Leh airbase not only served as the arterial base to keep Ladakh supplied but also for potential offensive ops. This thread traces attempts by @IAF_MCC to have fighter aircraft operate from the 11,000ft AMSL Leh airfield since the 1960s. #IAFHistory (1/19)
What makes a fighter landing challenging? - Airspeeds are higher at Altitude, causing higher ldg speeds, tire bursts, damage, wear and tear, requiring longer runways. Engine thrust is lower due to rarified atmos, requiring longer runways to take off, and lower payload. (2/19)
Due to use during the 1962 war, PSP runway at Leh started to disintegrate. IAF relaid a permanent runway that was ready by Oct 63. 114 HU moved in April 64. But they were not alone, in the same month, Bhupinder Singh, CO 23 Sqn, landed a Gnat! (3/19) tinyurl.com/59xxku59
Bhopinder Singh was a Test Pilot (ETPS, UK). Had commanded AATU & was involved in the Gnat program. He was now CO of Panthers, the first sqn to convert to Gnats. Taking off from Ambala, he did three landings & refueled at Leh - The highest landing in the world by a fighter.(4/19)
His VM Citation reads "He was entrusted with
complicated & exacting task of high altitude trials. The task was hazardous in the absence of data on which the behavior of the ac could be pre-assessed. Data collected will have far-reaching effect on the future of Fighter ops(5/19)
On 15 Jan 67, A Canberra flown by PP Singh,MVC CO of 5 Sqn from Palam landed at Leh along with MC Kappen as Navigator. Shiv Dev Singh, AOC-in-C WAC, leading from the front was also in the cockpit for the historic moment (6/19)
The need for Canberra at Leh remains a mystery but could be furthering studies on fighter/ bomber performance or a message to the adversaries of the capabilities. While ac could take-off from airbases in plains, being able to land/take-off at Leh reduced Time-to-target (7/19)
Another landing of Gnats at Leh took place in June 72 when 2 Sqn, led by Johnny Greene. A Gnat was "cleaned up" & a small dett of men, one packed tail parachute, a starting trolley were sent to Leh. He did a recce, a few overshoots & did one low overshoot & landed at Leh. (8/19)
In the subsequent days, a few other pilots of the sqn did the same, but the dett was called-off. It is interesting the @IAF_MCC decided to have these experiments on the Gnat - Dimunitive stature, low weight made it a safer choice- albeit not lower on skills! (9/19)
It would take a good 12 years for the next landings - and it would rain fighters at Leh. In April 84, Ops Meghdoot (Siachen) was launched and IAF was tasked to be prepared for offensive Ops. And it would respond by having the first MiG-21, Hunter and MiG-23BN land at Leh.(10/19)
First to show up for the MiG-21Bis of 26 Sqn. Led by the CO, AK Talwar, they had the most trouble due to the highest ldg speeds - Had to do two circuits to align apporach, check hub and tyre speeds. A joint dett of 26 and 3 Sqn from Avantupur to Leh. (11/19)
Apr 84, Hunters of 27 Sqn would show up. Led by the CO, Wg Cdr Dange & his Flt Cdr, they did the usual routine of handling sortie, overshoots and finally land. On 5 May 84 - 4 a/c formation of Hunters landed. Full story by JP Joshi himself - tinyurl.com/3zcbkvvb (12/19)
MiG-23 BN (SM-245) landed in May 84. Led by AD Joshi, CO, 221 Sqn. AD Joshi would also make 221 Sqn the first to do armament trg at Toshe Maidan, Dummy dives at camp 6, and would lead to opening of the Kar Tso range. Full story by him here - tinyurl.com/4x5kae4s (13/19)
MiG-23BN and Hunters would mount regular detts for the coming few years. Apr-June 85, 20 Sqn, "Thunderbolts" in its full livery landed at Leh (27 Sqn had converted to Jags). They would run a regular dett for a few years , enthralling the locals with displays at Leh too! (14/19)
These detts were never easy on pilots, ground crew or technicians. Thinking out of box to solve unknown problems was the norm. Hunters for instance faced issues of starting up at Leh and it was solved by S/L Sharma. One of the many many stories of overcoming odds (15/19)
Nov 98 would see two a/c find themselves at leh for fighter Ops - Mig-29 from 223 Sqn and MiG-27s from 9 Sqn. W/C Sud and W/C Avtar Singh leading the charge. The MiG-29 would make it to leh regularly thereafter, but MiG-27 found it tough to work up and would not return.(16/19)
1984 to 1998 - The common link is Air Mshl VK Bhatia (Vrc & bar). He was with Dte of Off Ops in 84 & moved in as COO of Leh to oversee the ops. He would himself end up flying many sorties. In Nov 98, he would again help pilots. His version here - tinyurl.com/mr3u3thd (17/19)
Today, all frontline fighter a/c of the IAF has the capability to operate out of Leh, including at night. In fact in 2016, MiG-29s of 223 Sqn, ran their first dett out of Thoise! Leh has come a long way from the hairy days of its setup - tinyurl.com/yckjrbwc (18/19)
One unmissable pattern in all the landings since 1964 - True to the spirit of leading from the front - it was the CO of each sqn that did the first landing. always, putting himself in harms' way and taking the most difficult task on himself. "Touch the sky with Glory" (19/19)
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1/ There's growing confusion between two important systems:
👉🏽 Akashteer
👉🏽 IACCS
Both play crucial roles in India’s air defence.
But let’s be clear — they operate at different altitudes — literally and metaphorically.
Here’s how 👇 (1/8)
#IAFHistory
But, let’s get some history, geography and law right.
History: The Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept was first developed by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (US Navy) and John Garstka in 1998. It envisioned linking forces digitally to enhance situational awareness and increase warfighting effectiveness.
2/
📕 Let’s talk law — the Union War Book is India’s master document on war responsibilities.
Until 1993, there was no single agency for air defence.
Each service did its bit, and consequently the Army built up significant frontline/terminal AD assets.
Then came a historic shift:
🛡️ “Air Defence of the country is the responsibility of the IAF.”
As we rightly marvel at the IACCS Air Defence system in action earlier this month…
What many forget is that the trigger for IACCS wasn't war.
It was this:
➡️ The Purulia Arms Drop of 1995.
🛩️ Crates of AKs parachuted into Bengal, and no one saw it coming.
🧵👇
#IAFHistory
17 Dec 1995. A Latvian AN-26 aircraft drops weapons over Purulia.
Undetected. Unchallenged.
India was stunned.
A Group of Ministers review followed—and a national embarrassment turned into a call for reform.
At the heart of it: India’s airspace surveillance. 2/
Among the key recommendations -
✅ Procurement of an Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) for the IAF.
Initial approval: ₹585 Cr for 5 systems.
Approved in principle by Raksha Mantri (1999) & CCS (2001).
I promised to be back with the @IAF_MCC and Sargodha love affair.
Yes, @akshaykumar's Sky Force showed 1965 — but let me tell you about 1971.
This time, it was India’s newly formed Top Gun school — TCDTS — that painted the skies above Sargodha.
Buckle up. 🧵👇
What’s TCDTS?
Formed in 1971, the Tactics and Combat Development & Training Squadron was the IAF’s brainchild for fighter combat.
Based at Adampur, it was packed with the crème de la crème — handpicked MiG-21 and Su-7 pilots who’d go on to rewire enemy expectations.
Before war broke out, these elite pilots were already tasked with rewriting air combat playbooks.
But in December 1971, they were ordered to do something unheard of:
Fly low-level night strikes on heavily defended PAF bases — including the crown jewel: Sargodha.
SAVING FISH OIL: THE BATTLE FOR AMRITSAR RADAR, 1965 🇮🇳
29 PAF missions. Napalm. Rockets. Machine guns.
And the first-ever combat use of the now famous L-70 gun— in the world.
Col Mandeep Singh’s riveting account is a must-read. Sharing the highlights 🧵(1/18)
#IAFHistory
During the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched multiple missions to destroy the Indian Air Force's (IAF) radar installation near Amritsar, codenamed 'Fish Oil'. Here's how the IAF's defenses stood firm. 2/
The Amritsar radar, a Soviet-made P-30(M), was operated by 230 Signal Unit and was crucial for early warning, covering deep into Pakistani territory. Its strategic importance made it a prime target for the PAF. 3/
No better time to learn the evolution of India’s shield in the skies. #AirDefenceDay
Sharing #IAFHistory deep dives on how @IAF_MCC built a layered defence — radar by radar, missile by missile.
How we rose to meet tech, tactical, and strategic challenges - blunted raids.🧵
This goes back into time from 1944 onwards when Radars came to use by IAF and ends with how we used them effetively in the 1965 and 1971 Wars, after massive struggles.
After the 1965 war, India’s radar and communication gaps were exposed, especially after losing US assistance. What followed was a remarkable, yet largely untold, story of ingenuity and indigenisation, ADGES as it came to be known!