NEW: Using a massive database compiled on the Wagner Group by former Ukrainian intelligence officers, we found and interviewed half a dozen families who have lost sons, husbands or brothers in Vladimir Putin's mercenary army. A four-month investigation: newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-…
The story behind the story: In September, I traveled to Kyiv to do some reporting for my forthcoming GRU book. I was introduced to Gen. Ihor Guskov, a former counterintelligence officer at the SBU, Ukraine's domestic security service.
Guskov has spent the last seven years tracking every known Wagner fighter around the world.
With his onetime boss, Vasyl Hrytsak, Guskov now runs the Ukrainian Center of Analytics and Security, a think tank, that continues the work they started at the SBU.
Their database includes more than 4,000 Wagner fighters. Guskov gave me the whole thing.
Each entry includes a full name, date of birth, callsign, and a ton of photographs mined from social media for every documented fighter. In many cases, Guskov also found last known home addresses for the mercenaries.
Using the latter information, @newlinesmag and its partners @DelfiEE and @dagensnyheter tracked down family members of fallen fighters. All had similar stories to tell about how their relatives were recruited and died on foreign battlefields under the veil of secrecy.
E.g. "Mark didn’t have any military experience that his mother is aware of. Natalya tried to persuade him not to go, but he insisted. 'I said I was against it, but he just said, "Mom, I love you." And that was it,' Natalya says."
"Just a little over a month later Mark was killed. 'He was just cannon fodder,' Natalya says."
Most of the Wagner fighters we profiled are buried in a cemetery in Rostov. Their families have been told not to ask questions or seek any kind of restitution if they ever intend to cross into Russia to visit the gravesites. Some aren't even convinced their loved one is gone.
“How do I know that my brother is dead? I have no death certificate or anything,” asks Oleg, the brother of Aleksandr Motinga, who joined Wagner and is believed to have died in Syria in 2017.
It was virtually the same story everywhere we went: poor young men with little to no schooling, often from broken or violent homes, lured by ambiguous online adverts with promises of foreign adventure and small fortunes.
One mercenary, Vladislav Apostol, was from a little-populated village near Chișinau. He became notorious after a video surfaced in 2017 showing Apostol and four other Wagner fighters torturing and mutilating Hamadi Bouta, a deserter from the Syrian army.
They bludgeoned, dismembered and immolated Bouta -- on camera. Then they took selfies.
Apostol wielded a sledgehammer.
In the EU's sanctions package announced this week, that gruesome snuff film was cited as one of the many war crimes Wagner is guilty of.
Dmitry Utkin, the former GRU officer who commands the group, is accused of having ordered this atrocity as well as the filming of it.
Apostol was killed in that famous firefight with US-backed forces (and US aircraft) near the Conoco gas plant in eastern Syria in March 2018.
Using Gen. Guskov's dataset, we were also able to conduct a demographic analysis of the Wagner Group.
"Among the 4,184 individuals in the database, fighters have come from 15 different countries, and some have multiple citizenships. The majority, 2,708, unsurprisingly hail from Russia, 222 from Ukraine, 17 from Belarus, 11 from Kazakhstan, nine from Moldova, eight from Serbia..."
"four from Armenia, four from Uzbekistan, three from Bosnia and Herzegovina, two from Kyrgyzstan, two from Tajikistan, two from Syria, two from Turkmenistan and one from Georgia." Some have dual or multiple citizenships.
With respect to fatalities, we found that of "the 372 confirmed dead, 75 are known to have died from 2014 to 2016, 186 in 2017 and 86 in 2018."
According to Hrytsak, the former SBU chief, it is nonsensical to describe Wagner as a "private military company." It is, he says, "Russian military intelligence" and it poses a serious danger not only to Ukraine and the MENA region, but globally.
“If they need to recruit 100 people tomorrow to do something illegal in Europe, these people will fly in dressed in civilian clothes...They will assemble, put on uniforms and take up arms. One small group can very quickly destabilize the situation in any country."
Today's front-page story in @dagensnyheter: "The mercenaries are fighting in Putin's secret army."
And @DelfiEE's ad for the investigation, broadcast in snowy Tallinn:
NEW: A Syrian army deserter was savagely beaten to death and mutilated on camera by soldiers of the notorious Wagner Group in eastern Syria in 2017. Now his family wants justice. Report by @newlinesmag and Sweden’s @dagensnyheternewlinesmag.com/reportage/fami…
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"The situation on the frontlines has not significantly changed in the last month. For UA, the most difficult area remains the southern part of the eastern front—Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. RU continues to advance there, but very slowly and at the cost of heavy losses."
"Some bloggers claim that Kurakhove has already fallen into RU's hands, but it seems that this is not yet the case. UA continues to resist, but after some time, RU will take the town. Pokrovsk is farther away, and urban battles there could last a long time. There is no real threat of RU capturing it within a couple of months."
Breaking: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has released an unclassified report into the IC and its work on Havana Syndrome, or Anomalous Health Incidents. From the first lines of the executive summary: "It appears increasingly likely that a foreign adversary is behind some AHIs."
Last March @InsiderEng and @60Minutes concluded a yearlong investigation pointing at evidence that Russian military intelligence -- specifically GRU Unit 29155 -- was likely behind AHI. You can read that here: theins.ru/en/politics/27…
Rare opportunity for the Tukrs here. IRGC/proxies are a busted flush. Russia is busy elsewhere, in a battle space where Erdogan has quietly armed the opposing side to rather impressive result (while not antagonizing VVP as other NATO allies have). Erdogan and Fidan are thoroughly and utterly fed up with Assad's BS on normalization.
Moreover, Erdogan sees the incoming Trump administration as far more malleable and accommodating than the outgoing Biden one. Brett McGurk ain't coming back this time. If the U.S. withdraws from Syria, the previous plan of handing the American-PKK protectorate in the Jazira over to Russia is now a dead letter. With what fucking army? Prigozhin's Conoco contracts seem a distant memory now, too.
New: Remember "Pablo Gonzalez," the GRU illegal traded back to Russia in August? He posed for years as a Spanish journalist. A #FreePablo campaign was undertaken by various press freedom organizations when he was arrested in Poland on charges of espionage. Well, guess who gave him a big old hug at Vnukovo Airport when Pablo touched down? This guy.👇
Oleg Sotnikov is a GRU officer and team member of Unit 26165, or "Fancy Bear," which is responsible for the 2016 DNC hack. He helped with the close access hacking of the OPCW in The Hague, and also anti-doping organizations, including USADA, for which he was indicted in District Court in PA. Sotnikov was consul in Rio during the Brazil Olympics in 2016, when over a hundred Russian athletes were caught cheating with performance enhancing drugs. Our story below: theins.ru/en/politics/27…
Rather odd for a Spanish correspondent to immediately recognize and embrace an internationally wanted member of Russian military intelligence, isn't it. But there it is (at left), live on Russian TV, right behind you-know-who. We ran facial recognition software to ID Sotnikov.
New "Karl" thread, the first since the U.S. election, with @holger_r:
"RU is pushing hard on 2-3 fronts. On the Kursk front, they have managed to gain control over a third of the territory occupied by UA. I don’t see RU being able to push UA out of Kursk within this year or by the time Trump takes office on Jan 20. Their pace of progress is slow everywhere on the front."
"The second front where UA continues to struggle is the southern part of the eastern front, from Pokrovsk to Vuhledar. There, UA’s progress is happening continuously, even if it is slow."
New insights from "Karl," the Estonian military analyst, as told to @holger_r and me: 🧵
"Last time, we discussed that the situation near Vuhledar had become critical for UA. By now, it has been abandoned. In summary, RU's offensive toward Vuhledar began a year ago with an attack on Novomykhailivka. The situation in Vuhledar itself started to become uncomfortable a few months ago."
"The main reason RU is advancing there—like along the entire eastern front—is that it's hard to defend against Russian bombs. If RU bombers get close and drop glide bombs, sooner or later UA positions are destroyed, and they must retreat."