Thread by @TomHJHill

1) De-escalation Pathways for the Ukrainian War, and How Big a Task this Will be for Negotiators: a 🧵 by a peace negotiator (long):

2) Nuclear conflict experts have been some of the first to point out the need for de-escalation pathways for this conflict, for obvious reasons.

3) Other mil strategy scholars have also started joining in: this is because, as @LawDavF put it, there are growing signs that neither the submission of Ukraine nor the militarily forced withdrawal of Russia from Ukrainian territory are likely to be possible

4) This situation therefore calls for serious work on a negotiated agreement (NA), because the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) looks both risky in the extreme and ruinously expensive for all concerned at best

5) (not to mention murderous for the Ukrainian citizenry, and Russian and Ukrainian militaries). All the more so as both sides have declared themselves willing to go all the way on their BATNA, wherever this war takes them.

6) Understanding and exploration of a realistic NA, therefore, needs to be strengthened. This requires much more than just recognizing a NA is a good idea. Highlighting how much work this is going to take is the point of this thread.

7) FWIW as a generalist outsider (not a Ukraine expert at all) with an interest in the conflict, my hunch is that the most reasonable and feasible middle ground framework will be something along the lines of:

8) A. Ukrainian independence, with its sovereignty and democratic system of gov respected/protected, with internal and ext. guarantees for this, including UE’s continuing right to possess its own military for self-defence (i.e. no to “demilitarization”)

9) B. Ukrainian neutrality, backed by internal and external guarantees
C. Russian withdrawal from Ukraine (other than Crimea and Donbas)
D. RUS possession of Crimea accepted in some form by Ukraine and the West (but short of recognition of Russia’s claim of legal sovereignty)

10) E. A constitutional solution to the Donbas (ranging from an implementation of Minsk to recognition of the independence of the two separatist territories)

F. Sanctions on Russia lifted

11) Caveat 1: there are worthy competitors out there to this list.
Caveat 2: A lot of mediation is about creating a 1st draft for the parties to shred so that you can start working out, through their reactions, where the bridges between them really lie. Take this in that spirit

12) Bringing a framework like this to life is not only about the will of the parties to commit to it. Each heading needs to be negotiated, modalities agreed and distrust that they will happen managed.

13) This is about as simple/feasible a list as I can imagine, but it still means a HUGE amount of hard negotiating. That’s what I'm here to stress. Calls for an impending NA may be, in current form, as glib as calls for supporting a UE mil vic or RUS regime change

14) This requires serious thought and serious work. Stalemates on the battlefield do NOT magically create the conditions for negotiated agreements — they only create an interest in them

15) Getting into negotiations on these individual points will be like splitting the atom: a lot of alternative moving parts and possibilities spill out underneath each of these headings. Each of varying levels of acceptability to Russia, Ukraine and NATO countries …

16) … that will each need to be wrestled over in the context of the wider negotiations and the evolving military situation, meaning the political and security implications of each point will be subjected to a kaleidoscope-like structure of evolving calculations and concerns.

17) One of my biggest (among many) concerns at the moment is RUS withdrawal, even if offered in return for the juicy incentive of something approaching recognition of RUS control of Crimea alongside guarantees for UE neutrality in perpetuity.

18) The Russian advance in the north and north east has appeared troubled, but its advances in the south and south east have gone quite well

19) I can see RUS finding it difficult to give up strategic “facts on the ground” in return for written promises and pledges, no matter how robustly embedded in international treaties and Ukrainian domestic laws.

20) Top of the list of those facts on the ground: 1) control of Europe’s biggest nuclear power station (and 25% of the current Ukrainian electricity supply); 2) keeping Kyiv within artillery range permanently (leverage); 3) control of waterways that sustain the Crimea; …

21) … 4) cutting Ukraine off from its ports on the coast through which 60% of its exports and 50% of its imports flow, along with significant revenues for the Ukrainian state, weakening the Russia-hostile power long-term.

22) Even if RUS agrees to withdraw, will it be full and immediate or phased? If phased, how many, over how long and against what conditions and guarantees? Who will do monitoring and verification? On what basis will all agree it’s taken place?

23) Then there will be the issue of security and ceasefire arrangements to enable withdrawal. There may also be issues of command and control of Ukrainian forces who may by then include a lot of people’s defence units under less direct control of the Ukrainian military.

24) Lots that can go wrong, lots of mechanisms that willneed to be negotiated to make withdrawal work, even if there is the political will to commit; and lots of ways the parties can turn these issues into a labyrinth of negotiations should they desire …

25) That’s just Withdrawal. Then there’s Crimea. Recognizing legal sovereignty over territories seized through aggression looks unfeasible, as far as I can tell, for the West.

26) So, softer or de facto forms of recognition/acceptance will be required (and I don’t believe Russia – neither Putin nor the Russian population – can give up on Crimea, so there is likely no escaping negotiations on this issue if we are to have a NA).

27) There are on-the-shelf tools for this, or yet-to-be made remedies put together by creative lawyers and negotiators. To give a flavour of options off-the-shelf: a lease arrangement; a UN-run, free/fair, internat. recognised referendum; 3) lots more (for future thread)

28) Those are difficult things to agree on, to say the least. Then there’s the Donbas. The trouble with the Minsk agreements hitherto tell you everything you need to know about the challenge of agreements on this, but this MIGHT be an issue that could be tabled for a later round.

29) Ukrainian Armed Neutrality: again, this issue is like splitting the atom when it comes to the form, content and sequence of negotiations that may be possible and required to make it real. For a future thread, but start to use your imagination and you get the idea.

30) Conclusion: a negotiated agreement looks, to the level headed, necessary and desirable, with signs there is a will on the RUS, UE and NATO sides to negotiate. But those three camps are going to need to get very professional and very detailed very quickly …

31) …if a negotiated agreement to end this war is going to have a chance. This is going to take a lot of late nights pouring over maps, data, positions and historical precedents. It will require a lot of creativity and political bravery, with publics prepared for the compromises

32) Conclusion cont.: While enormous resources are now being poured into the war from all sides, significant intellectual resources need to be poured simultaneously into working out the potential form, content and strategy of a negotiated agreement …

33) … if the bravery of the Ukrainians on the ground is to be matched with a sincere attempt by their Western backers to help them find a way out of this hell. END.