I still don't think anyone appreciates the significance of Russian operations at Hostomel airport.
It's ~75 km from the river crossing at Chernobyl to the airport. Compare that to the doctrinal template of Soviet deep operations, which calls for airborne operations 80 km deep...
One purpose of airborne troops in the operational depth is to exploit any fleeting opportunities. But the main reason is to disrupt the rear of forward echelons and render their position untenable.
The breakthrough around Chernobyl was crucial, the Russians' only available mobility corridor on the right bank of the Dnieper. The crossing at Chernobyl is one of the few through the Pripyat Marshes, an otherwise impassable obstacle.
Attacks in the operational depth—or even the threat of them—can cause forward positions to collapse.
It's not at all clear what forces the Ukrainians had at Chernobyl, but it's very likely that this, rather than a madcap dash for Kiev, was the Russians' real motive.
If reports of heavy Ukrainian vehicle losses near Hostomel are true (impossible to confirm right now), then the landing accomplished this and more by forcing a counterattack in the open, either from Kiev or from elsewhere.
Warfare is governed by two inherently opposing logics: the “economic” logic of optimization and balance, and the logic of decision—overwhelming force at a critical point that decides an outcome. This tension runs through all levels of war.
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The logic of economics encompasses purely attritional warfare, although it also extends far beyond: warfare by balance sheet, allocating forces to where they can get the best casualty ratios, while defending terrain whose capture might improve the enemy’s ratio.
This can apply to anything from tactical dispositions to force structure. Exploiting Ricardian advantage—itself a concept borrowed from economics—to maximize cost-effectiveness is an application of economic logic to grand strategy.
It’s easy to overlook New York City’s military geography since it hasn’t faced a live threat in over 200 years. But it is perhaps the finest natural naval bastion in the world, one of the major reasons for its place as America’s economic capital.
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Any good naval base has traditionally had a few key elements: a defensible harbor, a large roadstead for assembling the fleet, and access to deep water. All major naval bases have this: Yokosuka on Tokyo Bay, Southampton on the Solent, Brest and Sevastopol Roadsteads…
The eastern seaboard of the US is endowed with plenty of these: Boston Harbor and Newport on the Narragansett; Wilmington/Philadelphia on the Delaware Bay, Norfolk, Baltimore, and Washington on the Chesapeake—even Charleston Harbor, although small.
There’s a lot of overlap between the concepts of “small wars” and the “little war” of the 16th-18th centuries—the regular skirmishes and raids that took place during lulls in the action of major wars. Both in the nature of the fighting and their roles in the broader context.🧵
“Small wars” occupy a pretty wide conceptual horizon—from old-school colonial wars to large-scale insurgencies to periodic border skirmishes between large states. Yet in all of these, combat is usually limited to the tactical or lower operational level. dispatch.bazaarofwar.com/p/the-chain-of…
The fighting in “little war” was similarly small-scale—it consisted mostly of smaller actions designed to spoil enemy preparations, impose friction, and test the enemy’s strength—but took place firmly within the context of regular large-scale wars.
The strategic logic that governs tensions over Taiwan today is analogous to the British and French struggle over Antwerp: a sea power motivated by the need to protect allies and contain a naval rival vs. a land power seeking freedom of maneuver.🧵
After French naval strength peaked in the 1690s, Britain was able to blunt the threat of an invasion fleet. She quickly gained an absolute advantage in sea power, and land wars consumed too much of France’s resources to actively contest both domains.
Although the French only had to get lucky once, their northern coast, despite having several fine harbors, lacked any protected roadsteads sufficient to assemble an entire fleet—southern England, by contrast, had excellent ports at Plymouth and Portsmouth.
Lots of focus on the difficulty of creating a breakthrough in a long-range precision strike regime, but that’s only half the problem. Assuming it can be done, pushing exploitation forces up from the rear would be another challenge in itself.
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A basic element of combined arms is their simultaneous offensive and defensive function. Hitting an objective in several ways increases the odds of success, while making it harder for the enemy to hit vulnerable troops at the point of attack—an overwhelming pulse of combat power.
LRPFs frustrate this by being harder to suppress and quicker to counterattack. Successful offensives require either extreme incrementalism (what we see in Ukraine), or an absurd concentration of deep strikes, AD, EW, artillery, etc. that exceed any current military’s capacity.
Saltpeter, or crystallized potassium nitrate, was the most important component of gunpowder. It naturally occurs in deposits around the world, but for countries like Sweden that lacked them, it could be created through an involved and somewhat disgusting process.🧵
Saltpeter provides the oxygen for rapid combustion, giving gunpowder its bang. Early formulas were more fast-burning incendiaries than explosives, with pitch or oil mixed in, until the optimal ratio was discovered: 75% saltpeter, 15% charcoal, 10% sulfur
Europe as a whole had little naturally-occurring saltpeter: much of it came from the Americas, where it formed in caves from bat guano, and India, where it was refined from certain soils—this drove Dutch, English, French, and Danish colonial trade with India in the 17th century.