His parents used to teach in the same school in Chechnya. His dad was a Chechen, Andarbek Dudaev, his mom a Russian, Zoya Surkova. He spent his childhood in his dad's village where he was known as Aslanbek Dudaev. But then his parents divorced and mom took him to Russia proper
After school he served in army, in military intelligence. Then Perestroika started and commerce was allowed. In 1987 he started working as a marketing deputy for the future oligarch Khodorkovsky - who'll soon become the richest man in Russia. You see Surkov, Nevzlin, Khodorkovsky
What was Khodorkovsky doing back then? This story shows the origins of many largest oligarchic fortunes in Russia. Khodorkovsky was the head of local НТТМ - office for scientific and technological initiatives of the youth. A department of Komsomol - Committee for the Soviet youth
Until Perestroika positions in these НТТМ centres were not that lucrative. But then everything changed. To understand why, we should do a little trip into the Soviet monetary system and how did the Soviet money function
In 1929-1932 Stalin imposed total control over the economy. All enterprises were state enterprises now. And yet, money didn't disappear. Instead Stalin built a new monetary model. In the old, traditional one, there was one circular flow of money. Stalin made two separate flows
The first one was the cash flow. Cash was used by state to pay wages to ppl and by ppl to buy stuff from state. Second flow was noncash. This money was used to do transactions between government enterprises and agencies. Cashing out noncash money was absolutely prohibited
Why would Stalin do that? Largely to pump money into the industry without triggering hyperinflation. Government created as much money as necessary for construction + subsidies, but made sure it won't be used by regular people for buying stuff. Hence prohibition for cashing out
Prices on retail market were arbitrary. E.g. public transport was super cheap, much cheaper than it costed to the state. Meanwhile cars were super expensive, the state selling them with at least 200-300% profit margin. State earned money selling cars and paid for public transit
And yet, within the noncash flow prices were way more arbitrary. They didn't reflect market reality, cuz there was no market. E.g. textile and aerospace industry production was valued in noncash roubles. But actual costs of the latter could be 1000 times as high as of the former
The system was functional as long as the strict prohibition to cash out noncash money remained, and two flows didn't mix. And yet, in late 1980s some agencies got the right to cash them out. Most importantly these НТТМ branches of the Komsomol - committee of the Soviet youth
What did they do? Of course, they started cashing out as much of the noncash money as they could. That triggered hyperinflation, destroying the frailing Soviet economy, but created some enormous fortunes. Such as the one of Khodorkovsky - the future richest oligarch in Russia
This shows why the НТТМ leaders were so overrepresented among the richest people in Russia. They used the crony opportunities Komsomol gave them and cashed out lavishly. Moreover, it shows why former Komsomol leaders are so overrepresented among the contemporary Russian elites
Soviet propaganda portrayed Komsomol as idealistic youth faithful to the Leninism. This was often true in 1920-1960s. However, by the 1980s true believers were selected out. New leadership consisted of incredibly cynical and opportunistic folk - such as Khodorkovsky or Matvienko
Upward mobility within the adult Party was difficult by that time. Frailing gerontocracy occupied all the positions of power and refused to go. So these young smart and cynical ppl waited for their chance, and they exploited the collapse of Soviet system better than anyone else
Let me quote Dorenko:
"We'll live for 130 years. My kids and grandkids will live in my shadow. Only my great-great-grandchildren will see the sky. We'll fuck everyone. Why us? Cuz we've plundered the country. We killed, slandered our fathers. That's why our generation is unique"
So Surkov started working for a crony Komsomol official Khodorkovsky. Khodorkovsky's star was rising and Surkov's too. Soon he was leading the PR service for the richest oligarch in Russia
But Surkov was too smart too put al legs into one basket. While working for Khodorkovsky he also consulted the government as PR expert. And when Voloshin, one of the closest members of Yeltsin's 'family' leads his administration, Surkov becomes his deputy, leaving his former boss
Thus he became Kremlin's deputy managing PR, political technologies and domestic policy. His most important task was "drowning" Primakov and advancing new Yeltsin's successor - Putin. Putin had full support of the Kremlin, but was totally unknown. You needed to make him electable
But Primakov was still very powerful. Russia had 89 governors and 84 joined Primakov's party. And governors used to have *a lot* of power back then, especially leaders of major cities like Moscow and St Petersburg. Meanwhile the unknown party of Putin "Unity" had zero governors
So in early 1999 nearly 100% of political establishment supported Primakov, seeing him as an obvious successor. Those who didn't were usually outcasts whom he didn't accept in his party for this or that reason. And yet, Kremlin did everything they could to prevent Primakov's rise
Surkov personally talked with governors and persuaded 39 of them to join Putin. So now Putin had 39 and Primakov only 45. How did Surkov do this? Through blackmailing: by that point Putin had dossiers on all of them. Surkov also made clear that Kremlin won't allow Primakov to win
Surkov also did fund-raising. Berezovsky and Abramovich were the two biggest donors for the Putin's campaign, but there were many others, too. On average businessmen would donate just 10 million dollars each - more like insurance in case Putin wins
PS I made a factual mistake in the last thread - misidentifying Surkov on the initial photo. Thus I deleted it. Will post a corrected version a bit later as a blogpost
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The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.
Slavonic = "Russian" religious space used to be really weird until the 16-17th cc. I mean, weird from the Western, Latin standpoint. It was not until second half of the 16th c., when the Jesuit-educated Orthodox monks from Poland-Lithuania started to rationalise & systematise it based on the Latin (Jesuit, mostly) model
One could frame the modern, rationalised Orthodoxy as a response to the Counterreformation. Because it was. The Latin world advanced, Slavonic world retreated. So, in a fuzzy borderland zone roughly encompassing what is now Ukraine-Belarus-Lithuania, the Catholic-educated Orthodox monks re-worked Orthodox institutions modeling them after the Catholic ones
By the mid-17th c. this new, Latin modeled Orthodox culture had already trickled to Muscovy. And, after the annexation of the Left Bank Ukraine in 1654, it all turned into a flood. Eventually, the Muscovite state accepted the new, Latinised Orthodoxy as the established creed, and extirpated the previous faith & the previous culture
1. This book (“What is to be done?”) has been wildly, influential in late 19-20th century Russia. It was a Gospel of the Russian revolutionary left. 2. Chinese Communists succeeded the tradition of the Russian revolutionary left, or at the very least were strongly affected by it.
3. As a red prince, Xi Jinping has apparently been well instructed in the underlying tradition of the revolutionary left and, very plausibly, studied its seminal works. 4. In this context, him having read and studied the revolutionary left gospel makes perfect sense
5. Now the thing is. The central, seminal work of the Russian revolutionary left, the book highly valued by Chairman Xi *does* count as unreadable in modern Russia, having lost its appeal and popularity long, long, long ago. 6. In modern Russia, it is seen as old fashioned and irrelevant. Something out of museum
I have always found this list a bit dubious, not to say self-contradictory:
You know what does this Huntingtonian classification remind to me? A fictional “Chinese Encyclopaedia” by an Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges:
Classification above sounds comical. Now why would that be? That it because it lacks a consistent classification basis. The rules of formal logic prescribe us to choose a principle (e.g. size) and hold to it.
If Jorge Borges breaks this principle, so does Samuel P. Huntington.