Our understanding of AOPP is it that is some sort of API that wallet developers can incorporate that will automatically 'prove' ownership of a non custodial wallet to the exchange where the user is withdrawing from.
Here is why Samourai Wallet won't include support for AOPP
1) Undermines self custody. Ironically proponents of this say this will promote self custody by providing a regulated pathway. That is nonsense and by buying into this system you are legitimizing the concept that self custody requires permission & compliance.
2) Reveals a weak 'immune system'. The fact that so many developers of non custodial wallet software have seemingly bought into this system will only serve to bolster further incursions by regulators in the future as compliance among developers was high previously
3) Further undermining of the pseudonymity of Bitcoin. Tying identifying information to what is supposed to be a pseudonymous UTXO is a serious privacy concern by itself. Providing regulators with a cryptographic proof of your identity to a certain output is over the line
We don't yet attribute malice to the people behind the AOPP nor the developers who have made the decision to implement this API into their software. The endeavor is no doubt some misguided quest to improve experience for users.
The road to hell is paved with good intentions
We hope developers of non custodial bitcoin software will reconsider normalizing this kind of regulatory overeach by refusing to support the AOPP in their software.
We hope users who use service providers that require this kind of overreach reconsider their option to use them
Users who choose to make use of exchanges in hostile jurisdictions (like Switzerland) can of course manually sign a message with their private key, but we will NOT be facilitating this communication in any way using any API.
Samourai will not be a pipeline to mass surveillance.
A four part crash course in bitcoin privacy and blockchain analysis. Users armed with this knowledge are better prepared for evaluating the implications of spending and receiving and can begin to take steps to protect their privacy. 👇
Part 1/4
Basic Introduction to Chain Analysis And Transaction Privacy
This is called a Sybil attack, and the operator of this mixing software is admitting - and even laughing about it - that Sybilling their users is official company policy.
We first detected Sybil behaviour in Wasabi during the summer of 2019, which was flatly denied by the Wasabi team. Further to that, our staff were doxxed by Mr. Fiscor in retaliation for our disclosure.
At the time we had no reason to believe that Wasabi was Sybiling, though we labelled the entity "the friendly whale" as they always appeared when liquidity was low and needed a pick me up. We continued to research this as it was clear they wouldn't.
How to Whirlpool on mobile, a tweet thread tutorial
First, you need some coins in your wallet. The smallest amount you can mix is a little above 0.01005 BTC. If your wallet is empty, then add some funds using the "Receive" action
2/ Open Whirlpool by pressing the blue "+" in the bottom right corner of the screen. This will launch the Whirlpool service to get mixing started.
There exists an entity operating as a de-anonymizing “hot wallet” present within transactions by Wasabi since June 1, 2019. This entity has been clustered very easily due to flagrant address reuse, and downright bizarre behavior. This impacts ALL users since June.
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This entity participates in Wasabi transactions and enjoys an address reuse rate of over 60%. Of course, there should be 0% address reuse within any mixing platform, so something is not right. Let's look into it.
The two primary addresses of interest are Address A (bc1qutrq7rfhv56gdqn4m0nm8agygepxahd7cz3j8u) and Address B (bc1q2673rjvne7z9ncqnd7a2pxk6grkwzumgesgauj). Both addresses are active and have balances today and appear to participate in almost all Wasabi transactions since June 1,