Company called me for advice for dealing with "the cyber war"
A few min into the call I realized there were differing opinions of some of the people on the call.
I'm sharing an anonymized version. There's LOTS to unpack.
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q: is anything different? Are attacks going up?
a: outside of Eastern Europe, it's shockingly calm (at least to me). Things have ramped up a bit, but mostly in the form of scams (donate now type stuff)
so far, it's been quieter than I'd expect
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That said, it's always a good idea to be evaluating your defensive posture. I think it's safe to say that the status quo is fragile, and things can get bad fast. If you have reasonable/credible reason to believe you are the target of a nation state, please re-up your d now.
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If you're NOT the likely target of a nation state (this is most of you reading this tweet btw), you are SOMEBODY's target. You should be double checking your posture.
Understand that you may be a jumping off point to the real target. Don't aid your enemy.
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q: should we freeze all vacations and just rebuild our defenses?
a: HELL TO THE NO. This is a marathon, not a sprint. If your first reaction is to light your hair on fire, you'll be burned out in no time flat.
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When times are getting tough, just stop. Pause. Think.
Assuming your opponent has been planning things, they already have the initiative on you. Making dumb twitch responses is what the skillful adversary is hoping for and anticipating.
Breathe. Make strategic responses.
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q: what can we do to show we're taking these threats seriously?
a: (1st great question!)
Hopefully, you have a list of options for how you're going to respond. Prioritize them and hit the low hanging fruit first. Even if they don't move the needle much... it is an improvement.
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For all other improvements, rank them by estimated level of effort vs impact. If it's low effort, but medium impact, it may make sense to do that before a high effort/high impact. Right now, your goals are to improve. Don't try to "solve" anything. just get a little better.
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q: how are we doing compared to our competitors?
a: (WORST QUESTION EVER)
Even if you somehow got viable KPI on your competitors, they will be meaningless to you. While the products/services you do will be similar, *how* you do it will be radically different.
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Bluntly said, any comparison from org to org is, stupid.
It's not an apples-to-apples comparison. And even if it were, so what? I don't know of many market verticals where being "average" or just slightly above it is a desired state.
Look at the breach reports!
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Some favor market vertical comparisons because they think if they're better at security attackers will target the weaker in that vertical. NDAs prevent me from sharing details, but that's not what I've seen/experienced. Nor does it fit with what peers have told me.
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If someone has data/use cases that prove weaker in market verticals are targeted, please let me know!
Attackers fall into one of two camps.
- opportunistic
- targeting
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Opportunisitc attackers will go after EVERYONE in a market vertical who has a specific flaw. They are REALLY good at finding a particular weakness and hit everyone they can.
This means you can still be best in the market vertical and still be targeted if you have the flaw
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Targeting attackers are after you and you alone. There's not a damn thing you can do to stop them. What you *should* do is start listening to how they're attacking you and shore up your D to meet their attempts.
The best CTI is your own logs!
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q: besides our own logs, what CTI should we subscribe to?
a: Your own telemetry will be lightyears ahead what you're getting from others. My next best suggestion would be from your ISAC. Your org should already belong to one. If not, join up. nationalisacs.org
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Don't think that paid CTI will be better/worse than free or homegrown. You must test the CTI feed before you pay to see if you can act upon it.
CTI gets a bad rap because people misuse it. It's an indicator... like a weather report.
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You wouldn't go outside with an umbrella up because you were told it is supposed to rain. You'd check first. You might be more inclined to take your umbrella with you, but you'd check first. Same with CTI. It's not scripture... it's a weather report. Treat it as such.
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q: what's the biggest risk right now?
a: I worry that orgs will overreact and cause outages or break things to "protect" against a threat. It's OK to move faster, but be reasonable about it. There's WAAAAAY too much hype right now. Try to streamline where it makes sense.
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I hope this thread helps folks! You can fight and win at infosec as a defender. I'm glad that others are taking things a little more seriously... and you should too! But let's keep it all in reason. Keep making things incrementally better. You got this. LMK if I can help.
fin.
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Got an interesting DM on what I think Purple Teaming is.
Purple teaming is when you have the red (attackers) sitting (or online) with the blue (defenders)
It's slower than a pen test (red has to constantly check in on blue)
But it has LOTS of advantages.
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In a few other tweets today I said pen testing is specialized QA. It's all about "do the controls work as we expect them to?"
Unlike waiting for a formal report, in a purple engagement blue is show some stuff live and real time.
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Blue learns:
- does the control work?
- how do attackers bypass the control?
- what steps are needed to do the bypass (this is huge btw. Lots are shocked how easy it is to trick tools)
- how attacker view networks/systems
- goals of the attacker
I try to be nice... but when I see people giving flat out wrong advice... it's trying.
Complaint du jour:
q: we're struggling with patching
"expert": yes, it's hard. Just do it more... harder and faster for a bit. You'll get caught up, then it's easier.
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That's NOT how that works! It sounds reasonable.. and the person asking won't know they got a HORRIBLE answer.
If someone is in a hole, telling them to do X, but only more. Is NOT going to get them out of that hole.
They have to change strategy AND tactics.
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If you've fallen behind patches, just stop for a week. YES, you read that right. STOP applying patches and just think. What about your patching is broken? Does it take too long to test? Push? Verify? Reporting? What?
I've had 3 calls so far today (it's not even 10) about defending against Russian cyber ops
I'm tired of having the same call... so... here's what I've told everyone. This is the playbook you need... but it's not going to be what you think it will be.
Ready? Lets go!
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Watch your egress. Firewalls work both ways. Carefully monitor outbound traffic. DMZ servers RESPOND to external requests. Look for DMZ systems initiating outbound. This is what "phoning home" (aka C2) looks like.
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Note: you will have a handful of DMZ servers initiating outbound. File xfer systems, any mail server (you likely shouldn't be running your own). Some web services may also initiate outbound.
But it's rare.
Most orgs? Your exception list will fit on a single sheet of paper.
This means you (yes *you*) can generate TOMLs that will be reviewed by the W2L crew. As long as you follow the template guides, your content will be included in the releases.
This is _huge_ and should allow W2L to scale almost vertically in terms of community involvement.
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I'm super hopeful that we get a TON of contributions. We've done so much care and attention to the input we've had already.
Have a DLP solution? Want to **REALLY** make it actually... useful?
Scan the endpoints for sensitive info. You'll get a report with the data on that host.
Work with risk and legal to assign any arbitrary point value to this sensitive info.
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Example:
PCI data is 5 points per record
PII is 3 points per record
PHI is 10 points per record
Note: your points will be based on your orgs concern over exposure of each record type. Don't let anyone else tell you what points you should use. You're measuring your risk
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Now calculate the total risk points per endpoint. Get ready for some shocks!
There are some tools that do this already, but now you have a fancier DLP risk report tool.
You have network monitoring capabilities. Great! But what are you looking for?
All too often folks start focusing on individual attacks. And yes, it's important that you can catch the latest RAT from Grid Iguana (from Hacksylvania)
Don't lose sight of the big picture.
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Monitor for DMZ outbound traffic.
Almost all DMZ systems are responding to some request from remote user. Your DMZ systems are the destination, not the source. An early indicator an attack worked is a DMZ system phoning home to the C2 network. Your machine is a source here.
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Like all things, this isn't 100%. There will be a few DMZ systems that do originate outbound traffic... but it should be rare enough that you can detect on this alone and have a short exception list for known outbound originators.
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