(1) The scale of the sanctions is unprecedented—and the single most significant sanction is the one that targets the Central Bank of Russia. To picture the scale, the CBR has roughly $640b in assets; whereas, at its peak in the early 2010s, Iran's entire GDP was around $550b.
(2) Putin almost definitely did not anticipate sanctions of this scale. The best evidence is that Moscow left a lot of its assets exposed—around 2/3 of the CBR's assets are denominated in G7 currencies. Deterrence may have failed because Putin underestimated the West.
(3) These sanctions were made possible by three main factors. First, Ukraine put up much stiffer resistance to Russia's invasion than anyone expected, winning the hearts and minds of the world. By denying Putin a blitzkrieg victory, Ukraine inspired the West to push back hard.
(4) Second, European opinion shifted dramatically after the invasion. Many (myself included) expected the EU to be laggards on sanctions. Instead, Putin's war shook Europe to the core, building political support for heavy sanctions—even though they would be costly for Europe.
(5) Third, early warning of Putin's invasion gave the West months to prepare and vet a menu of sanctions options. Since last fall, the G7 has been intensively coordinating sanctions. That's why they were ready as soon as Putin ordered tanks to roll (a big difference from 2014).
(6) While sanctions are unprecedented in scale, they're not yet comprehensive. The West retains ample room to increase pressure, if needed. Most significant, the West could impose an Iran-style pressure campaign on Russia's oil sales, reducing exports and locking funds offshore.
(7) The West could also expand full-blocking sanctions to additional Russian banks, including Sberbank (which is by far Russia's largest), as well as to non-financial state-owned enterprises across the energy, defense, mining, transport, shipping, and telecommunications sectors.
(8) Will China be Putin's white knight? I'm skeptical. Yes, Beijing will exploit the situation to advance its interests. But I doubt Beijing wants to be perceived as bankrolling Putin's imperialism. And a Sino-Russian alternative to the global financial system is a pipe dream.
(9) Will all this pressure change Putin's calculus? Sadly, it probably won't. But it does give Putin a powerful reason (in addition to Ukraine's tough resistance) to cut a deal. Even if Putin persists, sanctions remain valuable as they'll degrade Putin's capacity to do more harm.
(10) If Putin continues the war, Russia will become "North Korea on the Volga"—a pariah that is isolated economically and politically. This will be terrible for the Russian people, who deserve better. It's no cause for celebration. But right now, it's the likeliest outcome. /end
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(1) Step one is to close the massive loophole for Russian energy.
Since the start of the war, Treasury has maintained a general license that exempts payments for Russian oil and gas from financial sanctions The intent was to avoid spiking oil prices and worsening inflation.
(2) But economic conditions today are very different from February 2022. Inflation is at its lowest level in years, and the outlook for oil prices is bearish.
Biden should terminate the general license before he leaves office.
There is wide understanding that export controls are failing to stop Russia from acquiring critical components for its military-industrial complex
To try to fix the situation, @POTUS is effectively conscripting banks to implement the export controls (2/7)
This is a shrewd move: Banks are far better equipped to implement U.S. sanctions and export controls than other types of firms are, as is well explained in this recent podcast (3/7) thesanctionsage.com/p/episode-9-st…
I've been taking a break from commenting on current events as I finish my book. But I've been asked a lot about reports that Russia is now shipping oil without Western services and thus skirting the price cap, so I'm making an exception.
(1) Does this mean the price cap is faltering? In short, yes.
It was always clear that Russia would eventually be able to ship most (if not all) of its oil without Western services. The USG seemed to think it would take a long time. But it seems to be happening quickly.
(2) Does this mean the price cap is broken beyond repair? No.
From the start, the USG designed the price cap to be relatively light-touch — Washington was more worried about overcompliance than undercompliance, as I described here. energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/w…
As we approach the one-year mark of Putin's brutal attempt to conquer Ukraine, how are sanctions working? What should the US and its allies do on sanctions in the year ahead?
(2) Russia's economy has been more resilient than expected. But the outlook is bleak. By cutting off Russia from foreign technology + investment and slashing its oil revenues, sanctions are destroying the economic model Putin relies on to pursue an imperialist foreign policy.
(3) Importantly, it's not only Russia's economy that has shown resilience. Just as sanctions have not been as devastating to Russia in the short term as was originally anticipated, they have not hurt the United States or Europe as much as many feared.
In the last few months, @USTreasury has signaled it would ramp up enforcement of secondary sanctions on foreign companies providing support to Russia's military-industrial complex.
This week, we've gotten a clearer picture of what that means. A short 🧵:
(1) First, a definition: Secondary sanctions involve the US imposing penalties on foreign firms that support targets of US sanctions—eg, if the US were to sanction a Chinese firm that provided material support to a sanctioned Russian defense company, that's a secondary sanction.
(2) In September, after Russia held sham referenda in occupied Ukrainian territories, @USTreasury said it would ramp up enforcement of secondary sanctions. Specifically, it highlighted the risk of providing support to Russia's military-industrial complex. home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/…
Today, the G7 formally endorsed a price cap on Russian oil sales. This plan has been in the works for months. Many doubted it would get across the finish line.
Bottom line: This is a big deal. It will erode the Kremlin's most critical source of revenue: oil exports (🧵):
(1) First things first: Oil is the lifeblood of Russia's economy. In recent years, oil has accounted for 30-40% of the Kremlin budget. But sanctions have caused a 15% decline in Russia's non-oil revenues. The result is that oil is playing an increasingly essential role for Putin.
(2) To date, Western sanctions have not made a dent in Russia's oil revenues. While the US and several allies placed an embargo on Russian oil months ago, Russia has increased sales to China, India, and other countries, keeping the overall volume of its sales roughly constant.