Assistance to restructure police and military forces is a major component of peacebuilding and stabilization efforts, but we know little about when and why it succeeds or fails. 2/
Research on security assistance and SSR points to negative effects on human rights and stability, and to failures to improve oversight and accountability. But some countries have adopted institutional changes. Has external support made any difference? If so, when? 3/
I show how success or failure depends on internal politics. Governing elites who are most vulnerable politically tend to benefit most from institutional change, and depend on external backing to consolidate their power. 4/
Drawing on state formation, civ-mil, and institutional change literatures, I show how elites’ political networks and revenue sources affect how they use security forces to stay in power – and shape possibilities for institutional change. 5/
External influence – through conditions on aid, norm diffusion, delegation agreements – depends on internal political dynamics. But how external actors navigate these dynamics also matters. 6/
I analyze an original dataset on security governance across postwar countries, and in-depth case studies of military and police restructuring in Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Timor Leste. 7/
I also explore these dynamics in countries facing ongoing civil war through brief case studies of Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Somalia. 8/
Finally, I explore how internal politics affect institutional change efforts beyond the security sector, and outline policy implications for planning, managing, and delivering assistance to security forces in conflict-affected states. 9/