The gas that transits Ukraine today mostly ends up in Italy. Here are some numbers I'm looking at when thinking about Italian energy security.
tl;dr: Italy's strategic stocks would be a lifesaver if gas flows through Ukraine were interrupted.
Italy meets winter demand through storage and pipeline imports. LNG is important but small relative to those other flows. Storage, in particular, is key. At times, storage has delivered almost as much as international pipelines.
Russia is Italy's largest supplier but Algeria is not far behind. In January 2022, in fact, Algeria delivered more gas than Russia (as flows from Russia declined). Other supply sources are important too, but no source, on its own, can match what Russia and Algeria deliver.
Russia delivers anywhere from 15 to 30 TWh per month to Italy. LNG was already at 10 TWh in January, and has only ever reached 14 TWh. The key to offsetting a loss in Russian supples will be storage. Commercial stocks are only about 30TWh—the balance is strategic stocks.
In short, Italy is demonstrating the wisdom and power of strategic gas storage. At this moment, strategic reserves would be essential in offsetting a loss in Russian gas flows when alternatives are more limited. A real lesson for energy security. Fin.
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Μύθος: Τα ελληνικά νοικοκυριά πληρώνουν τις υψηλότερες τιμές στην Ευρώπη
Τα στοιχεία της Eurostat δείχνουν ότι οι τιμές ρεύματος για τα νοικοκυριά είναι διαχρονικά χαμηλότερες από τον ευρωπαϊκό μέσο όρο. (Το ίδιο δείχνουν και τα δεδομένα του Household Energy Price Index.)
Μύθος: Η ελληνική βιομηχανία χωλαίνει λόγω του υψηλού κόστους ενέργειας
Ο δείκτης μεταποίησης, που έπεσε 30% στα χρόνια της οικονομικής κρίσης, έχει σχεδόν ανακτήσει όλο το χαμένο έδαφος, με μια σημαντική επιτάχυνση μετά το 2021.
On December 19, the energy ministers of the European Union agreed on a Market Correction Mechanism for natural gas. Why do we need such a mechanism? What might it accomplish?
A thread.
The starting point for the intervention is a diagnosis of market failure in European gas:
✅ Prices untethered from fundamentals
✅ Manipulation by a dominant player
✅ Sharp drops in liquidity
✅ Extreme volatility
In this context, the question is *how* to intervene, not if.
The parameters of the intervention were laid out in Article 23 of a proposed Council Regulation published on October 18.
The objectives:
✅ Do not jeopardize supply
✅ Ensure demand keeps falling
✅ Protect gas flows within Europe
✅ Do not trigger added financial stress
The @IEA WEO is always a delight to read—full of beautiful graphs and penetrating insights, a roadmap for building the energy system of the future.
This year, I want to highlight a few charts that really underscore Europe’s energy security predicament. 🧵
The increase in energy prices represents a *massive* macro-economic shock. The global trade in natural gas is usually $200 to $400 bn. This year it might reach $800 bn. Europe accounts for most of this increase on the import side. This is a shock whose ripple effects will last.
I never tire of this chart because 1 ½ years since gas prices started to get out of control this graph can still surprise me. Versus Sept 2020, TTF went up almost 25 times. 25x. Yes it then fell, but it's still hard to fathom what this means. Our systems are not built for this.
The European discourse on energy often conflates two distinct ideas: market forces and market design.
Market forces say that Europe must pay more for energy. But market design can determine how much more.
We cannot escape market forces. But we can design markets differently. 🧵
The European gas market suffers from two market failures. First, a dominant player can easily manipulate prices to serve their political ends.
No government would let a domestic market operate untouched under such duress. Why should Europe?
Second, liquidity is low.
Look at TTF (on August 26). In a few hours, prices swung by €60/MWh. That’s about $100 per barrel of oil equivalent. The “market” changed its view by $100/b in a few hours!
These swings happen often. Yet these limited trades set prices for everyone.
Instant takes can be dangerous in a rapidly evolving situation. We are learning more every hour.
But I’ve appreciated the chance to think out loud before on this platform. So here are some ideas swirling in my head about Russia cutting gas to Poland and Bulgaria.
1/ I wonder if we are tripping over a technicality. European firms are paying in hard currency. The fact that Russia is converting these euros into rubles seems irrelevant to me. (I’ve read plenty on the specifics of the scheme; I am still baffled by it.)
We sanctioned the Russian Central Bank largely to freeze its assets. We have not sanctioned Russian energy. If Europe wants to sanction Russian energy, fine; but we cannot let the mechanics of a financial transaction trigger a policy shift of this magnitude.