I started my substack with a text "How Russia got so big and so cold"? History of Russian imperial expansion, teaches some important lessons about Russian big strategy. Media focuses too much on its ideological context and too little - on economic one
Let's look at the map of Muscovite expansion. The rise of Muscovy was a chain of hostile takeovers oriented northward - to control the supply of furs from the North and Siberia (orange line). They would push their representatives into local administrations and then impose control
That's how Moscow secured the supply of the main tradable good it could get, the furs, and cut off its main rival of Novgorod from its supply lines. After Novgorod was isolated from its eastern lands, which supplied it with tradable goods, the fall of this republic was determined
Over the centuries, the main concern of Russian power was:
1. Secure the supply lines of tradable goods (natural resources) 2. Secure their export flows to the West
Export was vital for funding technological import. And technological import was vital for the imperial expansion
Consider the map of Oprichnina - the lands Ivan the Terrible took under his direct rule. We see its economic context. Control the routes to Siberia in order to get the natural resources and control the export lines to Europe to ship them off. So he moved his residence to Vologda
Russian expansion northward was motivated by these trade concerns = supply + export of natural resources. The North which controlled both was the richest region of Russia. Consider the number of taxpaying (= free and rich enough) households in 1682-1683. Only the North had cash
But then Russian communication lines were shifting south. Through the internal waterways Russia reached Okhotsk (red) - the first Pacific base from where the expansion to Alaska started in the 18th c. The real rise of the south started circa 1900 with the Trans-Siberian (grey)
That's why construction of Trans-Siberian was so important. Heir apparent personally oversaw and opened it
Tip: If you wanna know priorities of Russian rulers, check what their kids are doing. Nicholas - railways, Stalin's sons - army. And Putin's daughters? High-tech healthcare
These new communication lines reshaped the country - decline of the north, rise of the south. The old capital and trade hub of Siberia Tobolsk dropped. While Novosibirsk which emerged in 1893 as a construction workers' camp emerged as new capital and third largest city in Russia
Only with completion of the Trans-Siberian Russia gets its current configuration, with population being concentrated along the southern border, Canada-style. That hasn't been the case historically. In fact, this shift to the south continues and will reshape Russia even further
Lessons
Russian imperial expansion is dependent on technological import. And import is funded by the export of natural resources. Hence priorities
1. Secure supply lines for these resources 2. Secure their export lines
In this respect Putinomics is no different from Oprichnina
Furthermore. LOTR style battles played less role in Muscovite expansion than we presume and hostile takeovers - far larger. Main wars were won by expanding Muscovite influence within existing institutions through pressure and blackmail. Army was used later, to finish them off
The biggest point of failure in the entire expansion mechanism is the export flow. No export revenue -> no technological import -> no expansion. That's why Russia is aggressive while the fossil fuels are expensive, and docile when they're cheap. Russia is not self-sufficient
And finally. For the past 400 years, Russia has been continuously moving south. Its centre of gravity shifted from the sub-Arctic to Volga. In the future we should expect it to move even further south to the Russian sunbelt on Krasnodar coast. That's already happening. End of🧵
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In August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed his FSB Chief Putin as the new Prime Minister. Same day, he named him as the official successor. Yet, there was a problem. To become a president, Putin had to go through elections which he could not win.
He was completely obscure.
Today, Putin is the top rank global celebrity. But in August 1999, nobody knew him. He was just an obscure official of Yeltsin's administration, made a PM by the arbitrary will of the sovereign. This noname clerk had like 2-3% of popular support
Soon, he was to face elections
By the time of Putin's appointment, Russia already had its most favoured candidate. It was Primakov. A former Yeltsin's Prime Minister who broke with Yeltsin to contest for power. The most popular politician in Russia with massive support both in masses and in the establishment.
In Russia, the supreme power has never ever changed as a result of elections. That simply never happened in history. Now that is because Russia is a (non hereditary) monarchy. Consequently, it doesn't have any elections. It has only acclamations of a sitting ruler
Obviously, there has been no elections of Putin in any meaningful sense. There have been only acclamations. And that is normal. His predecessor was successfully acclaimed with an approval rate of about 6%. Once you got the power, you will get your acclamation one way or another
Contrary to the popular opinion, Russia doesn't have any acclamation ("election") problem. It has a transition of power problem. Like Putin can get acclaimed again, and again, and again. But sooner or later, he dies. What next?
My team has documented the entire Russian missile manufacturing base. That is 28 key ballistic, cruise, hypersonic and air defence missile producing plants associated with four corporations of Roscosmos, Almaz-Antey, Tactical Missiles and Rostec
The link is in the first comment
Our report How Does Russia Make Missiles? is already available for download
By the next weekend, we will be publishing the first OSINT sample, illustrating our methodology & approach. The rest of our materials will be made available laterrhodus.com
Key takeaways:
1. Missile production is mostly about machining 2. You cannot produce components of tight precision and convoluted geometry otherwise 3. Soviet missiles industry performed most of its machining manually
That was extremely laborious and skill-intensive process
No one gets famous by accident. If Alexey @Navalny rose as the unalternative leader of Russian opposition, recognised as such both in Moscow and in DC, this indicates he had something that others lacked. Today we will discuss what it was and why it did not suffice 🧵
Let's start with the public image. What was so special about the (mature) @navalny is that his public image represented normality. And by normality I mean first and foremost the American, Hollywood normality
Look at this photo. He represents himself as American politicians do
For an American politician, it is very important to present himself as a good family man (or woman). Exceptions do only corroborate the rule. Notice how McCain defends @BarackObama
Should Putin just suddenly die, @MedvedevRussiaE is the most likely compromise candidate for the supreme political power. He is the inaugurated President for God's sake. Which means, the anointed King.
"Not a real king", "Figurehead", "Nobody takes him seriously" is just intangible verbalism. Nothing of that matters. What matters is that he is the inaugurated President, consecrated by God. Opinions are subjective, anointment is objective
It is the fact
Medvedev may be one single person in the entire Russian establishment with a decent chance to keep power, should Putin go. For this reason, he may not even need to fight for power. The power will very probably be handed to him
On Friday, @navalny died (most probably killed) in prison. This is a good time to discuss the prospects of Russian opposition and the future transition of political power, once Putin is gone. This is also a good occasion to debunk some pervasive myths on the mechanics of power🧵
First, getting rid of @navalny was probably a correct decision on behalf of Kremlin. Execution of this murder may have been suboptimal (unprofessional, etc.). But the very idea to eliminate him was reasonable and makes total sense. There is nothing crazy or irrational about it
This remark may sound as cynical or paradoxical. So let me present you another paradox, which is yet to be fully processed by the political theorists. And the paradox is:
Bloody tyrants rule longer
The Russian history may possibly demonstrate this better than any other