What do Danish bog weapon deposits and Taliban "operators" in western equipment have in common?
They're both examples of an empire making its opponents more politically and militarily sophisticated.
THREAD:
Throughout Denmark and southern Sweden, there are deposits of weapons and other military equipment from the Roman Iron age preserved in bogs. These were most likely votive offerings -- taken from defeated enemies and then given over to the deep to thank the gods for victory.
At sites like Illerup Ådal and Vimose in Denmark, for instance, there are the remnants of hundreds of spears, swords, shields, and personal military equipment ranging from belts and baldrics to bowls and combs from 2nd and 3rd centuries AD.
These sites give us a window into how the armies and societies north of the Roman frontier were organized, in a region that is very sparsely covered by written sources, and even then only with a healthy dash of ethnic stereotyping. What do we see?
Many of these men were armed with Roman weapons, especially swords, along with other Roman equipment like brooches and belts. Some still had Roman factory marks or I.O.M., short for "Jupiter Optimus Maximus."
Among the locally produced equipment, there is evidence of standardization and mass production. Two of the spearheads from Illerup, along with others from other sites, were stamped with the name Wagnijo, which is likely the name of the blacksmith or entrepreneur who made them.
There is even a mostly complete mail coat from Vimose, and given the style of fastenings it was probably manufactured locally.
The archeologists who excavated Illerup Ådal even believe they found evidence of specific ranks, with 350 iron shield bosses, 30 bronzed ones, and 5 of silver or gold. These correspond with the amounts of decoration in other types of military equipment found.
The equipment of the ordinary men is not only the most numerous but the most standardized, and suggests that warlords were leading armies of hundreds or even a thousand men who were equipped from central armories and may be better described as soldiers than warriors.
Above all, we can see the influence of Rome beyond its frontiers. The Germanic tribes fought Rome, served in Roman armies, traded with Roman merchants, and were paid by Roman diplomats -- many did all of the above at various times.
The 1st century Roman historian Tacitus describes how the power of Germanic leaders depended on supporting a retinue of young warriors. The moralizing historian never went to Germania, and must be taken with a heavy grain of salt, but this detail is probably correct.
Roman contact led to a more economic developed society and Richer chieftains. They, in turn, could support bigger and more well equipped retinues, forge more powerful and cohesive confederations, and eventually pose a bigger threat to Rome itself.
Was this the only, or even most important, thing that led to the Fall of the Western Roman Empire? Certainly not, but it did mean that the Germanic armies faced by Valens and Constantine were probably more capable than those faced by Caesar and Germanicus.
Modern Americans may be shocked to see their enemies dressed and equipped like their own soldiers, but this process isn't new. Empires depend on a massive organizational and technological gap with their enemies, but contact with them inevitably errodes it.
My sources for this: The theory on Roman contact leading to Germanic development came from Empires and Barbarians and The Fall of The Roman Empire by Peter Heather, and the details of the archeology are mostly from Illerup Ådal: Archaeology as a Magic Mirror by Jorgen Ilkjaer.
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The English state was remarkably centralized as far back as Anglo-Saxon times, with a national system of law and strong monarchy. Opposition was channeled through a single parliament, and therefore took on a national character as well.
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