I am teaching a graduate course on the “21st Century History Wars” this semester. If anybody is interested in following along here on Twitter, I’d be happy to keep a running diary of what we read and discuss. A few thoughts on the outline of the course and the idea behind it:
Not just in the United States, but on either side of the Atlantic, we are witnessing intense conflicts over questions of cultural hegemony and national identity that have catapulted debates over “history” to the top of the political agenda.
These are struggles over who gets to define the national story and what place the legacies of racism, slavery, colonialism, and imperialism should occupy in it – with serious implications for the political, social, and cultural order in the present.
These “history wars” provide an excellent window into the broader political, social, and cultural debates that define the U.S., in particular, and the “West” more generally – they are directly tied to current conflicts over multiracial, pluralistic democracy.
We start with a deep dive into past and present history wars in the U.S.: From the fight over National History Standards in the 90s to the current flurry of reactionary education / history bills on the state level, from the 1619 Project to the conflict over Confederate monuments.
We’re also exploring the inter- and transnational context: It was the killing of George Floyd in the summer of 2020 that led to a transatlantic wave of protests, acting as catalysts for broader debates over the past and present of colonialism and racism in the UK and elsewhere.
And we’re paying special attention to Germany, where a fierce new fight over how to study, teach, and remember the Holocaust, the so-called Catechism Debate, erupted in the summer of 2021 – not coincidentally at the height of the “History Wars” elsewhere in the “West.”
These German debates are interesting from a U.S. perspective, in particular, as the idea that America should “learn from the Germans” is so widely held over here, that Germany had somehow found a more honest, more productive way of handling the “Memory of Evil.”
Just when the idea of “Learning from the Germans” has been so widely applauded in the U.S., voices in Germany have become louder calling for a critical re-assessment of the German way of “working through the past,” diagnosing some deep and disconcerting flaws.
The overall goal of this course is to gain a better understanding of the ways in which “history” shapes the present, how it influences political, social, and cultural debates, who gets to define that “history” and what role historians, politicians, activists play in that process.
We want to examine why such conflicts over “history” come to the forefront of the political/social/cultural debate at specific moments in time, and explore them as reflections on national identity, with all the political consequences that entails.
I’ve never taught this course before, so it’s all a bit of an experiment and I am very much open to suggestions and ideas regarding readings and topics. I’m working with a fantastic group of students, and I am excited to find out where our discussions will go.
Very excited to find out that so many people are interested in following along. Wonderful. Once again: It will be an experiment. I’ll do my best to keep up over the course of the semester, outlining what we read, the issues we discuss, our main conclusions and open questions.
I think I’ll try to post an update every week, probably in the form of short, separate threads, otherwise this original thread would become unwieldy quite quickly. But I’ll always update this thread here with a link to those weekly reflections, so this can be the starting point.
The semester has already started, we are three weeks in - so as soon as I find the time, I’ll post an update on what we’ve been reading and discussing so far, before we’re set to revisit the 1619 Project next week. Excited to hear everybody’s thoughts and ideas!
People are suggesting a hashtag would be helpful, which I think makes sense. I’ll be using #GEST535 - simply because that’s the course’s official designation.
Also, a sincere apology in advance: It will be impossible to answer everyone’s questions or react to all the comments.
Finally, a warning: In addition to updates on the course, expect lots of U.S. politics and history. I focus on democracy and its discontents, and that’s obviously an acutely contested issue. I also write columns for @GuardianUS, if you’re interested. Here’s the latest:
Here’s the recap of Week 2: A look at some big-picture takes on the History Wars, and a discussion centered around how nationalist regimes deploy “memory laws” and whether American Liberals have abandoned the idea of progress in history.
Here’s the recap of Week 3: An attempt to contextualize the conflict over history education - and a reflection on “patriotic” visions of history and the project of creating national unity.
Why the Stakes in this Election Are So Enormously High
Democracy itself is on the ballot. If Trump wins, the extreme Right will be in a much better position than ever before to abolish it.
Some thoughts from my new piece - while we all nervously wait (link in bio):
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Consider this my closing argument: As of right now, only one of the two major parties in the United States, the Democratic Party, for all its many flaws, is a (small-d) democratic party. The other one is firmly in the hands of a radicalizing ethno-nationalist movement. 2/
The fault lines in the struggle over whether or not the democratic experiment should be continued map exactly onto the fault lines of the struggle between the two parties. Democracy is now a partisan issue. Therefore, in every election, democracy itself is on the ballot. 3/
Combine the myth of American exceptionalism, (willful) historical ignorance, and a lack of political imagination and the result is a situation in which a lot of people refuse to take the Trumpist threat seriously.
There is a pervasive idea that in a country like the United States, with a supposedly centuries-long tradition of stable, consolidated democracy, authoritarianism simply has no realistic chance to succeed, that “We” have never experienced authoritarianism.
But the political system that was stable for most of U.S. history was a white man’s democracy, or racial caste democracy. There is absolutely nothing old or consolidated about *multiracial, pluralistic democracy* in America. It only started less than 60 years ago.
Many Americans struggle to accept that democracy is young, fragile, and could actually collapse – a lack of imagination that dangerously blunts the response to the Trumpist Right.
Some thoughts from my new piece (link in bio):
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I wrote about the mix of a deep-seated mythology of American exceptionalism, progress gospel, lack of political understanding, and (willful) historical ignorance that has created a situation in which a lot of people simple refuse to take the Trumpist threat seriously. 2/
There is a lot of evidence that this election may be decided by a sizable group of people who strongly dislike Trump and his plans, but simply cannot imagine he would actually dare / manage to implement any of his promises and therefore aren’t mobilizing to vote. 3/
This warning was not coming from the Left. Although he rejects the label, Kagan is probably best described as a neocon. He’s an influential Never Trump Ex-Republican. And he believed that unless we changed course, America was on a trajectory towards a Trump dictatorship.
Nothing is ever inevitable. But what Kagan got right is that every political analysis needs to start from the recognition that there’s an eminently plausible and fairly straightforward path from where we are to autocratic rule. That’s even more obvious now than it was a year ago.
Crucial piece by @Mike_Podhorzer on how polls are obscuring the extremism of Trump’s plans.
A related thought: Since the mainstream discourse stipulates that extremism must be “fringe” in America, anything that has broad support is reflexively sanitized as *not* extremism.
This apologist sleight of hand is often deployed to provide cover for extreme forces within the GOP: If extremism is not defined by its ideological/political substance, but as “something fringe,” then the minute it becomes GOP mainstream, it ceases to be regarded as extremism.
Just like that, not only do extremist ideas and policies get automatically legitimized - by definition, the Republican Party, regardless of how substantively extreme, also gets treated as “normal” simply because it ain’t fringe, because it’s supported by almost half the country.
Trumpism is what a specifically American, twenty-first century version of fascism looks like. And in November, fascism is on the ballot.
Some thoughts from my new piece (link in bio):
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Donald Trump’s closing pitch to the American people is rage, intimidation, and vengeful violence. He is threatening – or promising, if you ask his supporters – fascism. No more plausible deniability for anyone who refuses to see the threat. 2/
Mere weeks before the election, I revisit the Fascism Debate and discuss where we stand after Trump has, even by his own standards, gone on a rampage recently. If anyone thought more evidence was needed before we could call it fascist, the Trumpists have certainly provided it. 3/