Stanimir Dobrev Profile picture
Feb 26, 2022 33 tweets 6 min read Read on X
1/I am going to try to explain the irrational Russian Armed Forces behavior towards strategy, common thought, or even the chances repatriated SSO that are now POW try to murder a bunch of men with stars.
2/Here's where I will start from. The Russian armed forces have never attempted anything like this. This isn't about what kind of war they're fighting it's about what they're capable of mustering.
3/Secondly it seems the decision making structrues have low opinion in general of Ukraine and their fighting abilities and sort of an ideal that there's a willing subservience in Ukranians if they get to be part of Russia. Pure racism informing their decision making process.
4/Thirdly battalion tactical groups are terrible units to support operations. They have overload the commander lack support and might not properly integrate with air or do adeqaute scouting as signals and recon are missing along with liasons with them.
5/Fourthly without standing down even if parts of the UA Nat Guard, Police, Border Guard, Territorials and Army are defeated, UA regional commands can be autonomous for days and are vast structures, short of ordering their demobilization their removal is way too costly for RuMoD.
6/And there's a lot of hidden corruption and misreporting that gets baked in into calculations but the higher you go up the chain as in a corporation, the more dimissive management is that it will be an issue. AKA Putin doesn't even remotely grasp how bad it is.
7/Based on those 5 let me try to explain the situation now. Russian units aren't stopping fire or limiting use of their kalibrs and stand off strikes. This is all they could muster south. Kalibrs are limited by launch tubes, a bit over a hundred is what they had ready.
8/We saw constant trains and movement over time moving Ru equipment and lots of aircraft being moved over to mustering points and at the end people. By then the supply was at its limit just keeping them warm and fed. They found out the hard way this was their logistical limit.
9/What people sa wasn't that troops packed spare tanks for long drives. They were carying their fuel reserves on them. The few organic refueling trucks were not enough to make up an actual reserve or depot. They had one full compliment, some spares in one truck , thats it.
10/This didn't seem that crazy in the Kremlin because the prevailing thought in the higher echelons and Putin's inner circle and the FSB was one highly dismissive of Ukraine highly hyped up by Russian army propaganda reporting. They missed that they were buying their own bullshit
11/The release of the information paralyzed them in terms of decision making. But the inherent bias remained and UA delayed mobilising so it didn't dissuade them. For 7 days they ate away supplies rather than actively trying to build them further, they were waiting a go order.
12/The limited supply meant it had to be a mad dash. BTGs were split into smaller sub units traveling on multiple roads to avoid congestion. When they met something they'd wait to coalesce or get into a fight. If the UA was suprised it would work.
13/Were the Ru troops quality ones they'd do better with just surprise on their side. But they were mostly poorly trained as full units were never called up before. Usually a brigade would send only a company and could hand pick.
14/Now it's either confess the lies about readiness or be creative. Because the corruption had created such a rot, brigade commandes chose "creative" (criminal), conscripts were added to the build up. Ghosts soldiers on the roster were hidden. That meant BTGs were far greener.
15/When these hit a city or made contact they'd deploy in unideal formations of platoon to company size. Not their fault all that much, this is what they knew. Then if a UA unit knew in advance where they were and was careful, it would anihilate the BTG splinter formation.
16/Because the timetable had to be kept, supplies were already short with the delay Ru troops would go a step further. They'd keep one sub unit to block and redirect subsequent units, the rest would continue on parallel roads. Again timetable meant usually more major roads.
17/After a couple of road blocks, BTG'd be diluted, lost a bunch of units and fighting to standstill. You'd expect that there would be air or artiller support. But BTGs aren't suited for that, when they move in chunks in parallel the artillery spotters could be in another group.
18/As we said also there was a problem stocking supplies but still CAS should probably not be as limited? Yes but Russian SSO more used to directing it had other tasks and Russia doesn't have a platform like the US surveilance planes and drones that can operate in contested air.
19/And the air was contested because of the limited early strikes due to the small build up + limited recon of where UA AF & AD were prior to this. Satelites take pics at known times, moving equipment often can dissuede strikes as it's uncertain anything will be in place.
20/What then was struck were major stationary objects, depots in main areas, radars, major command and control but again limited by number of reloads. So then Ru MoD started rolling the columns with heavy support of helicopters and planes ahead.
21/This works on day 1 when you know where your guys start & can track where they are easily and you know beyond that point it's all enemy. Once you land and refuel, it's less easy especially because as we mentioned, a BTG splitinter lacks a signals unit, just has a few officers.
22/Then comes the air asault. Becuase you have to be quick you also have to do risky stuff. The problem of course is that because your helicopters are parked in fields, ready for one load with some trucks and one set of ammo, you can do it once a day with each group.
23/That's why you wait till the end of the assualt attempt to see if it works. If you have to refuel and prep for a second go, your trucks have to go to a depot and reload and then come back. And only then try again.
24/You still have to try to take the airport fast and get guys in because if the operation takes too long and you haven't kept them(the UA) on the back foot your green troops are still moving piecemeal on roads, don't have much with them, any small village could be their end.
25/So the air assault fails, part of the pincer moves fail, you can't budge most of the UA troops what do you do? You go for broke, hope you win the race between entrechment in Kyiv and you just throwing all you have and hope if you decapitate UA, regional commands lose faith.
26/Otherwise becuase what remains of your force is split in small groups moving on main roads UA can mobilize move via back roads and just recapture most of the towns as you have few troops for actual 24/7 duties and to even spot them moving back into the town.
27/Can it work? I don't know. Is it a good plan. Hell no. Could they execute anything else, without the entire structure confessing the army has corruption,which yes the boss expected, but it's such a rot it might cost him his throne, yeah not when he's in this mood.
28/ So the spineless bunch decided to throw away 18-19 year old conscripts and veterans and pray they get lucky. Also that Putin hasn't noticed how nuts this is shows that he's either delusional or is completely inept when it comes to military affairs.
PS/ A lot of the commentary prior missed the readiness of the Russian forces and the poor state of affairs. Overreliance on official statements and major military pages missed tons of low level testimonials and regional investigative pieces on how big the rot was.
PPS/ Aggregation of Zvezda and VK mil informing pages and MAKS show sales pitches should be tempered by what we can find on the ground and regional and smaller outlets, forums and blogs were servicemembers were pissed were abundant to the point they shouldn't have been dismissed.
PPPS/ We saw lots of evidence for that and even then a part of the community of analysts dismissed it assuming once it's about having a war footing RU structures will take it serious. But that's not how bad habits work.
PPPPS/ And in the minds of the Kremlin they have been continuously on a war footing. So if during that time they left arms companies bankrupt sometimes even more than once, the habit was not going to break most likely.
To quote Nemtsov here:
<<Он ёбнутый... чтоб вы поняли?>>
And huge thanks to @ain92ru who knows a lot more than me about this but due to the situation in Russia has posted a lot less.

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