Political institutions of the Golden Horde (thread)
Imperiogenesis argument is well known in Russia. Some cheer the Horde for laying foundations of vast empire. Others lament the orientalisation of Russia and adoption of 'Asian despotism'. But how did the Horde itself look like?
While the impact of the Horde on Russia was widely discussed, until recently there were few studies on political, legal, institutional tradition of the Horde. A great pile of literature focusing on this subject is appearing right now - there are even very decent works in English
Regarding the early, Mongol period, the honest answer would be - we don't know. General studies mention 'Yasa', the Mongol Code of laws allegedly introduced by Chinghis Khan. But was Yasa an actual document, statute, or a name for the Mongol common law? Scholars still debate
Actually the very notion of Yasa as an actual document was introduced by a French historian François Petis de la Croix in the 17th c. He didn't have a text of it, just assumed it existed. Later, Russian historians tried to reconstruct its text relying on Muslim sources
So even regarding Yasa we are not really sure if it was a statute or a common law tradition legitimised by the authority of Chinghis Khan
What we know very well however, is the post-Horde period. And the best documented successor of the Horde is the Crimean Khanate. While all the major cities of the Horde were destroyed with all their documents, Crimean cities survived and their archives survived, too
What does it mean? In Crimea we have not only 'sources-myths', but also 'sources-remains'. We have not only chronicles or royal decrees, but also court protocols, correspondence, etc. We know not only the theoretical legal norms, but also - the real legal and political practice
Let's start with politics. The term 'Khanate' implies it was led by the Khan. What was his role? Most scholars till recently just assumed the Khanate was an example of 'Oriental despotism'. This was considered obvious and rarely questioned. Until scholars started reading archives
Consider reports of Russian envoys to Crimea. What picture do they describe to their Tsar? Pretty interesting. First of all, Tsar should understand that the letters he's sending to Khan will be read publicly. And the Khan's letters to the Tsar will be checked collectively, too
This is unusual. All of Crimean aristocracy - Khan's brothers, nephews, cousins, leaders of important tribes, they all had right for the private and usually secret correspondence. The Khan being the only exception - all of his correspondence is checked by the tribal elders
In 1680 Vasilii Tyapkin, an envoy of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich to Murad-Giray's court writes to his master that during a plague, Khan 'not only received your letters personally, but even personally negotiated the diplomatic treaties which never happened under his predecessors'
So the personal and single-handed management of foreign affairs by Khan was possible only during the state of emergency. It wasn't a normal practice. And we have a reason to believe it wasn't a particular feature of Crimean system, but rather a political tradition of the Horde
For example in 1737 Bashkirs who rebelled against Russia invited a Kazakh Khan Abul Khair to rule over them. According to a Russian report, they made a condition that Abul Khair mustn't write or open letters without the knowledge of the tribal elders
These cases from such distant lands as Crimea and Bashkir territories which didn't have a direct connection with each other, imply that these limitations of royal power might be a part of an implicit, common law tradition which they probably inherit from the late Golden Horde
While culture of Crimean Khanate ilooked similar to the Ottoman and partially relied on the same sources (e.g. Hanafi madhab), it still differed. Although Shariah judges (wadis) played an important role, in Crimea private prosecution principle dominated over the public one
Private lawsuits were much more widespread here than in the Ottoman Empire and covered nearly all crimes including homicide. In the kadiasker archives there are even cases of subjects winning private lawsuits against a Khan, their sovereign
In a sense that was parallel to the Ottoman Empire. Many Western historians studying Ottoman archives were shocked by how often lower status individuals won cases against higher status ones. That could explain why early modern people - including very anti-Ottoman ones...
... mentioned the concept of Ottoman/Turkish justice as something self-obvious. That's a pretty common topos in the European literature of that age. However, in the Ottoman Empire it was unthinkable for subjects to sue their sovereign, let alone win
Krolikowska-Jedlinska suggests that 'the Crimean Khanate resembles, to some extent, the system of the limited monarchy. We cannot ignore the similarities between the political institutions in the Crimean Khanate and some of the limited monarchies that existed in Europe'
So the preliminary conclusion is - common argument about the 'Oriental despotism' of Crimean Khanate and post-Horde states is just false. In many respects the power of Khan is more limited than the power of most European monarchs who could at least manage foreign affairs
Does it mean however, that the Tatars played no role in the development of Moscow absolutism? Probably they did. Not in a sense that Moscow picked up absolutist practices from the Tatar states, but in a more indirect one
First of all, princes of Moscow became strong and relevant by working as tax collectors for the Horde. Thus they concentrated enough resources and bought enough land to become the dominant state in Russia. So the rise of Moscow was largely due to external influence of the Tatars
Internal infuence was no less important. Many waves of noble Tatars came here to Moscow with their kindred and armed retinue. They offered their service to the Prince of Moscow and in return were granted with land, serfs and numerous privileges
These troops worked not only as the military force against other Russian states (e.g. they probably played key role in the defeat of Novgorod) but also as internal force. Ostrowski and Nefedov argued that Tsars preferred to rely on Tatars to purge their rivals within Muscovy
If you think about it, it makes total sense. Yes, these guys were a terrifying force when concentrated. But they were scattered all over the alien and hostile country. They're Turks among Slavs, Muslims among Christians. They had no one but Tsar to look for support and protection
And their position was turning precarious, as they were losing Tsar's support. The fall of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1550s made them still useful, but not *that* necessary. Tsar started openly addressing them as his slaves, just as Russian nobles. They lost the right to leave freely
With the new Romanov dynasty coming to power in 1613 the pressure to baptise was gradually increasing. In the beginning Tsars tried to persuade them offering stimuli to accept Christianity. Indeed, those who agreed to convert were usually promoted and lavishly rewarded
With more people converting, the pressure on remaining ones increased. Aleksei Mikhailovich, while still luring some with promises ('convert and I'll marry you to my sister') started repressions and confiscations. The official reasoning was - Muslims shouldn't own Christian serfs
Not because of 'oppression' - that's modern and completely ahistorical interpretation, but because ownership of Christians by Muslims created risks of Muslims luring Christians in their religion. Considering how superficially Christian Russian peasantry was, that was a real risk
Under the regency of Sofya confiscations stopped and even partially reversed (on southern territories - Kasimov, Temnikov lands). Tatar levies helped her to supress Khovanchina revolt, so she backed off with the Christianisation measures
But then Peter I comes to power. In 1713 and 1715 he simply prohibits to Muslim landlords to own Christian Orthodox serfs, thus eliminating old Tatar landholding elites. They were given a choice between converting or losing their wealth and status
A very typical situation - one branch of family would refuse to convert, while other branch would agree. Usually the government would confiscate the lands and peasants of recusants and grant them to those who complied
Thus converts would become great lords while their non-conformist relatives would live in nearby villages dispossessed of their lands and status - as state peasants. They kept their personal freedom (=didn't become serfs) and that's it
But in every rule there're exceptions. That's a monument to the founder of Chelyabink - Qutlu-Muhammad Tevkelev. He was a Qasim Tatar nobleman who refused to convert. He still got promoted and Peter I granted him 3 000 Christian Orthodox serfs (breaking his own law)
Why? First of all the Russian ruler is not bound by his own laws. He doesn't have to be consistent. Second - Tevkelev was a useful collaborator. A Muslim Turk he genocided Muslim Turks - Bashkirs and secured Russian colonial expansion in the Urals
His negotiations with Kazakhs duribf the annexation of what is now north Kazakhstan are also quite telling. Kazakhs wanted to sign an equal treaty but Tevkelev responded that Russia "as a very glorious state in the world will not conclude any treaties with the steppe beasts"
Tevkelev's descendants continued to be large landowners and leaders of nobility in Ufa Governorate till the Revolution
(will continue in an hour or two)
While in general Tatar aristocracy was pressured to accept Orthodox Christianity, some found more creative solutions. For example, one of Girays - Khan dynasty of Crimea - married a Scottish woman and converted to Anglicanism. Here you see his son, also an Anglican
Certain relief happened during the reign of Paul I. Usually his decisions are dismissed as whims of a capricious man-child. I disagree. When you look at them combined altogether they look like a very consistent and well-thought policy somewhat similar to the later Korenization
One of his first orders 'Henceforth, Sevastopol should be called Ahtiyar, and Feodosiya - Kaffa'. Next time he ordered to call Simferopol - Akmecit, the White Mosque. Why?
When his mother Catherine II annexed Crimea she systematically changed local Tatar or Italian toponyms to Greek ones. A sort of heritage erasure conducted with a big reverence to Classical tradition and in the context of her Greek project
Paul was critical (to say the least) of his mother and her policies. So once he came to power he immediately restored the old toponyms in newly conquered territories. If his actions were motivated by personal vendetta, he would probably stop here. But he went much further
In annexed territories of Poland-Lithuania Polish language was made official again. Lithuanian statute was restored as the regional code of laws. Paul also restored old regional laws and institutions of Vyborg and Baltic governorates abolished by his mother
Around 600 Tatar families were restored in their noble status again (though not in wealth and power). Even more importantly, in year 1800 Paul for the first time allowed to print books in the Tatar language.
Tatars repeatedly petitioned to allow printing books and in 1797 Paul agreed. But the Senate sabotaged the initiative. In 1800 Paul agreed to the petition again and now forced the Senate to submit. So on 13 September 1800 the printing in Tatar was allowed for the first time
That's quite an interesting story. Paul has some of the darkest reputations among Russian rulers. Historian Karamzin claimed that for its entire history Russia endured only two tyrants - Ivan the Terrible and Paul
Meanwhile Paul was the first ruler who tried to relieve dispossessed groups - minorities and serfs. He limited the time serfs had to work for their owners by three days a week, prohibited to break up peasant families when selling them - you could sell family only as a whole, etc
As a result he remains in historical memory as an insane tyrant rightfully killed by his own guards. This was the only military coup in Russian history conducted only by officers with no soldiers participating. Paul was super popular among soldiers, super unpopular among officers
So let's summarise what I told today about the Horde and imperiogenesis in Russia. Horde itself wasn't an 'absolute' or 'despotic' entity, and its successor states certainly weren't. However, the Horde delegated taxing and policing of Russia to Moscow and thus secured its rise
Furthermore, participation of Tatars in Muscovite army increased power of Prince in dealing not only with external enemies, but also with internal rivals. Position of Tatars was precarious and thus they had to be more personally loyal to the Prince than Russian Christian noblemen
Hypothesis: one of many reasons of relative weakness of royal power in Poland-Lithuania comparing to Muscovy could be the shortage of Tatars. I am pretty sure that if there were more of them, imperiogenesis would go very much faster. But I'll cover it next time
Let me mention some of the literature I used. I don't want to burden you with tons of books, so I will mention only very good and very relevant ones. A great study of diplomatic sources covering the relations of Russia and the Steppe. Pochekaev: From vassals to suzerains
On Tatar enclaves in Muscovy and how the status of Tatar aristocracy was changing as Moscow needed them less and lesss. Rahimzyanov: Moscow and the Tatar world
Social and family history of the Tatar aristocracy in Russia with the focus on souther frontier. Interesting because the frontier of Moscow and steppe for a very long time lied through Qasimov Khanate and Temnikov principalities. Yenikeev: Study on the history of Tatar nobility
And finally an amazing book by Krolikowska-Jedlinska on the legal and institutional culture of the Crimean Khanate. Bonus point - it's in English. The amount of labour and expertise invested here is really terrifying
End of thread - next time I will write on how did Volga became Muslim. Although the Islamic rule was established in 922 and fall in 1552 the mass Islamization happened in 18-19th cc, when Islam was a second class and persecuted religion. Amazing and not widely known success
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Many are trying to explain his success with some accidental factors such as his “personal charisma”, Cuomo's weakness etc
Still, I think there may be some fundamental factors here. A longue durée shift, and a very profound one
1. Public outrage does not work anymore
If you look at Zohran, he is calm, constructive, and rarely raises his voice. I think one thing that Mamdani - but almost no one else in the American political space is getting - is that the public is getting tired of the outrage
Outrage, anger, righteous indignation have all been the primary drivers of American politics for quite a while
For a while, this tactics worked
Indeed, when everyone around is polite, and soft (and insincere), freaking out was a smart thing to do. It could help you get noticed
People don’t really understand causal links. We pretend we do (“X results in Y”). But we actually don’t. Most explanations (= descriptions of causal structures) are fake.
There may be no connection between X and Y at all. The cause is just misattributed.
Or, perhaps, X does indeed result in Y. but only under a certain (and unknown!) set of conditions that remains totally and utterly opaque to us. So, X->Y is only a part of the equation
And so on
I like to think of a hypothetical Stone Age farmer who started farming, and it worked amazingly, and his entire community adopted his lifestyle, and many generations followed it and prospered and multiplied, until all suddenly wiped out in a new ice age
1. Normative Islamophobia that used to define the public discourse being the most acceptable form of racial & ethnic bigotry in the West, is receding. It is not so much dying as rather - failing to replicate. It is not that the old people change their views as that the young do not absorb their prejudice any longer.
In fact, I incline to think it has been failing to replicate for a while, it is just that we have not been paying attention
Again, the change of vibe does not happen at once. The Muslim scare may still find (some) audience among the more rigid elderly, who are not going to change their views. But for the youth, it is starting to sound as archaic as the Catholic scare of know nothings
Out of date
2. What is particularly interesting regarding Mamdani's victory, is his support base. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that its core is comprised of the young (and predominantly white) middle classes, with a nearly equal representation of men and women
What does Musk vs Trump affair teach us about the general patterns of human history? Well, first of all it shows that the ancient historians were right. They grasped something about nature of politics that our contemporaries simply can’t.
Let me give you an example. The Arab conquest of Spain
According to a popular medieval/early modern interpretation, its primary cause was the lust of Visigoth king Roderic. Aroused by the beautiful daughter of his vassal and ally, count Julian, he took advantage of her
Disgruntled, humiliated Julian allied himself with the Arabs and opens them the gates of Spain.
Entire kingdom lost, all because the head of state caused a personal injury to someone important.
One thing you need to understand about wars is that very few engage into the long, protracted warfare on purpose. Almost every war of attrition was planned and designed as a short victorious blitzkrieg
And then everything went wrong
Consider the Russian war in Ukraine. It was not planned as a war. It was not thought of as a war. It was planned as a (swift!) regime change allowing to score a few points in the Russian domestic politics. And then everything went wrong
It would not be an exaggeration to say that planning a short victorious war optimised for the purposes of domestic politics is how you *usually* end up in a deadlock. That is the most common scenario of how it happens, practically speaking
Global politics are usually framed in terms of kindergarten discourse (“good guys” vs “bad guys”) with an implication that you must provide “good guys” with boundless and unconditional support
BUT
Unconditional support is extremely corrupting, and turns the best of the best into the really nasty guys, and relatively fast
Part of the reason is that neither “bad” nor “good” guys are in fact homogenous, and present a spectrum of opinions and personalities. Which means that all of your designated “good guys” include a fair share of really, really nasty guys, almost by definition.
Purely good movements do not really exist
That is a major reason why limitless, unconditional, unquestioning support causes such a profound corrupting effect upon the very best movement. First, because that movement is not all
that purely good as you imagine (neither movement is),