Stanimir Dobrev Profile picture
Feb 26 33 tweets 6 min read
1/I am going to try to explain the irrational Russian Armed Forces behavior towards strategy, common thought, or even the chances repatriated SSO that are now POW try to murder a bunch of men with stars.
2/Here's where I will start from. The Russian armed forces have never attempted anything like this. This isn't about what kind of war they're fighting it's about what they're capable of mustering.
3/Secondly it seems the decision making structrues have low opinion in general of Ukraine and their fighting abilities and sort of an ideal that there's a willing subservience in Ukranians if they get to be part of Russia. Pure racism informing their decision making process.
4/Thirdly battalion tactical groups are terrible units to support operations. They have overload the commander lack support and might not properly integrate with air or do adeqaute scouting as signals and recon are missing along with liasons with them.
5/Fourthly without standing down even if parts of the UA Nat Guard, Police, Border Guard, Territorials and Army are defeated, UA regional commands can be autonomous for days and are vast structures, short of ordering their demobilization their removal is way too costly for RuMoD.
6/And there's a lot of hidden corruption and misreporting that gets baked in into calculations but the higher you go up the chain as in a corporation, the more dimissive management is that it will be an issue. AKA Putin doesn't even remotely grasp how bad it is.
7/Based on those 5 let me try to explain the situation now. Russian units aren't stopping fire or limiting use of their kalibrs and stand off strikes. This is all they could muster south. Kalibrs are limited by launch tubes, a bit over a hundred is what they had ready.
8/We saw constant trains and movement over time moving Ru equipment and lots of aircraft being moved over to mustering points and at the end people. By then the supply was at its limit just keeping them warm and fed. They found out the hard way this was their logistical limit.
9/What people sa wasn't that troops packed spare tanks for long drives. They were carying their fuel reserves on them. The few organic refueling trucks were not enough to make up an actual reserve or depot. They had one full compliment, some spares in one truck , thats it.
10/This didn't seem that crazy in the Kremlin because the prevailing thought in the higher echelons and Putin's inner circle and the FSB was one highly dismissive of Ukraine highly hyped up by Russian army propaganda reporting. They missed that they were buying their own bullshit
11/The release of the information paralyzed them in terms of decision making. But the inherent bias remained and UA delayed mobilising so it didn't dissuade them. For 7 days they ate away supplies rather than actively trying to build them further, they were waiting a go order.
12/The limited supply meant it had to be a mad dash. BTGs were split into smaller sub units traveling on multiple roads to avoid congestion. When they met something they'd wait to coalesce or get into a fight. If the UA was suprised it would work.
13/Were the Ru troops quality ones they'd do better with just surprise on their side. But they were mostly poorly trained as full units were never called up before. Usually a brigade would send only a company and could hand pick.
14/Now it's either confess the lies about readiness or be creative. Because the corruption had created such a rot, brigade commandes chose "creative" (criminal), conscripts were added to the build up. Ghosts soldiers on the roster were hidden. That meant BTGs were far greener.
15/When these hit a city or made contact they'd deploy in unideal formations of platoon to company size. Not their fault all that much, this is what they knew. Then if a UA unit knew in advance where they were and was careful, it would anihilate the BTG splinter formation.
16/Because the timetable had to be kept, supplies were already short with the delay Ru troops would go a step further. They'd keep one sub unit to block and redirect subsequent units, the rest would continue on parallel roads. Again timetable meant usually more major roads.
17/After a couple of road blocks, BTG'd be diluted, lost a bunch of units and fighting to standstill. You'd expect that there would be air or artiller support. But BTGs aren't suited for that, when they move in chunks in parallel the artillery spotters could be in another group.
18/As we said also there was a problem stocking supplies but still CAS should probably not be as limited? Yes but Russian SSO more used to directing it had other tasks and Russia doesn't have a platform like the US surveilance planes and drones that can operate in contested air.
19/And the air was contested because of the limited early strikes due to the small build up + limited recon of where UA AF & AD were prior to this. Satelites take pics at known times, moving equipment often can dissuede strikes as it's uncertain anything will be in place.
20/What then was struck were major stationary objects, depots in main areas, radars, major command and control but again limited by number of reloads. So then Ru MoD started rolling the columns with heavy support of helicopters and planes ahead.
21/This works on day 1 when you know where your guys start & can track where they are easily and you know beyond that point it's all enemy. Once you land and refuel, it's less easy especially because as we mentioned, a BTG splitinter lacks a signals unit, just has a few officers.
22/Then comes the air asault. Becuase you have to be quick you also have to do risky stuff. The problem of course is that because your helicopters are parked in fields, ready for one load with some trucks and one set of ammo, you can do it once a day with each group.
23/That's why you wait till the end of the assualt attempt to see if it works. If you have to refuel and prep for a second go, your trucks have to go to a depot and reload and then come back. And only then try again.
24/You still have to try to take the airport fast and get guys in because if the operation takes too long and you haven't kept them(the UA) on the back foot your green troops are still moving piecemeal on roads, don't have much with them, any small village could be their end.
25/So the air assault fails, part of the pincer moves fail, you can't budge most of the UA troops what do you do? You go for broke, hope you win the race between entrechment in Kyiv and you just throwing all you have and hope if you decapitate UA, regional commands lose faith.
26/Otherwise becuase what remains of your force is split in small groups moving on main roads UA can mobilize move via back roads and just recapture most of the towns as you have few troops for actual 24/7 duties and to even spot them moving back into the town.
27/Can it work? I don't know. Is it a good plan. Hell no. Could they execute anything else, without the entire structure confessing the army has corruption,which yes the boss expected, but it's such a rot it might cost him his throne, yeah not when he's in this mood.
28/ So the spineless bunch decided to throw away 18-19 year old conscripts and veterans and pray they get lucky. Also that Putin hasn't noticed how nuts this is shows that he's either delusional or is completely inept when it comes to military affairs.
PS/ A lot of the commentary prior missed the readiness of the Russian forces and the poor state of affairs. Overreliance on official statements and major military pages missed tons of low level testimonials and regional investigative pieces on how big the rot was.
PPS/ Aggregation of Zvezda and VK mil informing pages and MAKS show sales pitches should be tempered by what we can find on the ground and regional and smaller outlets, forums and blogs were servicemembers were pissed were abundant to the point they shouldn't have been dismissed.
PPPS/ We saw lots of evidence for that and even then a part of the community of analysts dismissed it assuming once it's about having a war footing RU structures will take it serious. But that's not how bad habits work.
PPPPS/ And in the minds of the Kremlin they have been continuously on a war footing. So if during that time they left arms companies bankrupt sometimes even more than once, the habit was not going to break most likely.
To quote Nemtsov here:
<<Он ёбнутый... чтоб вы поняли?>>
And huge thanks to @ain92ru who knows a lot more than me about this but due to the situation in Russia has posted a lot less.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Stanimir Dobrev

Stanimir Dobrev Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @delfoo

Oct 14
I don't think the loss of Kherson west of the Dnipro river would be as beneficial to Russia as imagined in terms of shortening the front-line.
First, as military historians like to point out , the line is shorter for both sides.
Second, sometimes the built up areas are important to hold for the sake of their built up characteristics. The bigger the town, the more suitable the housing is for quartering troops.
A partial reason for the Russian success in the south was the capture of actual stores and the regional civilian logistics network for food, fuel and intermediate depots for storage.
Read 13 tweets
Sep 13
1/ Since 2013, the Russian military has had to deal with lower quality of forces, coupled with lack of financial ability to properly train its ground forces and other similar troops to a degree (naval infantry, VDV), as opposed to ignoring the importance of training.
2/I don't think the Russian army threw out the books or dismissed training practices, it just got squeezed by new tasks to the point it could barely field its diminished manpower, say nothing about actually training its official strength properly.
3/ First we have to look at a comparison between the 2013 and 2021 armed forces. In 2022 the lower ranks were earning in purchasing power less than half of what 2013 payments were. People adjust their career paths accordingly and the 3-year contract term is very helpful for that.
Read 15 tweets
Jun 14
I will file this under "When you know so little about the Russian economy you boost an account that suggest the regular recalculation of the subsistence minimum under federal law 134 is a new one time salary increase" Image
The idea behind the 1997 law is to give a tool to recalculate the subsistence minimum and adjust min. wages & pensions accordingly. Rostat has quarterly data but federal decrees on the subject aren't as frequent and the extra funds for local gov. to cover this are often lacking.
Murmansk is an example where the local government has repeatedly been forced by the courts to eventually follow the decree despite arguing the funds are not there.
hibiny.com/news/archive/1…
Read 8 tweets
Apr 19
Hare's a thread on how I found out that Bulgaria is denying in practice medical aid to people with rare diseases fleeing the conflict in Ukraine and repressions Russia. Be warned, I am not a happy bunny about this.
First off Bulgaria isn't ready 55 days into the conflict to issue all the cards for refugee status to Ukrainians partially because the process only started by late March.
dw.com/bg/55-800-%D1%…
But beyond that because the refugee process is terrible and poorly worked out and a lot of folks could get residency status otherwise, they opted for that. We also have a large already settled diaspora of nationals from Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet states not in the EU
Read 14 tweets
Apr 14
My two cents on the "Moskva". While it was the flagship of the VMF's Black Sea fleet and it won awards it was in a pitiful state. Broader modernisation was cancelled in 2015 and what was done was mostly servicing and extension of power plant's life.
vpk.name/news/132344_mo…
By 2019-2020 it was deemed uneconomical to even attempt it. It had years left in it. I believe it was seen that by the mid 2020s it would need 3 years in servicing to extend the life by another 5 years.

vpk-news.ru/news/55367
In 2018 Flot Prom pointed to older Russian ships having severe issues with their fire suppression systems. Again something that's been postponed as most modernisation plans have been scrapped.
flot.com/2018/%D0%92%D0…
Read 4 tweets
Apr 11
Two things, the production was never technically stopped but reduced to limited numbers and the factory cut a large chunk of the guys working on the plane. I don't know how you can churn out 20 planes in 2 years honestly.
Also one of the issues I have with the attempts to exonerate Sedyukov as a victim of the defence industry is that he's the person cutting the workers of KAZ, last cut was a year ago or so with a proposed reduction of 800 people.
business-gazeta.ru/article/484982
And the number quoted is a reduction of the main company staff down to 4000 and the total with the auxiliaries being reduced to under 10000 from a prior 11500 and it can barely produce 2 Tu-214 planes a year.
business-gazeta.ru/article/453475
Read 4 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(