Thread by @cjcmichel

I know no one wants to talk about it, but state fracture in Northern Kazakhstan isn’t something that can be dismissed out of hand (especially given the past few years, and as KZ’s political scene turns turbulent). Quick thread 🧵:

In 1991, Yeltsin’s office claimed Russia had the right to “revisit” four different borders in the post-Soviet region.

1. Abkhazia (Russia invaded in 2008)
2. Crimea (invaded 2014)
3. Donbas (invaded 2014)
4. Northern Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan moved its capital to Astana in 1997, predicated (in part) on deterring regional separatist sentiment.

A few years later, an actual separatist plot fizzled (connected to, of all people, the fascist Eduard Limonov).

In 2014, shortly after launching the invasion of Ukraine, Putin claimed Kazakhs had “never had statehood,” and opted not to push back against the question of whether Kazakhstan could face a “Ukrainian scenario upon Nazarbayev’s departure.”

By the mid-2010s, (well-educated!) ethnic Russians in the region I spoke with were describing Kazakhstan as a “virtual” country (a “Bantustan”), and that Moscow could only trust its military, and no one else.

By the early 2020s, Duma deputies were *still* calling into question Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity. rferl.org/a/russia-lawma…

Is territorial fracture likely? Not at all. Is it something to at least pay attention to? Yes, especially as Nazarbayev—who, everything else aside, was at least seen as a bulwark of KZ’s multiethnic identity—suddenly appears potentially done.

There's incredibly little survey data/reporting on the topic of ethnic Russian separatism in Northern Kazakhstan, but this bit from @joannalillis's book points to the little we've seen:

https://twitter.com/cjcmichel/status/1087425865019998208

Another person who called for Russia to annex Northern Kazakhstan: Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

theatlantic.com/international/…

After an unprecedented few days, questions about Kazakhstan’s stability are suddenly wide open.

And so are questions about where northern Kazakhstan—and relations with Russia—might be going.

My latest: foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/06/kaz…

‘It’s a sword of Damocles that hangs over the heads of the Kazakhs because they know that, at any point, Russia could send in its little green men.’ wsj.com/articles/kazak…