NEW: Using a massive database compiled on the Wagner Group by former Ukrainian intelligence officers, we found and interviewed half a dozen families who have lost sons, husbands or brothers in Vladimir Putin's mercenary army. A four-month investigation: newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-…
The story behind the story: In September, I traveled to Kyiv to do some reporting for my forthcoming GRU book. I was introduced to Gen. Ihor Guskov, a former counterintelligence officer at the SBU, Ukraine's domestic security service.
Guskov has spent the last seven years tracking every known Wagner fighter around the world.
With his onetime boss, Vasyl Hrytsak, Guskov now runs the Ukrainian Center of Analytics and Security, a think tank, that continues the work they started at the SBU.
Their database includes more than 4,000 Wagner fighters. Guskov gave me the whole thing.
Each entry includes a full name, date of birth, callsign, and a ton of photographs mined from social media for every documented fighter. In many cases, Guskov also found last known home addresses for the mercenaries.
Using the latter information, @newlinesmag and its partners @DelfiEE and @dagensnyheter tracked down family members of fallen fighters. All had similar stories to tell about how their relatives were recruited and died on foreign battlefields under the veil of secrecy.
E.g. "Mark didn’t have any military experience that his mother is aware of. Natalya tried to persuade him not to go, but he insisted. 'I said I was against it, but he just said, "Mom, I love you." And that was it,' Natalya says."
"Just a little over a month later Mark was killed. 'He was just cannon fodder,' Natalya says."
Most of the Wagner fighters we profiled are buried in a cemetery in Rostov. Their families have been told not to ask questions or seek any kind of restitution if they ever intend to cross into Russia to visit the gravesites. Some aren't even convinced their loved one is gone.
“How do I know that my brother is dead? I have no death certificate or anything,” asks Oleg, the brother of Aleksandr Motinga, who joined Wagner and is believed to have died in Syria in 2017.
It was virtually the same story everywhere we went: poor young men with little to no schooling, often from broken or violent homes, lured by ambiguous online adverts with promises of foreign adventure and small fortunes.
One mercenary, Vladislav Apostol, was from a little-populated village near Chișinau. He became notorious after a video surfaced in 2017 showing Apostol and four other Wagner fighters torturing and mutilating Hamadi Bouta, a deserter from the Syrian army.
They bludgeoned, dismembered and immolated Bouta -- on camera. Then they took selfies.
Apostol wielded a sledgehammer.
In the EU's sanctions package announced this week, that gruesome snuff film was cited as one of the many war crimes Wagner is guilty of.
Dmitry Utkin, the former GRU officer who commands the group, is accused of having ordered this atrocity as well as the filming of it.
Apostol was killed in that famous firefight with US-backed forces (and US aircraft) near the Conoco gas plant in eastern Syria in March 2018.
Using Gen. Guskov's dataset, we were also able to conduct a demographic analysis of the Wagner Group.
"Among the 4,184 individuals in the database, fighters have come from 15 different countries, and some have multiple citizenships. The majority, 2,708, unsurprisingly hail from Russia, 222 from Ukraine, 17 from Belarus, 11 from Kazakhstan, nine from Moldova, eight from Serbia..."
"four from Armenia, four from Uzbekistan, three from Bosnia and Herzegovina, two from Kyrgyzstan, two from Tajikistan, two from Syria, two from Turkmenistan and one from Georgia." Some have dual or multiple citizenships.
With respect to fatalities, we found that of "the 372 confirmed dead, 75 are known to have died from 2014 to 2016, 186 in 2017 and 86 in 2018."
According to Hrytsak, the former SBU chief, it is nonsensical to describe Wagner as a "private military company." It is, he says, "Russian military intelligence" and it poses a serious danger not only to Ukraine and the MENA region, but globally.
“If they need to recruit 100 people tomorrow to do something illegal in Europe, these people will fly in dressed in civilian clothes...They will assemble, put on uniforms and take up arms. One small group can very quickly destabilize the situation in any country."
Today's front-page story in @dagensnyheter: "The mercenaries are fighting in Putin's secret army."
And @DelfiEE's ad for the investigation, broadcast in snowy Tallinn:
NEW: A Syrian army deserter was savagely beaten to death and mutilated on camera by soldiers of the notorious Wagner Group in eastern Syria in 2017. Now his family wants justice. Report by @newlinesmag and Sweden’s @dagensnyheternewlinesmag.com/reportage/fami…
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Darren Beattie, the MAGA appointee who dismantled the State Department’s counter-disinformation program, “is married to a woman whose uncle has taken several roles in Russian politics and once received a personal ‘thank you’ message from Vladimir Putin.” archive.ph/Q818Z
You really cannot make this up: “The funny thing is just about every Western institution would improve in quality if it were directly infiltrated and controlled by Putin,” [Beattie] wrote in September 2021.
“Beattie has deleted disparaging tweets about Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state, having previously claimed his now-boss attended ‘gay foam parties.’” Cc: @SecRubio
Nice story in @DelfiEE on how Russia paid young "protestors" 1,000 rubles (10 euros) each to stand outside eleven embassies of EU nations in Moscow before the May 9th parade: delfi.ee/artikkel/12037…
Payments were likely made with mobile app transfer on-site after the event. A list of those who responded to calls in chat groups was compiled so that the police would know whom not to detain. Screenshots not in the article below but shown to me demonstrate this fee-for-service arrangement:
Despite many central streets in Moscow being closed due to preparations for May 9th, participants were able to move freely from one embassy to another. How do you like that?
I've been emphasizing lately the unintended consequences of Trump's headlong embrace of Russia -- consequences not wholly undesirable for Russia. While it's wonderful for Moscow to see an American president so eager to realign with Russia's strategic interests, and so keen to denigrate and alienate American allies in that re-alignment, smarter figures in the Kremlin realize the hazards of such an embarrassment of riches. A helpful constant in this administration's rush to give Putin everything all at once is that the worst capitulationist ideas are being stress-tested in the media and in the GOP almost as soon as they're invented -- and often *before* the Trump administration has agreed on whether or not they're feasible. One of ideas these is that the U.S. will recognize Crimea as Russian territory.
As you might expect, this was Steve Witkoff's proposal, which is to say it was Vladimir Putin's. Dim Philby isn't so much an envoy as an unblinking relay of Putin's maximalist demands, all of which he presents to Trump as eminently reasonable, if not accomplished facts. (Recall Witkoff's lie that Russia was in full control of the Ukrainian regions it "annexed," regions Witkoff doesn't know the names of, when it is in full control of none of them.) The "Krym Nash" brain fart, I'm told, happened without any inter-agency coordination or buy-in from the principals, least of all Marco Rubio, who is at odds with Witkoff on this and on much else, regardless of the flattering tweets he is obliged to post about his scandalous colleague. Now notice this little nuance in the WSJ story cited above:
"Senior State Department official," indeed. You can almost hear the whirr of the backpedal in that paragraph. Giving up Crimea in a de facto or de jure capacity is a non-starter for Ukraine, as any junior State Department official can tell you. Zelensky could never sell it domestically even if he wanted to (and he doesn't) because the the political blowback would be severe and almost certainly unite opposition to both the policy and his presidency in a way that would make the resistance he experienced over the Steinmeier Formula look coy. (This might even result in a far more nationalistic and hawkish political figure to emerge as frontrunner for the Ukrainian presidency; exactly the opposite of what the Putin-Vance-Carlson triumvirate has been angling for.)
America's "washing its hands" of Ukraine-Russia talks can mean several things. First and foremost, it would mean ending this Witkoff/Rubio fandango to attain (or impose) a Russia-favorable peace deal of some kind, which reportedly would include de facto ceding occupied territory to Moscow. But what else does an American walk-away entail? Some unresolved questions below:
1. It is a near certainty that no additional military aid packages will come from this administration once the Biden-era ones run out. But does that mean Trump will refuse to sell weapons and ammunition directly or indirectly to Ukraine? Does it mean he will actively slap end user restrictions on European countries from buying American kit for the express purpose of donating it to Ukraine? (Even Rubio alluded to Ukraine's right to bilateral agreements with other countries.)
Right now, Germany continues to supply Kyiv with Patriot missiles. Long-range air defense is one of three critical areas in security assistance where Europe cannot yet compensate for the absence of American platforms, the other two being rocket artillery and howitzer ammunition. So new European aid packages featuring U.S.-made hardware seriously matter. Does Trump's pivot to Moscow include his limiting U.S. arms exports to Europe, something that would grievously harm the American arms industry beyond the harm Trump already inflicted on it with his attacks on transatlanticism, NATO, etc.? Between 2020 and 2024, Europe overtook the Middle East as the largest region for U.S. arms exports for the first time in two decades. Now, this government is clearly not above economic own goals, but it'll nonetheless be interesting to see how it sells a new dawn with Russia -- one without a concomitant peace -- as the price worth paying for crippling the American military-industrial complex.
2. Does Trump lift some or most sanctions on Russia in the absence of a peace deal? He might in pursuit of rapprochement, but even here he'll find it difficult to give Putin everything he wants with the stroke of a pen. Some of the toughest sanctions, including those on Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, are tied to Congressional notification/approval, thanks to Biden. Trump would also face some headwinds from Republicans on the Hill, who would not be happy with sanctions relief in exchange for nothing.
Moreover, Europe gets a vote.
SWIFT, which Moscow wanted its agricultural bank reconnected to as a precondition for a ceasefire, is based in Brussels. EU sanctions legislation is by consent. So far, there has been *no* indication the EU is considering lifting sanctions on Russia, whatever D.C. says, does or agrees to. The opposite, in fact, is the case: the EU has been discussing ways to increase sanctions on Russia in coordination with the UK: archive.ph/qsVfc
Excellent analysis by Kiel Institute. Some conclusions track with what @JimmySecUK wrote for @newlinesmag here: newlinesmag.com/argument/can-e…
“To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do.”
“Currently, European governments contribute about €44 billion annually to Ukraine’s defense, or roughly 0.1% of their
combined GDP, a relatively modest fiscal commitment. To replace total US aid, Europe would need to increase its annual support to approximately €82 billion per year, or 0.21% of GDP —essentially
doubling its current financial effort.
the United States allocated just 0.15% of their GDP per year to Ukraine, European states the 0.13%, and the EU institutions just below the 0.1%.”