Thomas Rid Profile picture
Mar 1, 2022 13 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Just wow wow wow. The Ukrainian newspaper Pravda leaked what appear to be personal data of 120,000 Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine — if confirmed as accurate, we're probably looking at one of the best-timed and most devastating leaks of all time pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/1…
6,616 pages of names, registration numbers, and places of service of Russians personnel — *just for volume comparison*, and nothing else: that's more pages than were ever published out of the Snowden cache. Image
Ukrayinska Pravda is a serious outlet, claiming to have a "reliable source." Intel penetrations of Russian gov and mil targets appear to be off the charts. GRU and others have a long history of catastrophic OPSEC. Still, I would want to see some independent confirmation here.
Important to note that there's a long history of leaking lists of names of covert personnel (see chapter "The Book War," in my ACTIVE MEASURES). We have examples of lists that are entirely legit, and some that were at least in part forged, for practical and psychological effect.
What's the practical effect? We know from history that a leak of personnel names has a powerful psychological effect on the organization in question. It creates an acute sense of vulnerability, in a very personal way, for those in charge, and for those exposed.
A leak of this kind also creates an immediate, hard dilemma for leadership: do you tell your own people that they have been doxed, so they won't learn about it from social media, press, or families, and embarrass yourself now—or do you not tell them, and embarrass yourself later.
Of course there's also sweet historical irony in this leak (either way, if it's legit or forged): this is an old Soviet active measures tactic now used against an army under the command of an ex-KGB officer who surely is familiar with this method.
Important note of caution here from my old colleague Ian. Any successful hits in cross-referencing so far?
Another note on verification: if history is any guide, then neither a few cross-referencing hits nor a few cross-referencing misses will allow a high-confidence assessment on the leak's veracity. The Russian army will either deny or glomar. Be prepared for long-term ambiguity.
Important note: this leak also exists in a file format that offers significantly more detail—and exif data. Some of the exif data show create/modify dates from April and June 2021, one file dates back to 2006.
Alternative hypothesis: we're looking at older, generic (and probably genuine) Russian army lists not directly linked to the invasion.
Worth noting that the leak appears to contain names, DOBs, addresses, unit affiliation, passport numbers, and phone numbers for thousands of alleged Russian military personnel. Verification more likely given this granular information.

Again: lists may not be linked to invasion.
Fresh and fascinating analysis of the Ukrainska Pravda leak, based on Field Post Numbers counts

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More from @RidT

Mar 6
An observation on the Taurus leak that I have not seen elsewhere (could have missed it):

The intercepted recording starts with BG Frank Graefe, in Singapore, saying "Hallo," to which the response is "Moin Moin Herr General, Hauptmann Irrgang hier." "Servus." (A common greeting)
Irrgang: "I would add you now, if you like."

Graefe: "Thank you."

Then: automated Webex voice: "You are accessing the conference now."
My interpretation: the general, from a hotel room in Singapore, likely did not join by URL, but called a staff officer to phone-connect him into the meeting. The intercept likely started before entering the Webex session. So that leaves us with two most probable scenarios:
Read 9 tweets
May 3, 2023
Some of you asked. So here are a few reflections on how I've started using Twitter moving forward—and whatever will come to replace it. Some of you may want to do the same.

Because this approach works even if—when, really—Twitter itself has disappeared.
This, btw, was good nytimes.com/2023/04/18/mag…
Posts on Twitter, or Mastodon, are a bit like public events with drinks afterwards: crucial for inspiration, for meeting people, for keeping up-to-date. But what really matters are the human-to-human connections, not the platform of choice. Bear with me.
Read 9 tweets
May 3, 2023
Hugely significant, precedent-setting outcome of the biggest insurance trial related to a cyberattack ever (I think): NotPetya was not "hostile or warlike action," insurers must pay $1.4B to Merck, ruled New Jersey appellate division judges Monday wsj.com/articles/merck…
Perhaps not how you articulate a winning argument. Image
The full court opinion is a fascinating read njcourts.gov/system/files/c… Image
Read 12 tweets
Apr 16, 2023
This story is interesting. But it straight-up takes my quote out of context. Not great.

Bottom line: I told @josephmenn that I *do not* believe the Russian figures and boasting intercepted and publicized here is credible, in line with historical precedent washingtonpost.com/technology/202…
GlavNIVT's "report" should be treated with a great deal of caution. Surprised the analyst writing this didn't include a stronger caveat. Image
Quoting me as the main person supporting the "drew alarm" line there strikes me as a very poor choice. I was not and am not alarmed by this figure. It is exactly the kind of boasting and self-deception that you would expect from a disinformation shop in an authoritarian system. Image
Read 6 tweets
Feb 19, 2023
This week Google/Mandiant published a blockbuster report on cyber ops in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Google is probably, next to Microsoft, the company with the most high-res visibility into CNE/CNA in and around the war. A few thoughts blog.google/threat-analysi…
This report is impressive work by a company that has invested an extraordinary amount of resources into defending Ukraine. Google, like Microsoft, deserves credit for doing the right thing and for publishing a big-picture, analytical report on cyber operations in Ukraine.
Also worth nothing that these two firms probably have more comprehensive telemetry than most SIGINT agencies today. Each of them.
Read 12 tweets
Jan 23, 2023
Last week I was a student for five days, five hours per day—with ChatGPT fully integrated into teaching. Here's what we learned, just in time for Spring Term (which starts tomorrow. Class was Malware Analysis, taught by @juanandres_gs @alperovitch) alperovitch.sais.jhu.edu/five-days-in-c…
AI isn’t going to replace people. People who use AI well will replace people who don’t use AI well.
Our little educational experiment with ChatGPT @alperovitch made it into the FT, of sorts Image
Read 4 tweets

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