I started my substack with a text "How Russia got so big and so cold"? History of Russian imperial expansion, teaches some important lessons about Russian big strategy. Media focuses too much on its ideological context and too little - on economic one
Let's look at the map of Muscovite expansion. The rise of Muscovy was a chain of hostile takeovers oriented northward - to control the supply of furs from the North and Siberia (orange line). They would push their representatives into local administrations and then impose control
That's how Moscow secured the supply of the main tradable good it could get, the furs, and cut off its main rival of Novgorod from its supply lines. After Novgorod was isolated from its eastern lands, which supplied it with tradable goods, the fall of this republic was determined
Over the centuries, the main concern of Russian power was:
1. Secure the supply lines of tradable goods (natural resources) 2. Secure their export flows to the West
Export was vital for funding technological import. And technological import was vital for the imperial expansion
Consider the map of Oprichnina - the lands Ivan the Terrible took under his direct rule. We see its economic context. Control the routes to Siberia in order to get the natural resources and control the export lines to Europe to ship them off. So he moved his residence to Vologda
Russian expansion northward was motivated by these trade concerns = supply + export of natural resources. The North which controlled both was the richest region of Russia. Consider the number of taxpaying (= free and rich enough) households in 1682-1683. Only the North had cash
But then Russian communication lines were shifting south. Through the internal waterways Russia reached Okhotsk (red) - the first Pacific base from where the expansion to Alaska started in the 18th c. The real rise of the south started circa 1900 with the Trans-Siberian (grey)
That's why construction of Trans-Siberian was so important. Heir apparent personally oversaw and opened it
Tip: If you wanna know priorities of Russian rulers, check what their kids are doing. Nicholas - railways, Stalin's sons - army. And Putin's daughters? High-tech healthcare
These new communication lines reshaped the country - decline of the north, rise of the south. The old capital and trade hub of Siberia Tobolsk dropped. While Novosibirsk which emerged in 1893 as a construction workers' camp emerged as new capital and third largest city in Russia
Only with completion of the Trans-Siberian Russia gets its current configuration, with population being concentrated along the southern border, Canada-style. That hasn't been the case historically. In fact, this shift to the south continues and will reshape Russia even further
Lessons
Russian imperial expansion is dependent on technological import. And import is funded by the export of natural resources. Hence priorities
1. Secure supply lines for these resources 2. Secure their export lines
In this respect Putinomics is no different from Oprichnina
Furthermore. LOTR style battles played less role in Muscovite expansion than we presume and hostile takeovers - far larger. Main wars were won by expanding Muscovite influence within existing institutions through pressure and blackmail. Army was used later, to finish them off
The biggest point of failure in the entire expansion mechanism is the export flow. No export revenue -> no technological import -> no expansion. That's why Russia is aggressive while the fossil fuels are expensive, and docile when they're cheap. Russia is not self-sufficient
And finally. For the past 400 years, Russia has been continuously moving south. Its centre of gravity shifted from the sub-Arctic to Volga. In the future we should expect it to move even further south to the Russian sunbelt on Krasnodar coast. That's already happening. End of🧵
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I have recently read someone comparing Trump’s tariffs with collectivisation in the USSR. I think it is an interesting comparison. I don’t think it is exactly the same thing of course. But I indeed think that Stalin’s collectivisation offers an interesting metaphor, a perspective to think about
But let’s make a crash intro first
1. The thing you need to understand about the 1920s USSR is that it was an oligarchic regime. It was not strictly speaking, an autocracy. It was a power of few grandees, of the roughly equal rank.
2. Although Joseph Stalin established himself as the single most influential grandee by 1925, that did not make him a dictator. He was simply the most important guy out there. Otherwise, he was just one of a few. He was not yet the God Emperor he would become later.
The great delusion about popular revolts is that they are provoked by bad conditions of life, and burst out when they exacerbate. Nothing can be further from truth. For the most part, popular revolts do not happen when things get worse. They occur when things turn for the better
This may sound paradoxical and yet, may be easy to explain. When the things had been really, really, really bad, the masses were too weak, to scared and too depressed to even think of raising their head. If they beared any grudges and grievances, they beared them in silence.
When things turn for the better, that is when the people see a chance to restore their pride and agency, and to take revenge for all the past grudges, and all the past fear. As a result, a turn for the better not so much pacifies the population as emboldens and radicalises it.
The first thing to understand about the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia did not plan a war. And it, most certainly, did not plan the protracted hostilities of the kind we are seeing today
This entire war is the regime change gone wrong.
Russia did not want a protracted war (no one does). It wanted to replace the government in Kyiv, put Ukraine under control and closely integrate it with Russia
(Operation Danube style)
One thing to understand is that Russia viewed Ukraine as a considerable asset. From the Russian perspective, it was a large and populous country populated by what was (again, from the Russian perspective) effectively the same people. Assimilatable, integratable, recruitable
In 1991, Moscow faced two disobedient ethnic republics: Chechnya and Tatarstan. Both were the Muslim majority autonomies that refused to sign the Federation Treaty (1992), insisting on full sovereignty. In both cases, Moscow was determined to quell them.
Still, the final outcome could not be more different. Chechnya was invaded, its towns razed to the ground, its leader assassinated. Tatarstan, on the other hand, managed to sign a favourable agreement with Moscow that lasted until Putin’s era.
The question is - why.
Retrospectively, this course of events (obliterate Chechnya, negotiate with Tatarstan) may seem predetermined. But it was not considered as such back then. For many, including many of Yeltsin’s own partisans it came as a surprise, or perhaps even as a betrayal.
The single most important thing to understand regarding the background of Napoleon Bonaparte, is that he was born in the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean, in the words of Braudel, is a sea ringed round by mountains
We like to slice the space horizontally, in our imagination. But what we also need to do is to slice it vertically. Until very recently, projection of power (of culture, of institutions) up had been incomparably more difficult than in literally any horizontal direction.
Mountains were harsh, impenetrable. They formed a sort of “internal Siberia” in this mild region. Just a few miles away, in the coastal lowland, you had olives and vineyards. Up in the highland, you could have blizzards, and many feet of snow blocking connections with the world.