1/6 An examination of provincial growth plans for 2022 suggests that we are going to see a renewed surge in infrastructure spending, according to Caixin. This comes after a year in which local governments were able to cut back. caixinglobal.com/2022-02-16/in-…
2/6 "Of the around 20 provincial-level regions that have announced growth targets for fixed-asset investment," Caixin says, "which includes government-driven infrastructure spending, almost all set targets higher than their GDP growth targets."
3/6 This isn't a surprise. Last year was the only year in which a surge in consumption, mainly a reversal of the sharp contraction the previous year, was likely to lead GDP growth, and this was reinforced by soaring exports and strong private-sector investment.
4/6 As a result, Beijing as able to force local governments to cut back on infrastructure spending in 2021, even as it also clamped down on the property sector. This is something it had been eager to do for years, but couldn't as long as it set high GDP growth targets.
5/6 But that was clearly a COVID-related one-off. This year, especially given the sluggish recovery of the property sector, there was no way local governments could achieve their growth targets without even faster growth in fixed asset investment.
6/6 That's why local governments expect FAI growth to lead GDP growth again. This also means that China must again see rapid growth in its debt burden. It's no coincidence that yesterday NIFD said it expected China's debt-to-GDP ratio in 2022 to rise by 4-5 percentage points.
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1/5 According to a former Chinese regulator, "Fed tightening is expected to reduce foreign capital inflows into China, shrinking the country's trade surplus and thus helping stabilise the yuan." reuters.com/markets/curren…
2/5 I think he's partly right. The PBoC has been worried about excessive inflows through the trade and financial accounts, and a narrower spread US-China interest rate spread should partially relieve the pressure on the financial account (not, however, the trade account).
3/5 Already in January net foreign purchases of Chinese government bonds were RMB 70 billion, versus RMB 79 billion in December and RMB 80 billion yuan in November. Total foreign holdings of Chinese bonds last month added up to RMB 4.07 trillion.
1/6 The construction of subsidized rental housing will be a priority of the current 5 Year Plan, but while some argue that this could help stabilize the real estate industry, the current estimates for construction seem too small to make a huge impact. caixinglobal.com/2022-02-15/in-…
2/6 As Caixin puts it: "The effect of subsidized rental housing in counterbalancing the real estate investment slump should not be overestimated, and the slowing of real estate investment growth is irreversible."
3/6 The good news is that subsidized housing is one of the most efficient ways to transfer income from local governments to the poor (assuming it is done with reasonable efficiency).
1/4 The late stages of investment bubbles – usually characterized by surging debt and soaring real estate prices – always seem to be accompanied by an explosion in debt-related transactions that turn out later to have been, at best, questionable. caixinglobal.com/2022-02-11/bil…
2/4 This seems to have happening quite a lot in China. According to Caixin, for example, Cedar WMPs were sold through a mishmash of online and offline distribution channels, and included a variety of questionable underlying assets.
3/4 Caixin quotes one investor as saying: "Many investors bought whatever their sales managers sold. Many can’t tell whether what they bought were trust products, privately offered products or debt financing products backed by accounts receivable.”
1/6 Pretty worrying article. It seems that the impact of the property-sector crisis, including through the non-payment of debt owed to small suppliers, was brutal last year on medium-sized enterprises, which account for over 80% of all jobs in China.
2/6 According to a study by Ant Research Institute and Peking University, MSEs saw operating income in the fourth quarter of last year drop to just 30.6 per cent of what it had been during the same period in 2019, on average.
3/6 This seems a pretty astonishing number to me, and it followed a terrible third quarter, when MSEs earned 36.1 per cent of what they made in the third quarter of 2019. This was why average hiring in 2021 Q4 was down more than 40% from Q2.
1/7 This is a case of incremental thinking, when trade only makes sense systemically: "Some economists have pointed out that Biden could have done more to ease inflation by cancelling tariffs on Chinese goods introduced by his predecessor Donald Trump." ft.com/content/a13504…
2/7 I disagree. Although I agree we should drop the tariffs, that's because the tariffs had no impact on overall trade imbalances. All they did was rearrange US bilateral deficits and Chinese bilateral surpluses without affecting either country's domestic imbalances.
3/7 But that's also why dropping them will have no impact on inflation. I think that becomes obvious when you recognize that external imbalances are always the consequences of domestic imbalances. carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…
1/7 Very interesting and very timely book, although I'm not sure it has a sufficient explanation of the costs of debt.
On China: "The world’s second largest economy is in many ways a poster child of the dangers of credit booms gone bust." voxeu.org/content/debt-e…
2/7 Although "barring major policy mistakes, there are convincing arguments why a ‘hot’ crisis can be avoided. The Chinese government remains in firm control of the financial sector and has ample fiscal resources to deal with any major fallout."
3/7 I think that's right: a crisis was always very unlikely, but, they continue, "the economic effects of a waning credit impulse, financial deleveraging and a resetting of expectations will likely have very real macroeconomic effects on the Chinese economy."