Just wow wow wow. The Ukrainian newspaper Pravda leaked what appear to be personal data of 120,000 Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine — if confirmed as accurate, we're probably looking at one of the best-timed and most devastating leaks of all time pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/1…
6,616 pages of names, registration numbers, and places of service of Russians personnel — *just for volume comparison*, and nothing else: that's more pages than were ever published out of the Snowden cache.
Ukrayinska Pravda is a serious outlet, claiming to have a "reliable source." Intel penetrations of Russian gov and mil targets appear to be off the charts. GRU and others have a long history of catastrophic OPSEC. Still, I would want to see some independent confirmation here.
Important to note that there's a long history of leaking lists of names of covert personnel (see chapter "The Book War," in my ACTIVE MEASURES). We have examples of lists that are entirely legit, and some that were at least in part forged, for practical and psychological effect.
What's the practical effect? We know from history that a leak of personnel names has a powerful psychological effect on the organization in question. It creates an acute sense of vulnerability, in a very personal way, for those in charge, and for those exposed.
A leak of this kind also creates an immediate, hard dilemma for leadership: do you tell your own people that they have been doxed, so they won't learn about it from social media, press, or families, and embarrass yourself now—or do you not tell them, and embarrass yourself later.
Of course there's also sweet historical irony in this leak (either way, if it's legit or forged): this is an old Soviet active measures tactic now used against an army under the command of an ex-KGB officer who surely is familiar with this method.
Important note of caution here from my old colleague Ian. Any successful hits in cross-referencing so far?
Another note on verification: if history is any guide, then neither a few cross-referencing hits nor a few cross-referencing misses will allow a high-confidence assessment on the leak's veracity. The Russian army will either deny or glomar. Be prepared for long-term ambiguity.
Important note: this leak also exists in a file format that offers significantly more detail—and exif data. Some of the exif data show create/modify dates from April and June 2021, one file dates back to 2006.
Alternative hypothesis: we're looking at older, generic (and probably genuine) Russian army lists not directly linked to the invasion.
Worth noting that the leak appears to contain names, DOBs, addresses, unit affiliation, passport numbers, and phone numbers for thousands of alleged Russian military personnel. Verification more likely given this granular information.
Again: lists may not be linked to invasion.
Fresh and fascinating analysis of the Ukrainska Pravda leak, based on Field Post Numbers counts
Note of caution: I would not put too much weight on the leaked DIA assessment: it’s low confidence; it came too quickly; not available in full text; it got politicized; and done by one of the least impressive outfits of the USIC, if I may stick my neck out just a little bit.
First off, proper BDA needs to be done on the ground in Fordo, in ways that are highly likely very difficult to pull off, given the nature of the damage, and therefore need time. The IRGC, obviously, has the best ground access.
The IRGC, however, also has the an interest in misdirection and deception, in both public and private statements, given that they know they are owned — meaning any SIGINT here is perhaps not as reliable a source as it otherwise might be.
It appears that foreign influence operations on this platform are picking up, as expected. So here are a few high-level observations. Under normal circumstances I would write a proper longer piece. But in the interest of time, here you go. A few trends, questions, and hypotheses:
Most of the exposed Russian tradecraft is sloppy, and often the engagement on X is fake. But not always. One day after this remarkable WIRED story came out, the U.S. IC confirmed the attribution to Russia to reporters (Confirmation npr.org/2024/10/22/nx-…) wired.com/story/russian-…
The U.S. IC is reacting very fast. They expose content as foreign malign influence without amplifying it at the same time. That is excellent. It would be even better if there was one central reference point for all announcements, including press-call drops, perhaps with delay.
"Influence and Cyber Operations: An Update," the new OpenAI threat intelligence report, out a few hours ago. The document is interesting for one specific reason that hasn't been mentioned in public reporting so far cdn.openai.com/threat-intelli…
This is the money paragraph, from today's OpenAI report "Influence and Cyber Operations: An Update."
tldr: AI labs sit at a middle section of adversary kill chains—if staffed & equipped properly, the labs are potentially uniquely well positioned for threat intelligence insights
The report also has some interesting LLM TTP examples
JUST OUT — September was a wild month for scholars of modern covert influence operations. No longer do we have to rely on a campaign's digital footprints alone. My first analysis of ~3K leaked internal files and fresh FBI evidence on "Doppelganger."
This video was an internal production by the Social Design Agency, a disinformation firm in Moscow, produced in early August 2023, likely to be viewed by Vladimir Putin. Note the memo reproduced in the description, discussing the video.
Several weeks ago German media (WDR, NDR, SZ) received a leak of internal files from the biggest Russian disinformation contractor, Social Design Agency, often referred to as Doppelganger. "Western security officials" confirmed authenticity. First story by @FlorianFlade et al
Another exclusive @tagesschau, this one is excellent. I wish they would excerpt or screenshot the source documents though tagesschau.de/investigativ/n…