractual terms, which is what she sought. The contractual terms provided for a loss of enhancement if a person left their job prior to expiry of notice.