Thread by @DrAlakbarov

Thread. 2022 will be a huge year in Russian foreign policy.

China and Russia have strengthened their political, economic and military relations in 2021 and they will be bolstering this partnership even more this year.

Moscow looks to Beijing for support of its goal in occupying parts of Ukraine, as well as a conduit to show Moscow can still play a role in Asia.

Meanwhile, Beijing needs Russian weapons, energy and support against Western pressure.

Expect typical old-fashioned balance of power

In Syria, Russia often uses its air superiority in Idlib as leverage against Turkey by targeting refugee camps and creating a new mass migration wave toward the country.

Moscow likely try to push for Turkish political concessions in its role as the guarantor of power to the Syrian opposition.

But Ankara could use this chance to put pressure on Moscow over the YPG.

Both Russia and Turkey is going to re-calculate the balance in their complex relations.

Of course, the US policy on Syria will determine the future of the normalisation efforts with the Assad regime and the power balance between Ankara and Moscow in Syria.

In Syria and Libya, Moscow and Ankara back opposing sides but have generally cooperated in trying to reduce conflict.

In South Caucasus, Ankara and Moscow are also cooperating in a diplomatic push to bring stability to the South Caucasus following Azerbaijan’s victory during the II Karabakh war.

Armenia and Turkey's special envoys are expected to meet in Moscow this month to kick-start talks on normalizing relations as part of a broader the Kremlin-mediated regional peace effort involving Armenia and Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan.

Iran and Russia both gave upbeat views on Tuesday about talks that kicked off this week to salvage Tehran's 2015 nuclear deal with global powers, although Western states have said the negotiations are going too slowly.

In Belarus, Lukashenko is likely to invite a much larger Russian footprint as a show of support for the regime.

Although a permanent military base is yet to exist, Putin has been pressuring Minsk since 2015.

While integration is Russia's number #1 goal, any instability in Belarus is seen as an unwelcome inconvenience by the Kremlin, as Lukashenko’s fury towards his neighbors could lead to an accidental flare up.

Belarusian independence has slowly shrinked as the Kremlin’s military presence expands in the country and may signal the end of previously enjoyed sovereignty.

In South America, Putin's key ally President Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, not only survived 2021 but also started bolstering his position in the region thanks to a new left-wing wave on the continent.

It's going to be a win - win for Russia if the left-wing candidate wins in Colombia, while Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva manages to defeat Bolsonaro in Brazil.

However, Cuban-Russian relations are started to weaken as the country is seeking more aid from Moscow.

Speaking of the US, to quote @DimitarBechev:

"Brezhnev’s USSR may be long gone and today’s Russia may be a pale shadow of its predecessor, but from the Kremlin’s perspective, it is doing its best to stay in the game."