Matthew Green is on BlueSky Profile picture
Jan 25, 2022 13 tweets 5 min read Read on X
I read the new location tracking complaint against Google filed by three state AGs and DC. It shouldn’t be surprising to anyone who is familiar with Google, but it’s pretty detailed. Thread. 1/
The basic allegation is that Google (mainly via Android) made it extremely difficult to turn off location data collection, and when people *did* try to turn this off, Google still collected and used location data for advertising.
As described in the complaint, there are basically three ways Google can get your location. (1) via GPS, (2) by monitoring nearby WiFi networks, (3) through IP address. Even if you turn GPS off, Google uses some of these. 2/
Once Google has your location information, the question is whether the user can stop them from recording it. As of 2018, Google seemed to make this possible through a Location History account setting. 3/
The Location History setting was described as “let[ting] Google save your location.” Presumably to ordinary non-technical users this language was about as clear as things get. According to the complaint, however, Google saved your location regardless of the setting. 4/
Specifically, Google has another “Web & App Activity” setting that also lets Google save your location. Because why have one setting when you can have many confusing ones? 5/
A brief interlude here to see what Google employees thought of these options. “[F]eels like it is designed to make things possible, but difficult enough that people won’t figure it out” is a solid quote. 6/
The complaint has a long section on “dark patterns” and this reads like a syllabus in a course on Silicon Valley privacy invasion. 7/
All the typical stuff: (1) presenting users with complicated opt-ins once at setup; (2) repeatedly “nudging” people who opt-out; (3) rewording dialog boxes to be less specific and maximize engagement; (4) hinting that apps “need” location history to work. It goes on. 8/
The one area where I felt j needed more detail was around the scanning of Wi-Fi networks. Even if you turn off GPS, companies like Google can determine your location by seeing nearby Wi-Fi. The complaint hints that Google does these even when you disable location. 9/
In fact, from context it feels like a lot of the redacted text in this document is about Wi-Fi geolocation. I hope future amended complaints get into the details. 10/
Final note: how did Google management feel about all of this? Was it all a big misunderstanding caused by good people trying hard not to be evil? Judge for yourself. 11/11 fin.
Here is the complaint so you can read for yourself. It’s only about 20 pages long. cdn.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus…

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More from @matthew_d_green

Mar 27
Ok, look people: Signal as a *protocol* is excellent. As a service it’s excellent. But as an application running on your phone, it’s… an application running on your consumer-grade phone. The targeted attacks people use on those devices are well known. Image
There is malware that targets and compromises phones. There has been malware that targets the Signal application. It’s an app that processes many different media types, and that means there’s almost certainly a vulnerability to be exploited at any given moment in time.
If you don’t know what this means, it means that you shouldn’t expect Signal to defend against nation-state malware. (But you also shouldn’t really expect any of the other stuff here, like Chrome, to defend you in that circumstance either.)
Read 5 tweets
Mar 25
You should use Signal. Seriously. There are other encrypted messaging apps out there, but I don’t have as much faith in their longevity. In particular I have major concerns about the sustainability of for-profit apps in our new “AI” world.
I have too many reasons to worry about this but that’s not really the point. The thing I’m worried about is that, as the only encrypted messenger people seem to *really* trust, Signal is going to end up being a target for too many people.
Signal was designed to be a consumer-grade messaging app. It’s really, really good for that purpose. And obviously “excellent consumer grade” has a lot of intersection with military-grade cryptography just because that’s how the world works. But it is being asked to do a lot!
Read 9 tweets
Feb 21
New public statement from Apple (sent to me privately):

“As of Friday, February 21, Apple can no longer offer Advanced Data Protection as a feature to new users in the UK.”
Additionally:

"Apple can no longer offer Advanced Data Protection (ADP) in the United Kingdom to new users and current UK users will eventually need to disable this security feature. ADP protects iCloud data with end-to-end encryption, which means the data can only be decrypted by the user who owns it, and only on their trusted devices. We are gravely disappointed that the protections provided by ADP will not be available to our customers in the UK given the continuing rise of data breaches and other threats to customer privacy. Enhancing the security of cloud storage with end-to-end encryption is more urgent than ever before. Apple remains committed to offering our users the highest level of security for their personal data and are hopeful that we will be able to do so in the future in the United Kingdom. As we have said many times before, we have never built a backdoor or master key to any of our products or services and we never will.”
This will not affect:

iMessage encryption
iCloud Keychain
FaceTime
Health data

These will remain end-to-end encrypted. Other services like iCloud Backup and Photos will not be end-to-end encrypted.
Read 5 tweets
Dec 29, 2024
What is this new setting that sends photo data to Apple servers and why is it default “on” at the bottom of my settings screen? Image
I understand that it uses differential privacy and some fancy cryptography, but I would have loved to know what this is before it was deployed and turned on by default without my consent.
This seems to involve two separate components. One that builds an index using differential privacy (set at some budget) and the other that does a homomorphic search?

Does this work well enough that I want it on? I don’t know. I wasn’t given the time to think about it.
Read 5 tweets
Sep 19, 2024
Most of cryptography research is developing a really nice mental model for what’s possible and impossible in the field, so you can avoid wasting time on dead ends. But every now and then someone kicks down a door and blows up that intuition, which is the best kind of result.
One of the most surprising privacy results of the last 5 years is the LMW “doubly efficient PIR” paper. The basic idea is that I can load an item from a public database without the operator seeing which item I’m loading & without it having to touch every item in the DB each time.
Short background: Private Information Retrieval isn’t a new idea. It lets me load items from a (remote) public database without the operator learning what item I’m asking for. But traditionally there’s a *huge* performance hit for doing this.
Read 14 tweets
Sep 12, 2024
The new and revived Chat Control regulation is back. It still appears to demand client side scanning in encrypted messengers. But removes “detection of new CSAM” and simply demands detection of known CSAM. However: it retains the option to change this requirement back.
For those who haven’t been paying attention, the EU Council and Commission have been relentlessly pushing a regulation that would break encryption. It died last year, but it’s back again — this time with Hungary in the driver’s seat. And the timelines are short. Image
The goal is to require all apps to scan messages for child sexual abuse content (at first: other types of content have been proposed, and will probably be added later.) This is not possible for encrypted messengers without new technology that may break encryption.
Read 4 tweets

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