Banks *in China itself* still use the greenback for more than two-thirds of their cross-border claims. Just 14% are denominated in yuan.
As is often pointed out, the Swiss Franc and Canadian and Australian dollars are used in more FX transactions than the Chinese yuan.
It's likely the yuan is more used down than in this 2019 data, but also consider that much of those flows will be with the Hong Kong dollar.
Which however you look at it is not exactly a global monetary transaction.
The key thing that I think people fail to understand about the dollar's global importance is that it's founded not so much on the U.S. dollar regulated by the U.S. Federal Reserve, but the eurodollar, an instrument that few people know about and fewer understand.
Are eurodollars money? Well, kinda. They owe their value to the fact that they're freely convertible with U.S. dollars, on the balance sheets of banks in the U.S. But they are created on the balance sheets of banks outside the U.S. and not subject to Federal Reserve regulation.
But I don't feel people are that much more clear about the role and significance of eurodollars than they were in 1971, when Milton Friedman wrote this highly readable paper on the nascent market:
Eurodollars were the crypto of their day -- a way to create money out of sight of government regulation. Their origin was in the dollar deposits of Communist countries after World War II, which the kept in Europe so that the Fed wouldn't be able to freeze their assets.
It's absolutely true that the Fed's post-2008 swap lines, and the growing use the dollar to extend the reach of Washington's secondary sanctions, and the action against the central bank of Russia last month, start eroding the eurodollar's autonomy.
But compare it to assets in a country like China with a closed capital account and sweeping asset forfeiture rules like China's so-called anti-sanctions law last year, and money based on the eurodollar is still the closest thing the world has to unregulated global finance.
If China opens up its capital account, starts running up huge budget deficits to provide more of a supply of safe assets, and establishes a solid reputation for rule of law, it might start to chip away at the edges of this edifice.
But any one of those conditions on its own would be an epic, extraordinary policy change, and would take decades to come to fruition. And that only gets you to the point where the yuan is as important as, say, the euro or the yen.
Dollar dominance is going to be with us for decades to come. (ends)
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Over the past few months I traveled to the former and future heartlands of the solar industry — Hemlock, Michigan and Leshan, Sichuan — to understand this chart.
How, in the space of 15 years, did China go from a bit-player in this key solar raw material to complete dominance?
There’s a ready explanation used by trade warriors as justification for tariffs and other bans: Beijing set out to dominate this industry, and may want to use solar energy as a weapon the way Moscow uses gas.
That’s the rationale behind the Biden administration’s 50% tariffs.
You might think that, installing more than half the world’s solar panels every year, China would be brimming over with solar installations.
One thing that really struck me, visiting over the past week, is how much unexploited potential is still there. 🧵
Looking out of plane and train windows in China these days you will see a lot of scenes like the above one. And at first glance it looks like a solar farm.
But it’s actually a farm farm! Polytunnels like this — often quite cheap-looking, with open sides —are everywhere.
China has 60% of the world’s greenhouses, covering about 8,000sq km according to this study last year.
The better crop yields from this have been key to keeping the country fed.
A thing people really do not understand about US companies fretting about their per-car EV losses stories is that this is almost entirely a spurious issue about the unique way US accountants treat certain types of R&D spending. 🧵
I've long been a huge fan of @michaelxpettis and agree with him about most aspects of China's economy, but I think there's good evidence that clean tech, at least, is seeing solid, operationally-financed, productivity-enhancing growth right now. 🧵
A pretty common argument you hear these days to justify trade restrictions on Chinese EVs, solar panels, and batteries is that the industries are only prospering because of unfair subsidies. I don't think that's supported by the data:
The argument goes something like this: China is awash in easy money from state banks; its renewable manufacturers are undercutting overseas rivals; ergo, its comparative advantage isn’t scale, efficiencies or innovation, but the availability of cheap government cash.
Last September I made one of the scariest calls I've made as a columnist — a prediction that consumption of crude oil had already peaked, despite predictions that this was a decade or more in the future:
Well, much of the ocean floor is strewn with these potato-sized pebbles, which appear to form through complex processes over millions of years and are rich in manganese and other useful base metals.
From time to time, people have thought about mining these nodules. The most famous case was an extraordinary Cold War caper in the 1970s, when Howard Hughes set up a fake nodule mining company as cover for a CIA operation to salvage a sunken Soviet nuclear submarine.