Thread by @Hippokleides

In the summer of 416 BC, an Athenian fleet of 38 ships carrying over 3,000 soldiers dropped anchor off the small Greek island of Melos, located south of Athens and east of the Peloponnese.

The inhabitants, the Melians, were the descendants of colonists originally from Sparta.🧵

Sparta and Athens were enemies and we call their gruelling conflict the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC).

Athens would eventually lose. But in 416, this was still far from obvious; Athens held naval supremacy in Greek waters. /2

Since Athens controlled the seas, it expected islands to take its side. Because Melos was a colony of Sparta, it was expected to take the side of its mother-city, its metropolis. Instead it had tried to remain neutral. /3

After Athenian attacks, Melos had eventually declared for Sparta but taken no aggressive action. Since then, Sparta and Athens had established an uneasy truce. Melos was not at war.

The Athenian force disembarked but did not take hostile action. Instead it sent ambassadors. /4

Our source for this event is the Athenian historian Thucydides. He was not there. He probably had very little idea what was discussed, although he knew the outcome.

We can be sure his account of the negotiation is essentially his own creation. /5

So was Thucydides a liar? Perhaps. But he was also a genius, a word I do not use lightly. His history is not just a description of the war between Athens and Sparta but an attempt to use the particular to illustrate general truths of human behaviour. /6

So when Thucydides wrote about the negotiation on Melos, he presented it as a philosophic dialogue. It explains why Athens invaded Melos, but mostly it concerns the nature of power, realism versus idealism, the hazards of human self-deception. Let's read the Melian Dialogue. /7

A central theme of the dialogue is laid out in its opening. The Melians protest to the delegation that Athens is acting in an unfair, immoral and bullying way.

The Athenian response is essentially “Yes, but what will you do about it?” /8

The Athenians address only the reality, not the morality, of the situation, suggesting the Melians do likewise. They do not pretend to be doing anything other than taking advantage of their superior power. The final phrase has become one of Thucydides’ most famous observations./9

No higher power exists to enforce law on states. To appeal to the ‘court’ of world opinion is to appeal for allies. Ultimate outcomes depend on the power of the parties. As famously translated by Crawley in 1910: ‘The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must.’ /10

The Melians respond that notions of international justice and mercy *are* a matter of self-interest: Athens’ fortunes may change (and did - as Thucydides knew), then it will rely on the judgement of others. If it acts harshly here, it may meet similar treatment in future. /11

The Athenians now begin to reveal the reason for their presence on Melos: they fear the other islands revolting against them and taking Melos’ freedom as an example. They will compel Melos to join their empire to show islanders there is no alternative to Athenian rule. /12

Note that the Athenians do not want to fight if they don’t have to. Destroying the city would reduce its value to them; if the Melians can swallow their pride they will not lose their lives; Athens will gain more by letting them live. War is always costly and often uncertain. /13

The Athenians are themselves trapped in their own logic of imperial prestige and fear of their own subjects.

As Pericles observes in an earlier passage “Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.” /14

The Melians finally get the idea that they should talk about interests, not appeal to fairness. But they refuse to acknowledge that they have woefully insufficient power to prevent the Athenians doing as they intend. /15

The Athenians now scorn the Melians, who persist in hazarding their survival on wishful thinking. Accept the reality of the situation, they say. There is no shame in bowing to overwhelming odds. You can fight and lose, or capitulate and survive. No men or gods will help you. /16

The Melians will not listen. They restate their hopes, their belief in just behaviour meeting divine reward. But now they add a new element – their allies, the Spartans, will help them! /17

The Athenians suggest that the world order is essentially Darwinian: states will rule whatever they have the power to. History, they observe, supports them in thinking that and the gods never seem to object. As for the Spartans, they are notoriously slow to help others. /18

The Melians clutch desperately to the idea that Sparta will save them. The Athenians patiently (and correctly) explain that Spartans are not going to risk themselves at sea to help an ally; the goodwill of the weaker party is not what forces an ally to risk themselves. /19

The Melians will not give up their hopes. The Athenians point out they have made no proposals to save themselves in the present. Led by their pride, their honour, their desperate hopes, they fail to acknowledge that they cannot win. Athens is too strong. /20

It has been a dialogue of the deaf. The Melians have not changed their position; the Athenians sarcastically berate them for refusing to understand their situation and clinging to desperate hopes. /21

The Athenians now commence their siege. Although the Melians put up considerable resistance, they are completely unable to overcome Athenian strength. The Spartans do not come. Nobody else acts against Athens in sympathy. Matters reach their inevitable, brutal conclusion. /22

Thucydides makes no comment on the morality of the arguments, because his point is that moral justification is irrelevant.

He does not celebrate strength either; despite Athens’ cynical attempts to gain advantage, it would ultimately be defeated. /23

The relentless, pitiless message is this: we have to deal with reality as it is, not how we would wish it to be. /24

Thucydides self-consciously wrote his work to be timeless – a colossal act of hubris, except that nearly 2,500 years later, we still read it.

If you enjoyed this thread, which will soon be lost in time, I encourage you to read his history, still one of the greatest ever written.

EPILOGUE

If you’ve read this far, the dialogue might bring comparable situations to mind. Reading history was once considered essential for aspiring statesman; now many are ignorant of it.

Many things change over the millennia, but has human behaviour really changed so much?

“We see that you have come prepared to judge the argument yourselves.”

“You, by giving in, would save yourselves from disaster; we, by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you.”

“One follows one’s self-interest if one wants to be safe, whereas the path of justice and honour involves one in danger. And, where danger is concerned, the Spartans are not, as a rule, very venturesome.”

“Hope is by nature an expensive commodity…”

REPRISE - 24/02/2022

“Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can.”

“This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist for ever among those who come after us.”

“We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way.”

“Hope is by nature an expensive commodity, and those who are risking their all on one cast find out what it means when they are already ruined; it never fails them in the period when such a knowledge would enable them to take precautions. Do not let this happen to you.”