The large number of forces Russia shifted from its Eastern Military District (12 BTGs+) to Belarus is illustrative of the degree of vulnerability Moscow is comfortable with China. The Russian Far East has probably not been stripped of combat power like this in decades. /1
This large deployment from EMD, unprecedented in contemporary history, offers one additional piece of evidence that the alignment liberates both states to pursue their respective contests, without having to invest as much in hedging against each other. 2/
If Moscow does go through with a large-scale military operation, this deployment will not be short lived. It suggests Eastern MD will be understrength for quite some time and it shows a degree of Russian confidence in the relationship. 3/
At the core of the alignment is a functional non-aggression pact, which enables both countries to pursue their respective contests. The implications are significant. For those interested, in 2020 I summarized my views on this subject in a WOTR piece. warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-em…
In the end its just one data point, but it is helpful in a broader conversation on whether we see signs of Russia demonstrating a degree of strategic vulnerability in its relationship with China, versus worrying about some sort of opportunistic Chinese irredentism.
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Sometimes oft repeated numbers need revisiting. One example is Russian artillery fire rates. These have generally been overestimated going back to 2022, along with ammo consumption rates, with sensational 60k per day figures. A short thread. 1/
First, what are we counting? The numbers given out are typically for main caliber artillery types: 152mm, 122mm, MLRS (300, 220, 122), and 120mm mortars. This figure is not inclusive of smaller infantry mortars, anti-tank guns, tanks used indirect fire roles, etc. 2/
Russian fire rates for 2022 were probably in the 15,000-20,000 range. Likely ~18,000 (see forthcoming podcast discussion on this). There’s little evidence that Russian fires reached 60,000 per day in 2022. The peaks were likely double the figure above, at 35,000-40,000. 3/
Thoughts following a recent field study in Ukraine. Ukraine faces difficult months of fighting ahead, but the situation at the front is better than it was this spring. More worrisome is the state of Ukraine’s air defense, and the damage from Russian strikes to the power grid. 1/
Ukraine’s manpower, fortifications, and ammunition situation is steadily improving. Russian forces are advancing in Donetsk, and likely to make further gains, but they have not been able to exploit the Kharkiv offensive into a major breakthrough. 2/
The Kharkiv front has stabilized, with the overall correlation of forces not favorable to Moscow there. Russian operations are focused on the following directions: Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Ocheretyne-Pokrovsk, and to a lesser extent Kupyansk. 3/
Some brief thoughts following a recent field study trip to Ukraine. The current situation is difficult, but UA is working to stabilize the front. Much depends on whether the US provides support, and UA effectively addresses its manpower issues in the coming months. 1/
The main challenges are manpower, fortifications, and ammunition. These are interrelated problems. There is also the issue of sustainment, which needs to shift towards localization of maintenance, and spare parts production for a diverse park of Western equipment. 2/
Mobilization requires resourcing. Western assistance and UA manpower issues are connected. UA needs funding and training support. However, the lead times to resolve manpower issues are significantly greater than what it will take to ship ammo if the supplemental is passed. 3/
A few issues with that top line casualty number released, given it includes losses from convicts, and LDNR. On top of that a significant % are also mobilized personnel and contracted recruits. The total number cannot be applied to the original force in a meaningful way. 1/
Given prior estimates the range could be 270-315k on total casualties. It is fair to say the Russian army which existed on Feb 2022 has lost much of its original personnel, and ground force equipment, but the initial invasion force itself had sizable numbers of mobilized LDNR.
The initial invasion force was brittle. Since then Russia has had a structural manpower problem, which it has sought to resolve via piecemeal solutions, and partial mobilization. The issue of rotation, and a deficit of men to conduct it, remains a looming problem for next year.
A few thoughts on DPICM. Providing cluster munitions to Ukraine, at this stage, could have a significant impact beyond what other capabilities might achieve. Despite the drawbacks, unlocking this stockpile has important implications for the course of Ukraine's offensive. 1/
Ukraine's offensive is limited by the artillery ammunition available. The US, and other countries, provided a significant amount for this operation. Much of this was borrowed from South Korea. Without this ammunition it is difficult to imagine this offensive taking place. 2/
Progress has been slow, difficult, and without sustained breakthroughs thus far. While UA retains the bulk of its combat power, artillery use rate is likely higher than anticipated, especially as the past weeks have seen a largely attritional approach. 3/
A few thoughts on Prigozhin's armed insurrection/mutiny/rebellion. For now it appears over. Wagner seems to be standing down, and leaving Rostov for LNR. Prigozhin launched a mutiny that ultimately challenged Putin’s power, and the system. Thread. 1/
This was not a traditional coup, but with Putin’s video and FSB statements it became a challenge that would reveal the extent of brittleness in the regime. It wasn’t a good showing for Russian state capacity or competence to respond to this kind of challenge. 2/
I had long wondered whether Prigozhin understood something intuitively about the system, if the regime was fundamentally hollow, prominent members like Shoigu were weak, and Putin could be pressed into deals, etc. or if he was grossly miscalculating. 3/