I think there are issues here. You can make your own mind up on the details but I have two main worries (not necessarily about this case - which I haven’t yet read - but more generally).
1. There is a tendency on both sides of the debate on the so-called (ab)use of judicial review for political ends to exaggerate what JR can actually do.
That lies behind some of the sillier stuff coming out of the so-called Judicial Power Project, exaggerating “judicial power”.
It has its mirror image in a belief that JR can sort out major problems in our politics. It can’t. And it shouldn’t. That job is for us/our MPs.
JR is like the plumbing in a building and lawyers are like plumbers. It and we can stop (most) leaks and keep water flowing. And it’s an important job. But if you want a new building, or are worried the walls are falling down, you need a builder or an architect, not a plumber.
2. There is a particular worry about crowd-funded litigation. It’s a good and important thing, as it enables important cases to be brought to test the law and where no individual or business can or is prepared to take the risk.
But it does require complete straightforwardness about chances of success and about what has actually happened.
I am not making any judgment about this case (I haven’t read it). And GLP has in my experience been pretty good on those fronts (perfection is not to be expected). But some others aren’t so good. And the model has inherent risks.
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This is confused. Neighbouring developed countries with huge trade/personal links usually do have a “special relationship” (involving elements of common trade regulation, generous mobility provisions etc) while fully respecting each other’s sovereignty.
To start, it isn’t particularly helpful - as Steve does - to conflate questions of standing in public law with questions of title to sue in private law.
In private law these are typically hard-edged (only the victim of a tort can sue on it; generally, subject to a statutory exception, only the parties to a contract can sue on it, etc).
It doesn’t matter whether Johnson believed before turning up that it was a “work event” (or reasonably necessary for work purposes) or if the event was sprung on him (ambushed by cake).
Once he saw bottles of wine and signs of a party, or saw that people were singing birthday songs and eat cake, it is hard to see how he could have believed the event was reasonably necessary for work purposes.
This is unlikely to work. The rules varied, but if we look at June 2020 (the “ambushed by cake” birthday sing-song, that Johnson admits attending for up to 10 minutes), the rule was that it was generally unlawful to participate in a “gathering” with people from another household.
An exception was where the gathering was “reasonably necessary for work purposes”.
So the test wasn’t “is the purpose work-related” (saying good-bye to a colleague; cheering everyone up with a birthday sing-song and cake); it was “is the gathering reasonably *necessary* for work”.
Good reminder that (shades of Watergate and many other career-ending scandals) the issue of whether Johnson deliberately misled the HoC in the cover-up is at the heart of the matter.
I’d add that I cannot see how this particular claim on 1/12/21 - given his already admitted participation in and hence knowledge of some of the “gatherings” (the key concept) - could have been anything other than deliberately misleading.
As Alexander says, the constitutional position when Ministers deliberately mislead the HoC is quite clear. They have to resign.