I think sometimes people are little too quick to claim that based on FACTS and LOGIC other people's risk preferences don't make sense.
For instance, I frequently see the claim that it's hypocritical or unreasonable to be willing to participate in a high-risk activity but then not be willing to participate in other lower risk activities.
The idea seems to be that a fully rational person would have some kind of fixed risk threshold. Below the risk threshold, the person would be willing to participate in the activity assuming it's something they find worth doing. Otherwise, they would decline.
I think this argument is actually flawed for a few reasons:
1. Risks add up! If I already take a lot of risks with my health, I might need to make up for that by being even more careful than average in other contexts. If I take big risks on everything in an attempt to be "consistent" then things might not end well.
I see people calling out governments for stuff like allowing restaurants to open but then disallowing less risky activities. The problem with that criticism is taking on the much bigger risk might be precisely why they can't afford to have any further risks on board.
2. The reasons why people take on risks matter to them. I might be willing to risk my health for work, or to be with family, but not for recreational activities. I might be willing to die in a war for my country but not die from covid for my employer.
People called out some public health advocates for supporting BLM marches while being pro-lockdowns, but I don't think this is obviously inconsistent at all. It might mean such people value social equality more than free markets (which is a pretty common preference to have).
3. I also think people have what seem like almost aesthetic preferences for the types of risks they wish to experience. For instance, a person with a phobia of spiders might be willing to share a room with a tiger over a tarantula.
Some people might have what amount to mild phobias about needles or cancer or dying hooked up to a ventilator. The fears might not be strong enough to qualify for a clinical diagnosis but it's enough to where it's no longer about the specific outcomes for them.
It's certainly irrational to have levels of fear that are disconnected from the potential harm, but experiences of fear are unpleasant in themselves. Given such fears, it doesn't seem hypocritical or irrational to me to act to reduce that unpleasantness.
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