I made a basic map, with red arrows, which I have held off from posting because I believed it would not be responsible to put something out like that unless it was clear the war had begun. This is just one very incomplete estimate of what the Russian op plan might look like.
Maps like this can be terrifying so please use with caution and don't treat it as any kind of established fact.
Just to emphasize, the Russian campaign does have maximalist war aims. It is about regime change, and multi-axes ground offensive. There's no evidence it will necessarily stop at the river.
I made this map before the war began last night. There's a lot of conflicting information and so its hard to update it with current events, but on the whole it looks relatively close as a representation of where Russian units are attempting to advance.

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More from @KofmanMichael

Feb 25
Some very early impressions of the last two days. It's an operation with maximalist war aims, and Moscow's thinking on this war seems to have been colored by war optimism. It looked as though Russian forces were expecting a quicker UKR military collapse and easier gains. 1/
Early campaign to knock out Ukrainian air defenses and air force had mixed results, Russian aerospace forces aren't particularly practiced at SEAD or DEAD. Most of the strikes in the opening phase were via cruise missiles. UKR air force still has some aircraft up. 2/
A brazen heliborne assault to take Hostomel airport with a small airborne element was a puzzling move. I doubt the goal was to land more airborne at a contested airport easily covered by artillery and MLRS. Likely they expected to hold out for ground reinforcements. 3/
Read 10 tweets
Feb 12
Sure looks like 4th tank division moving up
Its a bit blurry, but those look like T-80Us rather than BVMs, and that suggests a BTG from 4th Tank Division.
@80bvm you're missing your moment here.
Read 4 tweets
Feb 4
The large number of forces Russia shifted from its Eastern Military District (12 BTGs+) to Belarus is illustrative of the degree of vulnerability Moscow is comfortable with China. The Russian Far East has probably not been stripped of combat power like this in decades. /1
This large deployment from EMD, unprecedented in contemporary history, offers one additional piece of evidence that the alignment liberates both states to pursue their respective contests, without having to invest as much in hedging against each other. 2/
If Moscow does go through with a large-scale military operation, this deployment will not be short lived. It suggests Eastern MD will be understrength for quite some time and it shows a degree of Russian confidence in the relationship. 3/
Read 5 tweets
Feb 4
I'm going to differ a bit, this is looking for the wrong item in the text. Russia never framed this confrontation as being about Ukraine, it framed it as being about security guarantees and 'indivisibility of security' in Europe, using that as a vehicle to discuss its demands. 1/
The text very clearly indicates Chinese support for Russia's demands on security guarantees in Europe. We know what those are, and which countries they concern. So its a puzzle why folks are expecting to find Ukraine listed in all caps somewhere.
And it shows support for the Russian formulation regarding indivisibility of security.
Read 5 tweets
Jan 23
Folks are right to be skeptical about regime change, but if you consider the logic, a compellance operation or a punitive raid doesn't make good sense in this case. Moscow has no way to enforce implementation of any agreement it imposes without regime change and/or occupation. 1/
The problem with the various lower-end scenarios is they don't offer much in the way of gains. Prior offensives yielded Minsk I, and again Minsk II. This strategy is seen as having failed. Why would Moscow repeat the same failed strategy of compelling with a limited operation? 2/
Moscow loses bargaining power as soon as an offensive ends, which means it has no way to secure preferences in UKR no matter what deal is signed at gunpoint. UKR only gains in Western support, Russian influence declines in the country, sanctions increase. 3/
Read 7 tweets

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