If you are struggling to understand the difference between proposed SWIFT sanctions and the targeted sanctions on specific Russian banks unveiled today, here's a quick tutorial, using a forced air home heating system as an analogy for the cross-border payment system. 1/
In your home you have a thermostat. When the thermostat recognizes that the temperature is too low, it sends an electrical signal to your furnace to heat up some air and blow it into each room via heat ducts. 2/
In this analogy, SWIFT is the thermostat system, the the warm air is the $$$, and the ducts are correspondent bank accounts. 3/
SWIFT is how banks communicate with each other, requesting that $$$ be moved from one account to the next. But, just like the thermostat doesn't move warm air around your house, SWIFT doesn't move $$$ around the world. 4/
$$$ flows from one account to the next via correspondent banking accounts. This is the "duct work" of global finance. 5/
The US banking sanctions unveiled today prohibit specific targeted banks from accessing the duct work that moves $$$ around the world. 6/
OTOH, SWIFT sanctions would apply at the country level and cut off all Russian financial institutions from the thermostat (messaging system). But SWIFT sanctions would *not* cut all Russian banks off from the duct work. 7/
Technically, Russian banks not targeted directly by Treasury could attempt to find messaging workarounds, even if they were cut off from SWIFT. But this would take time and have substantial transaction costs. 8/
Banks (like VTB) targeted directly by Treasury won't be able to move $$$ through the financial ducts. To use the analogy, it is as if you were to disconnect a room from the heating ducts. Even if it had a thermostat, it wouldn't matter--heat would no longer reach the room. 9/
So, the targeted sanctions announced today are more severe for individual banks, but they are much narrower in scope.
Fin.
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The🌎economy is in a crisis, & yet the dollar is falling. Investors are turning up their noses at US debt, instead snapping up gold & German bunds as "safe assets"
The Trump admin's policies are, to borrow from Bob Gilpin, tarnishing the "prestige" of the US economy & the 💵🧵1/
In his foundational IR text, "War & Change", Gilpin argues that "prestige", not power, is the "everyday currency of international relations"; prestige is how the dominant state, or hegemon, gets what it wants within the context of the int'l order it has built. 2/
Gilpin defines "prestige" as the "reputation for power"
Now, I'm engaging in a bit of conceptual stretching here, but the US economy, & by extension the💵, have benefitted greatly from the aura of "prestige"
When the🌎economy is in turmoil, money flows *into* 💵assets. 3/
The longstanding, misplaced fear that China could one day sell off its vast Treasury holdings to trigger a dollar crisis is silly, not only because such a move would harm China's interests, but also because a 1977 law gives the US president the power to stop this exact thing.
What's interesting here is that the modern legal foundation for the US gov'ts capacity to sanction by freezing foreign gov't assets (w/in domestic & overseas US financial institutions) is based on a law passed b/c of fears of coordinated OPEC dollar sales.
The same misplaced fears that exist today about a Chinese attack on the dollar existed in the mid-70s about an OPEC attack. These fears led to the passage of the IEEPA, which effectively gives the president the power to declare and emergency and impose (gasp) capital controls
The secondary sanctions that apply are quite narrowly focused on industries also targeted under the export control regime. My guess is that the Biden admin learned export controls alone weren't preventing Russia from acquiring critical military components, in part, because... 1/
...banks in non-Western countries were willing to clear Russian payments for these goods. If those banks don't operate in countries that are party to the financial sanctions regime, there was no consequence for doing this. The secondary sanctions change this. Now, those...
2/
...banks will be cut off from doing business with US banks (e.g. clearing dollars thru CHIPS) if they continue to clear Russian payments within these narrow industries covered under the secondary sanctions. So, this adds a financial layer to the existing export controls...
3/
Per the report, Gazprombank has stepped in to handle the yuan payments as other financial institutions turn up their noses at processing Russia-related cross border USD payments.
2/
On one hand, this is evidence that sanctions are working. Banks are turning their backs on 🇷🇺, for fear of penalty.
However, it also shows that pathways outside of the dollar system are being created to maintain 🇷🇺 economic ties w/ the world (including a 🇺🇸 ally!)
3/
This report from last week insinuates that the RMB has become the top currency in China's cross-border transactions, surpassing the dollar for the first time ever. Here's a short 🧵on why that is misleading. 1/
First things first, these data only reflect the currency composition of *CHINA's* cross-border transactions. This is not about USD vs RMB in a global sense. Though obvious to most, its worth pointing this out because at first glance someone might draw the wrong conclusion. 2/
Now, the data in the story are from China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). They report that USD share declined from 83% in 2010 to 47% today. Meanwhile, the RMB's share grew from zero to 78% over the period. If true, that suggests a major sea change. 3/
When we talk about RMB internationalization, we're mostly talking about the growing role of RMB in China's own int'l transactions, not its use in trade b/w third countries. This story is a (still rare) example of RMB use in a deal not involving China 1/ washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/…
Using RMB to settle this deal between Bangladesh and Russia remains something of an anomaly. But it does raise the issue of how sanctions could necessitate more RMB trade settlement. The decision by Bangladeshi authorities appears to be a direct consequence of sanctions. 2/
That's instructive b/c it indicates that the RMB wasn't chosen over the USD b/c of market forces, but rather political factors. Also, it suggests that Russia may become a test case for third-country trade settlement in RMB, and why wouldn't it? 3/