The large number of forces Russia shifted from its Eastern Military District (12 BTGs+) to Belarus is illustrative of the degree of vulnerability Moscow is comfortable with China. The Russian Far East has probably not been stripped of combat power like this in decades. /1
This large deployment from EMD, unprecedented in contemporary history, offers one additional piece of evidence that the alignment liberates both states to pursue their respective contests, without having to invest as much in hedging against each other. 2/
If Moscow does go through with a large-scale military operation, this deployment will not be short lived. It suggests Eastern MD will be understrength for quite some time and it shows a degree of Russian confidence in the relationship. 3/
At the core of the alignment is a functional non-aggression pact, which enables both countries to pursue their respective contests. The implications are significant. For those interested, in 2020 I summarized my views on this subject in a WOTR piece. warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-em…
In the end its just one data point, but it is helpful in a broader conversation on whether we see signs of Russia demonstrating a degree of strategic vulnerability in its relationship with China, versus worrying about some sort of opportunistic Chinese irredentism.
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An update on the war following a recent trip. Ukrainian forces are holding, but the situation has worsened since July due to mounting offensive pressure. Here I cover some of the negative and positive trends, along with the salient dynamics at the front. Long thread. 1/
Drones continue to be responsible for most daily casualties, with the front line defined by overlapping drone and artillery fire engagement zones 20-25km from the forward line of troops. This is commonly referred to as the ‘kill zone.’ 2/
One of the key dynamics this year has been a tug of war contest between Russian forces and the AFU over superiority in this kill zone, and its relative footprint. That in turn determines initiative on the ground, and the cost incurred in offensive, or defensive ops. 3/
As the situation in Pokrovsk becomes critical, and AFU reinforces the pocket to stabilize the flanks, there's considerable attention now to how this battle is unfolding. A few thoughts on the situation. 1/
The situation around Pokrovsk deteriorated over time as Russian forces kept infiltrating through the southern part of the city. Ukrainian positions grew increasingly thin. Worsening weather enabled Russian troops to get more men into the city in recent weeks. 2/
Earlier in the summer AFU units were working to stem the infiltration. The Russian advance at Dobropillia to some extent forced a shift of attention & resources. A lack of operational reserves has long resulted in a ‘firefighting’ approach to counter advances across the line. 3/
Russia’s advance near Dobropillia reflects the broader problematic dynamic, characterized by a lack of cohesive defensive lines, and undermanned units holding terrain, which can result in gradual then seemingly sudden shifts. Thread /1 (DeepStateMap)
The situation is still developing and hopefully will not result in a larger operational breakthrough, but this is a symptom of challenges and problems that many have been speaking to. I sought to cover them in this lengthy thread two weeks ago. /2
Advances around Pokrovsk had been blamed on RF diversionary-reconnaissance groups. But these are often just small assault infantry groups of 2/4/6 men, or motorcycle/buggy groups, which can bypass the porous defensive line if they can get past the drone coverage. 3/
An update on the war following a recent trip. As Russian offensive presume mounts, the front is not at risk of collapse, though salients have formed. More concerning is that Russian improvements in drone employment have reduced Ukraine’s advantages. Long thread. 1/
In 2024 AFU expanded drone units within the force. This helped offset Russia’s materiel advantage, while compensating for the AFU’s continued manpower deficit. These initiatives are now well known and I covered them in previous threads. 2/
Drones became responsible for most day-to-day casualties at the front, attriting Russian forces at 0-15km, and serving as the main force multiplier for the AFU. This enabled a low-density defending force to hold the 1200km+ front line, establishing defeat and denial zones. 3/
An update on the war following a recent trip. The situation has improved compared with Fall 2024. Russian offensive momentum slowed significantly over the winter, though it is premature to claim that the front has stabilized, especially following AFU withdrawal in Kursk. /1
Russian advances were stalled for three reasons: materiel exhaustion from losses in the fall, effective Ukrainian adaptation to how Russian forces were prosecuting offensive operations, and winter weather conditions which affected the pace of operations. 2/
This dynamic may not hold as we get further into the spring. Russian forces appear to be regrouping for renewed offensive operations. Ukrainian forces have improved tactically at countering how RF fight, employing UAS to compensate for a deficit of manpower at the front. 3/
The suspension of U.S. assistance for Ukraine is a very unfortunate and significant development, but it may not have immediate impact. Ukraine is far less dependent on the U.S. for day to day battlefield needs in 2025, than it was in earlier periods of the war. 1/
Ukraine’s current approach to defensive operations combines mines, strike drones, and traditional artillery fires to attrit Russian forces at 0-30km. Most of the casualties are now inflicted with mines, and drones, which are produced in Ukraine. 2/
Traditional artillery fires are less relevant at the moment, and there is a relative parity between the two sides. In combination with munitions recently delivered by the U.S. in recent months, which frontloaded supplies, Europeans could sustain Ukraine through this year. 3/