Electoral fraud in Novosibirsk, Russia happening right now. Locals choose the new city talisman among animals from Novosibirsk zoo: wild cat, snow leopard, siberian tiger, polar bear and orangutan. Orangutan was winning till the Kremlin stepped in to steal his victory (thread)
Novosibirsk located in the south of Siberia is the third largest city in Russia after Moscow and St Petersburg. As most other Russian regions and municipalities it has little actual autonomy. Most of the key positions in the region are distributed among aliens - 'the Varyangians'
What does a Varangian mean? Let's go a bit deeper in history. The word Varangы (варяг) simply means 'Vikings', who according to Russian tradition played a key role in the earliest Russian state-building
According to Russian tradition, Slavs living in what is now Novgorod region tired from the constant internal fight and decided to invite rulers from abroad. 'Our land is vast and rich but orderless. Come to rule and reign over us'
So in 862 three Viking leaders came to rule and reign. Rurik settled in Novgorod, Sineus on the White Lake and Truvor in Izborsk.
See them on the map. Novgorod (Новгород), White Lake (Белоозеро) and Izborsk (Изборск) are mentioned as the first Viking strongholds from where they expanded southwards. Descendants of Rurik - or those guys who traced their genealogy to Rurik - ruled Russia since 862 till 1598
Is this story factually true? Not necessarily. The main source of the narrative - the Primary Chronicle - was compiled around 1113 - about 250 years later. Some authors argued it aimed to whitewash what was essentially a violent conquest, legitimising the rule of the conquerors
In modern Russian language the word Varyang (варяг) has two meanings. In historical context it is a Viking raider coming to a Slavic land and settling as a feudal lord. In political context however, it means sth different, though referring to the events of the bygone age
Before Putin came to power, the federal center was relatively weak, and regional elites - quite strong. In many respects they dared to show disobedience to the supreme power
Consider case of General Attorney of Russia Skuratov. Skuratov was investigating financial machinations with government obligations (ГКО). He investigated 800 important ppl, including cabinet members, officials of president's administration and even daughters of President Yeltsin
Skuratov went too far. He attacked not only ministers, but the family of president Yeltsin (or just 'the family', "семья", as it was called). Very soon a video tape showing 'a man looking like a general attorney' with two escort women was broadcasted on national TV
The investigation against Skuratov was personally directed by a young chief of the Federal Security Service - Vladimir Putin, who probably organised the entire operation. FSS indicted Skuratov with overstepping his legal powers
President Yeltsin ordered to lay off Skuratov for as long as the investigation lasts. However, the order had to be confirmed by the upper house of Russian parliament - the Federation Council. Here you see Skuratov talking with council members during the vote
Incredible it may sound, Federation Council refused to accept his resignation and insisted on Skuratov keeping his job. Why? Well, back then the federation council consisted from the governors and speakers of regional legislative assemblies. They were very independent from Moscow
In practice it was kinda House of Lords. They were very powerful people elected in their own regions and not owing much to the favour of president. To the contrary, they often tried to keep President at check
Consider Nemtsov then governor of Nizhny Novgorod. He organised collected a million signatures agains the Chechen War in 1996 in his region and delivered them to Yeltsin
Yeltsin asked:
— If you collected signatures all around the country, how many would you collect?
— 40 million
— Are these signatures for me or against?
— It depends on your actions. If you stop the war, they are for you, if not, then not
— I understood
What Yeltsin understood was that many regions were led by independent elites, who grew up there, were connected there and elected there. And thus they were people of conditional loyalty. Which might have worked unless Yeltsin had a family
'The family' (Семья) of Yeltsin was universally hated. Simply speaking they were accused of facilitating socio-economic collapse in order to enrich. E.g. the short-term loans led to the default in 1998 but enriched the main inside trader - Yeltsin's daughter Taryana Yumasheva
With Yeltsin's health quickly deteriorating, his alcoholism and heart attacks that constituted a major problem. What if he suddenly dies? Literally anyone who comes to power will attack Yeltsin's family to gain popularity. That was too predictable
They couldn't succeed themselves cuz they were unelectable. So they needed successor. Ofc they could demand guarantees of safety. But what if he breaks them? That was a huge problem. Any new president would have huge incentive to do a major investigation to gain popularity
A man without principles would betray them. A man with strong principles could too, valuing his public duty more than his personal obligations. A solution would be - finding a man whose main and single principle was personally loyalty. And Tatyana's husband Valentin found him
Putin started his career as an aide of Sobchak - the mayor of St Petersburg who was in opposition to Yeltsin. After Sobchak lost the election his activities were investigated and soon he was charged with corruption
His old boss defeated, Putin lost his old job. However, he soon got a new one - in Yeltsin's administration. In 1997, in his new capacity he organised the escape of his old boss to France, so he could avoid all charges and potential prison
That was a risky move. In other circumstances it could cost him his career. But not now. Under these grave conditions, Yeltsin's family saw him as a potential solution - a man with personal loyalty and a sense of gratitude
So Yeltsin's son in law Yumashev offered him to Yeltsin as a potential candidature and Yeltsin agreed. In May 1998 Putin becomes the Deputy Head of president's administration. In July - the Chief of Federal Security Service. In August - the Prime Minister
On the New Year Even 1999 Yeltsin declares his resignation - 3 months before his presidential term ended. And he appointed Putin as an acting head of the state. Till elections of course. That would happen in 3 months
That's a very interesting case. I often read absolutely delusional argument about Putin's regime being a sort of aberration from the normal constitutional order. That's a complete BS. Power in Russia never ever transitioned from one person to another as a result of elections
Since 1613 power in the country transitioned either through succession mechanism or through coup d'etat. But never through voting. Therefore, we have little reason to belief that the next transition will proceed through electoral mechanism. It never really did
On the bright side, Yeltsin's family made a right choice. Putin indeed was personally loyal and never betrayed his benefactor. His very first order as an acting president was to guarantee safety of an ex-president and his family and give them very wide material privileges
Immediately upon his succession, Putin starts dismantling entire structure of federalism. He saw autonomous elites and regional agency as a problem and sought unlimited power. In fact, Yeltsin could have exercised huge power, too. He was just more hesitant to use it. Putin wasn't
Well, first of all he fired Skuratov. Now the Federation Council succumbed. Then he changed the structure of this council - now it was comprised of his own appointees. Minus one check on power
Then he divided Russian territory to Federal Districts, each having a few regions under its jurisdiction. The Districts were led by President's Representatives - his personal appointees usually with the state security background
Then the gubernatorial elections were abolished. Interestingly enough, it was done in the context of the war on terror. After a school in Beslan was reportedly occupied by terrorists in 2003, Russian population lost the right to choose their governors - now Putin did it for them
Meanwhile Putin's minister of finance Kudrin launched the budget centralisation. In practice that meant that the regions were virtually dispossessed of independent income streams. Instead they had to rely on federal transfers which make them dependent on Kremlin's goodwill
Let me give you an example. Here you can see the map of budget transfers in Russia. Blue ones get more transfer cash from Moscow than they give to it, red ones get more transfers than they give. So almost all of the country is net-recipient. Does it make sense? Not really
While poverty of some regions is real, the poverty of others is very very questionable. In fact some of the regions listed here as recipients are very productive. Even the Samara Oblast with the top industrial production per capita in Russia is a net recipient of transfers. How?
There are two answers to this question. First of all - corporate centralisation. Under the federal pressure, smaller regionally-registered companies have to allow themselves to be absorbed by large federal-owned ones. Which mostly reside in Moscow/St Petersburg
Second, HQs of both state-owned and private companies are moved to Moscow at St Petersburg. For example a huge gas and oil producing SOE Gazprom is located in St Petersburg instead of northern Siberia where it actually extracts stuff
RUSAL - second largest producer of aluminium in the world is headquartered in Moscow. Its main production is concentrated in Siberia. Siberians who actually work there and have to suffer from pollutions RUSAL production creates get almost nothing. Cuz taxes r paid in Moscow
The list could be continued but it gives a general picture. Many Russian regions are reduced to poverty artificially. They r actually quite productive, it's just the value they produce streams to Moscow. So they r beggars dependent on the mercy of federal government
And finally let's talk of Varyangians. Once Putin started appointing governors, he gradually fired the old local ones and appointed complete strangers. In popular imagination they are compared with strangers that ruled Russia in early Middle Ages - hence, Varyangians
What makes a Varyag? Firstly, he has no connections to the region. He didn't live here, didn't make a career, has no network and no support here. So he is a personal appointee of the ruler completely dependent on him. Some are faceless federal bureaucrats looking like clones
Some are indeed career bureacrats. E.g. a chief of Moscow-based quango Nikitin appointed as a governor of Novgorod, despite never living there and having no connections to the region
Another pattern is appointing Putin's personal bodyguards as governors. Indeed governors of Tula, Yaroslavl, Astrakhan and Kaliningrad are Putin's former bodyguards with no political or civil service experience
A more weird case is appointment of an oligarch Boris Abramovich as a governor of Chukotka - the most remote Siberian region directly bordering Alaska. Here you see Abramovich with his new subjects
Here is Chukotka
Finally, a new law of Klishas Krasheninnikov which I will cover later gives federal government full authority over any regional ones. E.g. regional cabinets will be fully comprised of Moscow appointees and legislative assembly members will be considered federal civil servants
This policy has several consequences. First of all, as a result most of people who directly govern Russian regions are nomadic bandits. Not stationary ones. They are appointed there for a while and know they will be appointed somewhere else soon. They are not gonna root in
Thus they have no personal interest with the region's future. To the contrary, they have full incentive to such it dry asap. Much of destructive effect of 'corruption' in Russia is not so much greed as the short planning horizon
Furthermore, federal government is extremely wary of literally any forms of local agency and identity. The case with which I started might sound absurd. It indeed sounds absurd. However, while the Russian state is not so brutal in Moscow, it's extremely brutal in the province
This brutality may not be bloody, it usually isn't. It's rather a very thorough and systematic extirpation of any forms of agency, esp. those based on regional and provincial pride and identity. Any expression of this agency is suspicious. Including the city talisman elections
In this context, the sympathy of many American conservatives to Russia may look absurd. In fact, Putin's regime looks like conservative nightmare. Imagine all powerful DC grabbing all money and resources, and the entire country directly ruled by the whim of White House staffers
And yet, let me make one more observation. Assuming that Putin is a very personally loyal man, promoted mainly on basis of his personal loyalty to those who helped him on his way, what can we infer about his future actions? Especially regarding appointments?
My guess - look at those who helped him the most. Namely - on those who brought an unemployed staffer of a defeated city administration to Moscow and secured him job in the federal government. Putin was invited by another former Sobchak staffer now working for the feds - Kudrin
And who brought Kudrin to Moscow? Well, another former Sobchak's deputy - Anatoly Chubais, who then moved to Moscow and made a huge career in the federal government personally overseeing the privatisation of Soviet government property
Assuming all of this, the most trusted pool of Putin's cadres would be his old colleagues - Sobchak staffers and aides who regrouped around Putin after the defeat of their old boss. In a sense new regime was forged in the foundry of Sobchak's rather than Yeltsin's administration
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Wagner march was incredible, unprecedented to the extent most foreigners simply do not understand. Like, yes, Russia had its military coups in the 18th c. But those were the palace coups, all done by the Guards. Purely praetorian business with zero participation of the army.
Yes, there was a Kornilov affair in 1917, but that happened after the coup in capital. In March they overthrew the Tsar, then there was infighting in the capital, including a Bolshevik revolt in July, and only in September part of the army marches to St Petersburg.
Half a year after the coup. Not the same thing
I think the last time anything like that happened was in 1698, when the Musketeers marched on Moscow from the Western border. And then, next time, only in 2023.
(Army leaves the border/battlefield and marches on the capital without a previous praetorian coup in the capital)
As a person from a post-Soviet country, I could not but find the institutions of People’s Republic of China oddly familiar. For every major institution of the Communist Russia, I could find a direct equivalent in Communist China.
With one major exception:
China had no KGB
For a post-Soviet person, that was a shocking realisation. For us, a gigantic, centralised, all-permeating and all powerful state security system appears to be almost a natural phenomenon. The earth. The sky. Force of gravity. KGB
All basic properties of reality we live in
It was hard to come up with any explanation for why the PRC that evolved in a close cooperation with the USSR, that used to be its client state, that emulated its major institutions, failed to copy this seemingly prerequisite (?) institution of state power
Soviet output of armaments was absolutely gargantuan, massive, unbeatable. “Extraordinary by any standard” , it was impossible for any other country to compete with.
From 1975 to 1988, the Soviets produced four times as many ICBMs and SLBMs, twice as many nuclear submarines, five times as many bombers, six times as many SAMs, three times as many tanks and six times as many artillery pieces as the United States.
Impossible to compete with.
Which raises a question:
How could the USSR produce so much?
It is not only that the USSR invested every dime into the military production. It is also that the Soviet industry was designed for the very large volumes of output, and worked the best under these very large volumes
We are releasing our investigation on Roscosmos, covering a nearly exhaustive sample of Russian ICBM producing plants. We have investigated both primary ICBM/SLBM producers in Russia, a major producer of launchers, manufacturers of parts and components.
Each material includes an eclectic collection of sources, ranging from the TV propaganda to public tenders, and from the HR listings to academic dissertations. Combined altogether, they provide a holistic picture of Russian ICBM production base that no single type of source can.
Overall, you can expect tech moguls to have much, much higher level of reasoning abilities compared to the political/administrative class. But this comes at a cost. Their capacities for understanding the Other (masses count as the “Other”) are much poorer.
E.g. Putin is much, much less of an outlier in terms of intelligence compared to Thiel. He is much more average. At the same time, I am positively convinced that Putin understands the masses and works with masses much better.
One problem with that is that too much of the supply chain for drone production is located in China. The thing with drones is that they grew out of toys industry. Cheap plastic & electronic crap that all of a sudden got military significance
That is also the major problem I have with "China supports Russia" argument. China could wreck Ukraine easily, simply obstructing & delaying the drone/drone components shipments. That would be an instant military collapse for Ukraine.
Both Russian and Ukrainian drone industries are totally dependent upon the continuous shipments from China. To a very significant degree, their "production" is assembly from the Chinese components which are non alternative and cannot be substituted with anything else (as cheap).