I've got several DMs where folks are telling me it's hard to get logs. Yes. I agree. It's also table stakes. If you cannot get logs, hire someone who can... or get a contractor to help. Saying "it's hard" is true... but you 100% need those logs.
It's uncharacteristically harsh of me to say this... I don't care if it's hard for you to get those logs. GET THEM. If you cannot get them you no shot of stopping attackers.

Prevent is great, but it's not nearly enough. You must be able to detect. Logs are how you do this.
If your org isn't allowing you to get the logs for $reasons, maybe you need to leave. This is a no excuses thing. I cannot overstate this. I cannot believe I'm having folks argue this. I take comfort that they're embarrassed enough to only do this in DMs. They know it's bad.
Finally, I firmly reject the idea that costs prevents an org from logging. You may need to play games with retention, you may need to use a ton of open source components, but if you cannot log, IDK... my thinking at this point is your org isn't viable.
I want to be clear, I'm not talking fancy SIEMs and SOARs. I'm talking base logging. If you cannot do base logging, you need to rethink a LOT of things.

Ugh. Now I'm worried. I hope the "logs are too hard" crew is an edge case... but exp has shown likely not.

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More from @bettersafetynet

11 Jan
Blue team folks... we have to talk.

It's awesome that you're logging. That's the first step. Now here's the cool stuff to look for that the vendor didn't tell you about.
Pay careful attention to logs that stop coming in. If it's worth logging, it's worth monitoring when the logs stop flowing. (how long a gap you'll accept is up to you, but I rarely allow for over an hour)
Watch out for log sources where the time changes too much. (except for daylight savings changes)

Time drift is one of the most critical things to account for in log analysis. That's a given... but...
Read 8 tweets
23 Dec 21
Pen testers, we need to talk. Please listen up, take notes... and above all, ask questions.

A non-trivial part of my service portfolio is now reviewing the reports of other firms and either adjusting or providing missing context.

Read on for the common issues...
Most important: you need to give clients multiple options on how to fix something. MULTIPLE. At least 3. Telling them "fix the code" when it's from a vendor that's closed, doesn't help at all.
Show your work. There's a few firms that hide what they're doing. Some to the point where they just show a "ta da!" screenshot and don't explain how they did it... and frankly, that's weaksauce.
Read 10 tweets
11 Dec 21
Just got off phone with a client. Log4j is in their network. Vendor claims patch will be available next release... which is multiple months from now.

Here's what you do if you're in this situation.

1. Keep calm. There's no need to panic.
2. Carefully read this thread.

First, it's bad. It's a remote code execution meaning any attacker will almost certainly be able to run code of their choice on your systems.

If you can, please patch it's the easiest path. But you're reading this because you can't patch (for whatever reason) OK, let's go!
When dealing with attacks like this you should remember the acronym IMMA.

I = Isolate
M = Minimize
M = Monitor
A = Active Defense

I'll walk you through the IMMA model for the Log4j attacks we've seen so far.

Read 20 tweets
10 Dec 21
Boating update:
Mrs signed us up for a week long bootcamp style live aboard sailing adventure... however unlike earlier trainings we've done... this school sent us books 4 months out. With a warning... most take 6 months to do the homework. We have 4.
We were granted an exception since we've got prior experience. After looking at these books... I'm regretting asking for it.

There's just **so** much to learn.

I'm most worried about the night non-radio signaling & signal flags. Stuff I've never done before. :-/
If our paths cross over the next few months, and you hear me making odd dinging or horn sounds... I've not gone mad... I'm practicing overtaking in fog procedures. (which it's cool how nuanced the conversation can be... but like... wow it's also complex)
Read 4 tweets
8 Dec 21
HR & middle management folks... we need to talk.

Some management of people is done in the most non-nonsensical ways.

You may know that I mentor folks... like a lot of them.

Today one called me almost in tears. With permission here's a redacted version.
End of year evals are due soon. This person was told to rank each employee. Top 25% will get bonuses and put on advancement path. Bottom 25% will be put on PIP!

For those not aware PIP is Performance Improvement Program, it's basically the first step to being fired.
For a very large team you may have a bell curve distribution where this may be a viable approach. (I'd like to quibble at the numbers, but it's not THAT bad)

The issue is this approach is **horrible** for the small teams we tend to have in infosec.
Read 8 tweets
21 Apr 21
blue teamers:
We have to talk. Not everyone, but lots of us are writing really bad detects. Stop trying to detect the tool you will never win doing that. Detect the impacts.

A great example of this:
Responder is a great pen test tool (we use it on our offensive engagements and you should to)

You damn well better be looking for responder... but HOW you do that look is just as important as the fact that you do.

Perhaps the most frequently used mode of responder is the LLMNR function. This allows responder to trick Windows systems into giving up the currently logged in user's creds to the attacker who is on your local network, but not yet on the victim's system.
Read 6 tweets

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