The large number of forces Russia shifted from its Eastern Military District (12 BTGs+) to Belarus is illustrative of the degree of vulnerability Moscow is comfortable with China. The Russian Far East has probably not been stripped of combat power like this in decades. /1
This large deployment from EMD, unprecedented in contemporary history, offers one additional piece of evidence that the alignment liberates both states to pursue their respective contests, without having to invest as much in hedging against each other. 2/
If Moscow does go through with a large-scale military operation, this deployment will not be short lived. It suggests Eastern MD will be understrength for quite some time and it shows a degree of Russian confidence in the relationship. 3/
At the core of the alignment is a functional non-aggression pact, which enables both countries to pursue their respective contests. The implications are significant. For those interested, in 2020 I summarized my views on this subject in a WOTR piece. warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-em…
In the end its just one data point, but it is helpful in a broader conversation on whether we see signs of Russia demonstrating a degree of strategic vulnerability in its relationship with China, versus worrying about some sort of opportunistic Chinese irredentism.
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An update on the war following a recent trip. The situation has improved compared with Fall 2024. Russian offensive momentum slowed significantly over the winter, though it is premature to claim that the front has stabilized, especially following AFU withdrawal in Kursk. /1
Russian advances were stalled for three reasons: materiel exhaustion from losses in the fall, effective Ukrainian adaptation to how Russian forces were prosecuting offensive operations, and winter weather conditions which affected the pace of operations. 2/
This dynamic may not hold as we get further into the spring. Russian forces appear to be regrouping for renewed offensive operations. Ukrainian forces have improved tactically at countering how RF fight, employing UAS to compensate for a deficit of manpower at the front. 3/
The suspension of U.S. assistance for Ukraine is a very unfortunate and significant development, but it may not have immediate impact. Ukraine is far less dependent on the U.S. for day to day battlefield needs in 2025, than it was in earlier periods of the war. 1/
Ukraine’s current approach to defensive operations combines mines, strike drones, and traditional artillery fires to attrit Russian forces at 0-30km. Most of the casualties are now inflicted with mines, and drones, which are produced in Ukraine. 2/
Traditional artillery fires are less relevant at the moment, and there is a relative parity between the two sides. In combination with munitions recently delivered by the U.S. in recent months, which frontloaded supplies, Europeans could sustain Ukraine through this year. 3/
Brief thoughts on a European force for Ukraine. I think there is a degree of requirements paralysis. It doesn’t have to be hundreds of thousands of troops, or cover a 1200km contact line. Where it is deployed, and in what role, is more important than the overall size. 1/
The force does not need to be everywhere. It needs to be in country with battalions deployed on maybe 4 operational directions, and sufficient mobility to redeploy as necessary along the front. This can be as few as 3 brigades or their equivalents. 2/
A future Russian attack is going to come along a few predictable directions, and today most of the fighting is concentrated typically along 4-5 sectors of the front at a time. 3/
A long thread on the war and the current situation. Although the worst-case scenarios didn’t materialize in 2024, it was the most difficult period since spring 2022. There were positive developments, and bright spots, but the current trajectory is negative. 1/
First, a brief retrospective. Last winter things looked bleak. Ukraine was dealing with a deficit of manpower, low supplies of ammunition, and was only starting to establish a network of fortifications. Russia held the initiative, and the materiel advantage going into 2024. 2/
Even though Avdiivka fell, by summer it became clear that a collapse of UA frontlines was unlikely. Russia’s Kharkiv offensive was unsuccessful, and they couldn’t capitalize on the strain imposed. Early results from UA mobilization in June-July seemed positive. 3/
Sometimes oft repeated numbers need revisiting. One example is Russian artillery fire rates. These have generally been overestimated going back to 2022, along with ammo consumption rates, with sensational 60k per day figures. A short thread. 1/
First, what are we counting? The numbers given out are typically for main caliber artillery types: 152mm, 122mm, MLRS (300, 220, 122), and 120mm mortars. This figure is not inclusive of smaller infantry mortars, anti-tank guns, tanks used indirect fire roles, etc. 2/
Russian fire rates for 2022 were probably in the 15,000-20,000 range. Likely ~18,000 (see forthcoming podcast discussion on this). There’s little evidence that Russian fires reached 60,000 per day in 2022. The peaks were likely double the figure above, at 35,000-40,000. 3/
Thoughts following a recent field study in Ukraine. Ukraine faces difficult months of fighting ahead, but the situation at the front is better than it was this spring. More worrisome is the state of Ukraine’s air defense, and the damage from Russian strikes to the power grid. 1/
Ukraine’s manpower, fortifications, and ammunition situation is steadily improving. Russian forces are advancing in Donetsk, and likely to make further gains, but they have not been able to exploit the Kharkiv offensive into a major breakthrough. 2/
The Kharkiv front has stabilized, with the overall correlation of forces not favorable to Moscow there. Russian operations are focused on the following directions: Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Ocheretyne-Pokrovsk, and to a lesser extent Kupyansk. 3/