Can Russia's president launch nuclear weapons alone? The honest answer is "we don't know." A short answer is "probably." A longer answer is "it's complicated." A longish thread that may (or may not) help clarify things 1/
Most of what we know about the Russian launch authorization procedures is based on what is known about the Soviet command and control (C2) system. There is not much there, but not too little either 2/
A fairly compact description of the procedures is in the Russian Forces book. Here is the excerpt: russianforces.org/RussianStrateg…. Igor Sutyagin, who wrote most of it, used the work of Bruce Blair and Valery Yarynich but also did his own research, combing through all kind of sources 3/
I was told that this is a fair description of the system. Note that Yarynich was quite direct - "Russia's SNF C3 system ... completely excludes the possibility of a launch performed by one person" (p. 152 in scribd.com/doc/282622838/…, citing this catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/0076084…). 4/
It appears that the procedure implies that the order must be authenticated by the minister of defense and the command center of the General Staff must accept the order as valid. A first strike seems possible, although it would bring more people in the loop 5/
One way to think about it is that the designers of the system, the first version of which was built in the 1970s, certainly did not want to give the General Secretary the sole authority to launch, especially when it comes to a first strike 6/
Of course, with the presidential power what it is in Russia today this may have changed, but I would guess that people other than the president have a way to influence the decision even if they don't have a veto power. 7/
There are also some checks that protect the system from issuing a launch order in response to a false alarm - waiting for signs of actual nuclear detonations is one of them. But in the end all these checks can be overriden, especially if there is time to do so. 8/
All that, of course, deals with a command to launch a _strategic_ strike. The procedure for non-strategic weapons might be a bit different as it is likely to include some additional steps. One is the actual deployment of weapons. 9/
In normal time, there are no non-strategic weapons that are kept in a constant high degree of readiness. No Iskanders are roaming around with nuclear warheads on top of their missiles, no aircraft are sitting on tarmac with bombs or ALCMs loaded in their bomb bays. 10/
These weapons are in storage, most of them reasonably far from their delivery systems (see russianforces.org/blog/2017/08/w…). They would have to be taken out of storage, mated to missiles, loaded on aircraft, or otherwise deployed. 11/
Presumably, the president can issue an order to do so, but it would probably be done as part of a (pre-)planned military operation. This would give the military, who will be developing and executing the plan, an opportunity to take part in the decision. 12/
While I doubt they would have the veto power, this is a deliberative (and rather slow) process. In the end, the order (or pre-delegation of authority) would still come from the president. 13/
The authenticating process might be the same as in the case of strategic forces, with a call through dedicated terminals and all that. More likely, the president would be physically at one of the command centers and/or authentication would be done at some earlier stage. 14/
It's possible that whoever is in the authentication loop (eg the minister of defense) would balk at issuing the actual order, but it seems unlikely at that stage. And the president would have an opportunity to remove that person if necessary. 15/
So, the bottom line is probably that if we are talking about a retaliatory launch, the C2 system does provide some safeguards against a false alarm or a rash action of a single person. But when it comes to a deliberate first use, these safeguards could be circumvented. 16/16
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Regarding reports about ICBM fired by Russia to Dnipro. My take is that one must be skeptical and cautious. Regarding the "intercontinental" claim, the distance from Kapustin Yar to Dnipro is about 800 km. It's not an intercontinental range. But it's complicated. Short thread 1/
Some reports mentioned the RS-26 missile. Even if we believe them, RS-26 is not really an intercontinental missile. It was tested at the range of more than 5500 km, but it is in effect an intermediate-range missile, (think of it as SS-20 2.0): 2/russianforces.org/blog/2017/07/r…
The RS-26 program was mothballed in 2018 One cannot rule out that RS-26 was taken out of its "retirement" for a strike. This implies that Russia had a number of these missiles in storage for almost ten years. Not impossible, but rather unlikely. 3/russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/b…
There are a few things about the doctrine. While the changes have been in the works for some time, it does appear that the timing of the decree was chosen deliberately, to send a (strong) signal of disapproval of the decision to give the authorization. 1/
It's hard to say whether this signal will be followed by specific actions, of course. It's quite possible that Russia will take some escalatory steps outside Ukraine that would pose a serious challenge to the United States. 2/
What exactly those steps may be nobody knows but there are a number of options, from something demonstrative to something covert and ambiguous. I believe that these steps, if taken, will be non-nuclear, but the threat of escalation to nuclear would be strongly implied. 3/
Interestingly, NotebookLM did not see this as the most important (it's at the end of the thread). It also picked up a few more. Some are quite telling. I'll post them below. 1/
The "potential adversaries" is quite important. The mention of Belarus is less so (and NLM didn't get it quite right). 2/
This is interesting. I thought it was "reliable" in 2020 too. Drones etc. were expected, although I would say (I hope) that the launch must be massive enough to pose a threat to sovereignty etc. 3/
By the way, in the current version of Russia's nuclear doctrine there is no distinction between an aggression by nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon state. All you need is an aggression that threatens the existence of the state. However, there were/are negative security assurances 1/
These date back to 1995, but apparently still valid - Russia will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state except when it acts "in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State" 2/undocs.org/A/50/151
"In association" is not defined, of course, so it appears that the current formula - "with participation or support" - would apply. So, what's new? As far as I can tell, in the past, the implicit assumption was that an NWS would be the primary aggressor, joined by NNWSs 3/
I think we can tell which satellite is responsible for the "Russian nuclear something in space" scare. It's Cosmos-2553. Let's start with Mallory Stewart's statement earlier today at CSIS 1/
The US "has been aware of Russia's pursuit of this sort of capability but only recently have we been able to make a more precise assessment of their progress." What happened? "Russia has publicly claimed that their satellite is for scientific purposes." So, there's a satellite 2/
And it's an unusual satellite: "The orbit is in the region not being used by any other spacecraft." That's interesting. A satellite like that would stick out. There is more - "the orbit is in the region of higher radiation than normal lower Earth orbits." 3/
Colleagues reminded me that the Aegis Ashore system in Poland is about to become operational. The purpose of this entire project has always escaped me. Or, rather, I find it puzzling that a purely political enterprise with little or no utility has survived for so long. 1/
It was, of course, a political project from the very beginning. Obama had to do something about missile defense in Europe. The old GBI (in Poland and Czechia) was not particularly popular or capable. And it was a US mainland defense, so it had zero utility for Europe. 2/
Poland, of course, was happy to host, but Czechia - much less so. The old Europe was not happy about this at all, first because GBI was circumvented all NATO mechanisms and, second, because it was a serious irritant in US/NATO-Russia relations. 3/