Thread by @SeanDEhrlich

I read the Mearsheimer interview (I was bored during office hours and decided increased blood pressure was just what I needed to relieve the boredom.) Some takes: 1. The line about great power politics and not imperialism is just as dumb in context.

2. M is committed to idea that NATO/EU is in lockstep. This is both for intellectual consistency (IOs in his worldview are tools for the state that reflect power of states and not actors in their own right; since both NATO/EU are Western IOs, they reflect same state interests…

And therefore must be the acting in concert or being simultaneously used by the same powers. To do this you have to ignore that the US is not in the EU, not all countries in one is in the other, etc. But, whatever. Believing Europe is in US’s pocket is far down M’s list of sins)

Also, he has to believe NATO/EU expansion are equivalent because 2014 was sparked by Ukraine wanting to join the EU, not NATO. If M wants to blame US and NATO for current war, he had to elide this distinction.

3. He believes Russia won’t attack Baltics because they are in NATO but simultaneously argues that NATO expansion is bad. This isn’t as contradictory as some have pointed out as M only cares about preferences of great powers: that being in NATO is better for Baltics is immaterial

However, he doesn’t take his argument to its logical conclusion. If Ukraine were in NATO, Russia wouldn’t have attacked. Even if he’s completely right, then one way for West to avoid war btw Russia & Ukraine was not expanding NATO at all, but another way was to expand it faster.

4. Mearsheimer too often relies on rhetorical slights of hand and hair splitting definitions that might work and be acceptable in academic debate, but doesn’t work when engaged in public facing scholarship or wanting to influence policy outcomes.

5. Mearsheimer is not good at responding to his own words being read back to him, even when he uttered those words mere minutes before. He can’t admit he’s wrong or misspoke. It’s not a good look either within or outside of academic debate but it is far too common.

6. I don’t know how M believes that the US spent the 20 years after the end of the Cold War trying to spread democracy in the Middle East. That rhetoric existed but even the attempt in the Iraq and Afghanistan was half-hearted. Chotiner was absolutely right to call him out.

7. M seems to believe Russia, even if they win, will leave the DPR and LPR as independent states. It strikes me as far, far more likely he annexes them after some referendum like he did Crimea. Obviously, we don’t yet know who is right, but I’d put money on it being me.

8. If I never read or hear the phrase ‘unipolar moment’ again, I will be able to die a happy man.

Overall, the interview shows the shallowness of Mearsheimer’s brand of realism. It ignores interests of most countries; it assumes simplistic interests for the other countries; it changes empirical focus to suit its needs (sometimes looking at rhetoric, sometimes ignoring it etc)

I’m not a fan of realism in general (I’m not a fan of any of the isms, but realism less so than the rest), but Mearsheimer’s version is less useful and interesting that most of the rest. Not surprisingly, it leaves him unable to render intelligent analysis of the 🇷🇺-🇺🇦 crisis.