Kamil Galeev Profile picture
Feb 11, 2022 57 tweets 16 min read Read on X
Political institutions of the Golden Horde (thread)

Imperiogenesis argument is well known in Russia. Some cheer the Horde for laying foundations of vast empire. Others lament the orientalisation of Russia and adoption of 'Asian despotism'. But how did the Horde itself look like? Image
While the impact of the Horde on Russia was widely discussed, until recently there were few studies on political, legal, institutional tradition of the Horde. A great pile of literature focusing on this subject is appearing right now - there are even very decent works in English Image
Regarding the early, Mongol period, the honest answer would be - we don't know. General studies mention 'Yasa', the Mongol Code of laws allegedly introduced by Chinghis Khan. But was Yasa an actual document, statute, or a name for the Mongol common law? Scholars still debate Image
Actually the very notion of Yasa as an actual document was introduced by a French historian François Petis de la Croix in the 17th c. He didn't have a text of it, just assumed it existed. Later, Russian historians tried to reconstruct its text relying on Muslim sources Image
So even regarding Yasa we are not really sure if it was a statute or a common law tradition legitimised by the authority of Chinghis Khan
What we know very well however, is the post-Horde period. And the best documented successor of the Horde is the Crimean Khanate. While all the major cities of the Horde were destroyed with all their documents, Crimean cities survived and their archives survived, too Image
What does it mean? In Crimea we have not only 'sources-myths', but also 'sources-remains'. We have not only chronicles or royal decrees, but also court protocols, correspondence, etc. We know not only the theoretical legal norms, but also - the real legal and political practice Image
Let's start with politics. The term 'Khanate' implies it was led by the Khan. What was his role? Most scholars till recently just assumed the Khanate was an example of 'Oriental despotism'. This was considered obvious and rarely questioned. Until scholars started reading archives Image
Consider reports of Russian envoys to Crimea. What picture do they describe to their Tsar? Pretty interesting. First of all, Tsar should understand that the letters he's sending to Khan will be read publicly. And the Khan's letters to the Tsar will be checked collectively, too Image
This is unusual. All of Crimean aristocracy - Khan's brothers, nephews, cousins, leaders of important tribes, they all had right for the private and usually secret correspondence. The Khan being the only exception - all of his correspondence is checked by the tribal elders
In 1680 Vasilii Tyapkin, an envoy of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich to Murad-Giray's court writes to his master that during a plague, Khan 'not only received your letters personally, but even personally negotiated the diplomatic treaties which never happened under his predecessors'
So the personal and single-handed management of foreign affairs by Khan was possible only during the state of emergency. It wasn't a normal practice. And we have a reason to believe it wasn't a particular feature of Crimean system, but rather a political tradition of the Horde
For example in 1737 Bashkirs who rebelled against Russia invited a Kazakh Khan Abul Khair to rule over them. According to a Russian report, they made a condition that Abul Khair mustn't write or open letters without the knowledge of the tribal elders Image
These cases from such distant lands as Crimea and Bashkir territories which didn't have a direct connection with each other, imply that these limitations of royal power might be a part of an implicit, common law tradition which they probably inherit from the late Golden Horde
While culture of Crimean Khanate ilooked similar to the Ottoman and partially relied on the same sources (e.g. Hanafi madhab), it still differed. Although Shariah judges (wadis) played an important role, in Crimea private prosecution principle dominated over the public one
Private lawsuits were much more widespread here than in the Ottoman Empire and covered nearly all crimes including homicide. In the kadiasker archives there are even cases of subjects winning private lawsuits against a Khan, their sovereign
In a sense that was parallel to the Ottoman Empire. Many Western historians studying Ottoman archives were shocked by how often lower status individuals won cases against higher status ones. That could explain why early modern people - including very anti-Ottoman ones...
... mentioned the concept of Ottoman/Turkish justice as something self-obvious. That's a pretty common topos in the European literature of that age. However, in the Ottoman Empire it was unthinkable for subjects to sue their sovereign, let alone win
Krolikowska-Jedlinska suggests that 'the Crimean Khanate resembles, to some extent, the system of the limited monarchy. We cannot ignore the similarities between the political institutions in the Crimean Khanate and some of the limited monarchies that existed in Europe' Image
So the preliminary conclusion is - common argument about the 'Oriental despotism' of Crimean Khanate and post-Horde states is just false. In many respects the power of Khan is more limited than the power of most European monarchs who could at least manage foreign affairs
Does it mean however, that the Tatars played no role in the development of Moscow absolutism? Probably they did. Not in a sense that Moscow picked up absolutist practices from the Tatar states, but in a more indirect one
First of all, princes of Moscow became strong and relevant by working as tax collectors for the Horde. Thus they concentrated enough resources and bought enough land to become the dominant state in Russia. So the rise of Moscow was largely due to external influence of the Tatars Image
Internal infuence was no less important. Many waves of noble Tatars came here to Moscow with their kindred and armed retinue. They offered their service to the Prince of Moscow and in return were granted with land, serfs and numerous privileges
These troops worked not only as the military force against other Russian states (e.g. they probably played key role in the defeat of Novgorod) but also as internal force. Ostrowski and Nefedov argued that Tsars preferred to rely on Tatars to purge their rivals within Muscovy
If you think about it, it makes total sense. Yes, these guys were a terrifying force when concentrated. But they were scattered all over the alien and hostile country. They're Turks among Slavs, Muslims among Christians. They had no one but Tsar to look for support and protection
And their position was turning precarious, as they were losing Tsar's support. The fall of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1550s made them still useful, but not *that* necessary. Tsar started openly addressing them as his slaves, just as Russian nobles. They lost the right to leave freely
With the new Romanov dynasty coming to power in 1613 the pressure to baptise was gradually increasing. In the beginning Tsars tried to persuade them offering stimuli to accept Christianity. Indeed, those who agreed to convert were usually promoted and lavishly rewarded
With more people converting, the pressure on remaining ones increased. Aleksei Mikhailovich, while still luring some with promises ('convert and I'll marry you to my sister') started repressions and confiscations. The official reasoning was - Muslims shouldn't own Christian serfs Image
Not because of 'oppression' - that's modern and completely ahistorical interpretation, but because ownership of Christians by Muslims created risks of Muslims luring Christians in their religion. Considering how superficially Christian Russian peasantry was, that was a real risk
Under the regency of Sofya confiscations stopped and even partially reversed (on southern territories - Kasimov, Temnikov lands). Tatar levies helped her to supress Khovanchina revolt, so she backed off with the Christianisation measures Image
But then Peter I comes to power. In 1713 and 1715 he simply prohibits to Muslim landlords to own Christian Orthodox serfs, thus eliminating old Tatar landholding elites. They were given a choice between converting or losing their wealth and status Image
A very typical situation - one branch of family would refuse to convert, while other branch would agree. Usually the government would confiscate the lands and peasants of recusants and grant them to those who complied
Thus converts would become great lords while their non-conformist relatives would live in nearby villages dispossessed of their lands and status - as state peasants. They kept their personal freedom (=didn't become serfs) and that's it
But in every rule there're exceptions. That's a monument to the founder of Chelyabink - Qutlu-Muhammad Tevkelev. He was a Qasim Tatar nobleman who refused to convert. He still got promoted and Peter I granted him 3 000 Christian Orthodox serfs (breaking his own law) Image
Why? First of all the Russian ruler is not bound by his own laws. He doesn't have to be consistent. Second - Tevkelev was a useful collaborator. A Muslim Turk he genocided Muslim Turks - Bashkirs and secured Russian colonial expansion in the Urals Image
His negotiations with Kazakhs duribf the annexation of what is now north Kazakhstan are also quite telling. Kazakhs wanted to sign an equal treaty but Tevkelev responded that Russia "as a very glorious state in the world will not conclude any treaties with the steppe beasts"
Tevkelev's descendants continued to be large landowners and leaders of nobility in Ufa Governorate till the Revolution Image
(will continue in an hour or two)
While in general Tatar aristocracy was pressured to accept Orthodox Christianity, some found more creative solutions. For example, one of Girays - Khan dynasty of Crimea - married a Scottish woman and converted to Anglicanism. Here you see his son, also an Anglican Image
Certain relief happened during the reign of Paul I. Usually his decisions are dismissed as whims of a capricious man-child. I disagree. When you look at them combined altogether they look like a very consistent and well-thought policy somewhat similar to the later Korenization Image
One of his first orders 'Henceforth, Sevastopol should be called Ahtiyar, and Feodosiya - Kaffa'. Next time he ordered to call Simferopol - Akmecit, the White Mosque. Why? Image
When his mother Catherine II annexed Crimea she systematically changed local Tatar or Italian toponyms to Greek ones. A sort of heritage erasure conducted with a big reverence to Classical tradition and in the context of her Greek project Image
Paul was critical (to say the least) of his mother and her policies. So once he came to power he immediately restored the old toponyms in newly conquered territories. If his actions were motivated by personal vendetta, he would probably stop here. But he went much further Image
In annexed territories of Poland-Lithuania Polish language was made official again. Lithuanian statute was restored as the regional code of laws. Paul also restored old regional laws and institutions of Vyborg and Baltic governorates abolished by his mother Image
Around 600 Tatar families were restored in their noble status again (though not in wealth and power). Even more importantly, in year 1800 Paul for the first time allowed to print books in the Tatar language. Image
Tatars repeatedly petitioned to allow printing books and in 1797 Paul agreed. But the Senate sabotaged the initiative. In 1800 Paul agreed to the petition again and now forced the Senate to submit. So on 13 September 1800 the printing in Tatar was allowed for the first time
That's quite an interesting story. Paul has some of the darkest reputations among Russian rulers. Historian Karamzin claimed that for its entire history Russia endured only two tyrants - Ivan the Terrible and Paul Image
Meanwhile Paul was the first ruler who tried to relieve dispossessed groups - minorities and serfs. He limited the time serfs had to work for their owners by three days a week, prohibited to break up peasant families when selling them - you could sell family only as a whole, etc Image
As a result he remains in historical memory as an insane tyrant rightfully killed by his own guards. This was the only military coup in Russian history conducted only by officers with no soldiers participating. Paul was super popular among soldiers, super unpopular among officers Image
So let's summarise what I told today about the Horde and imperiogenesis in Russia. Horde itself wasn't an 'absolute' or 'despotic' entity, and its successor states certainly weren't. However, the Horde delegated taxing and policing of Russia to Moscow and thus secured its rise Image
Furthermore, participation of Tatars in Muscovite army increased power of Prince in dealing not only with external enemies, but also with internal rivals. Position of Tatars was precarious and thus they had to be more personally loyal to the Prince than Russian Christian noblemen Image
Hypothesis: one of many reasons of relative weakness of royal power in Poland-Lithuania comparing to Muscovy could be the shortage of Tatars. I am pretty sure that if there were more of them, imperiogenesis would go very much faster. But I'll cover it next time Image
Let me mention some of the literature I used. I don't want to burden you with tons of books, so I will mention only very good and very relevant ones. A great study of diplomatic sources covering the relations of Russia and the Steppe. Pochekaev: From vassals to suzerains Image
On Tatar enclaves in Muscovy and how the status of Tatar aristocracy was changing as Moscow needed them less and lesss. Rahimzyanov: Moscow and the Tatar world Image
Social and family history of the Tatar aristocracy in Russia with the focus on souther frontier. Interesting because the frontier of Moscow and steppe for a very long time lied through Qasimov Khanate and Temnikov principalities. Yenikeev: Study on the history of Tatar nobility Image
And finally an amazing book by Krolikowska-Jedlinska on the legal and institutional culture of the Crimean Khanate. Bonus point - it's in English. The amount of labour and expertise invested here is really terrifying Image
End of thread - next time I will write on how did Volga became Muslim. Although the Islamic rule was established in 922 and fall in 1552 the mass Islamization happened in 18-19th cc, when Islam was a second class and persecuted religion. Amazing and not widely known success

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