1/ Barcelona's structure was similar to what was seen v Galatsaray or other opponents. Where FdJ/Pedri did not interact much, they both progressed dynamically following ball receptions on either side of the pitch. Important to note García's connection with Pedri.
2/ Barcelona's structure saw Alba finding the midfield easily, given the double option the double-option he always could find (i.e wide to Ferran or centrally w/ Busquets & sometimes w/ Pedri). A result of simple overloads that allowed everyone to push up from the start.
3/ FdJ's press resistance was well utilized, i.e allowing Busquets time to take his decision given his passing range whilst allowing FdJ to invite press & distract it from Busquets, usually the most dangerous in terms of long-balls/switches. Allowed to overload wide, too.
4/ As Real Madrid could not contain Barcelona's progression, it not only allowed Busquets time but also Piqué & García. Arguably the best in those long-balls, Piqué exploited it well to reach Ferran Torres or other, more advanced outlets. Skipped the entire Madrid block.
5/ Jordi Alba had time following the goal-kick & Pedri drops deep w/ time advantage: Thanks to his body orientation, can accelerate tempo quickly w/ runners in front of him: Allows to split Madrid's wide-open defense (esp when there's a defender like Militao in front).
6/ Barcelona pressed Madrid from the first phase & the hosts quickly suffocated to a tight man-marking scheme. Despite some late pressing triggers on Barcelona's camp, it globally always stopped passing lanes or/and time. Allowed Busquets to press higher up, too.
6.a/ It's important that Busquets presses higher up to avoid him being the one to track back as he'd easily get outpaced by the opponent (especially Madrid!). This allowed FdJ & whoever was behind him to understand he'd have to cover which suited FdJ particularly, but also Eric.
7/ Late runs w/ FdJ are a trend since Koeman, but its timing has drastically improved w/ Xavi. His runs tend to land into the opponent's blind-spot, which allows more threat to be expected from possible reception.
8/ Madrid could not create through Vinicius the habitual threat with Araujo tightly marking him, aware of his surroundings prior to Vini's reception & allow the superior 1v1 situation (Araujo having the upper hand thanks to awareness + body orientation).
9/ Barcelona found easy transitions as the first line was often overcome with a direct, vertical pass to the midfield that allows the 5v5 higher up w/ advantage for Barcelona (tempo accelerator/initiator of actions).
10/ Dembélé's improvement remains positional, i.e understand that dribbling alone isn't always the best solution. Could break down the opposition block with one pass thanks to the forward movement that only translated into waiting a bit before releasing the pass.
11/ Eric García rightly identified Modrić main source of threat in the higher midfield which is why he blocked time/space right away, before ball reception to ensure Luka would not get the ball reception he looked for.
11.a/ This in turn translates into superb communication from the back-line, most likely the most drastic and important improvement under Xavi. Understanding that García pushed up, Alba turns back while Piqué holds his positions. This denied Madrid the long-ball transition.
12/ Barcelona rarely faced danger as most threat-creation sources had been shut down:
*Vini Jr is halted in the 1v1
*Modrić cannot find the necessary space to operate
*There is no threat in the box to worry about
Barcelona could limit ball progression w/ only one target.
13/ FdJ's strength came from the absence of a fixed role but rather an all-round helper. He's given the ball in order to start his disruptive run w/ enough passing options around him to release the ball whenever needed. Heaven on earth w/ the space made available by Madrid.
14/ Ferran's mobility allowed to evade pressure and to run in behind Madrid easily against his marker. Rapid football while keeping control of the situation. All-round helper around the pitch w/o being the main man.
15/ Why Xavi's system excels on either side of the pitch:
-Domination of horizontal lanes through proximity (press from front + behind)
-Domination of vertical lanes (allows to overload any zone w/in a few seconds whilst allowing distracting runs in behind as well).
16/ Barcelona rarely found Madrid's transitions difficult to defend against thanks to its rest defense. As defenders rarely had to commit forward (finding their corresponding interior/full-back through a vertical pass quickly), there not much to track back into. 2v4 situations.
17/ Busquets higher up translated into E.García becoming the base & in turn meant it was easier to manipulate the block w/ simple passes.
18/ Madrid started to falter as Barcelona's press did not require much running from everyone & as a consequence easier to intercept & therefore gain the ball higher-up (& this translates into the pressing ideas Xavi has gotten from Enrique).
19/ Barcelona continued using third/fourth man runs in the left-wing with Jordi Alba/Ferran Torres as runners & Pedri as the middle bridge, also acting as a distraction tool (or even screening/blocking as it's known in basket-ball). Allowed full fluidity for Barcelona.
20/ Barcelona often overloaded the right w/ Dembélé/Busquets/FdJ + Auba dropping deep which often meant Militao was left in hazardous situations where his decision-making shortcomings could be exploited by Ferran Torres.
21/ FdJ didn't drop deep as often as Pedri, but when he did, Dembélé made sure to prepare his run knowing FdJ would eliminate his marker and reach him. Allowed Dembélé to find himself in 1v1 w/ advantage where he could cut in like he wants.
22/ Madrid failed to connect both "islands" & it showed as they couldn't advance through Barcelona's press & block. Never disconnect your team into islands; Carlo Ancelotti's team saw its heavy consequences yesterday. occupied vertical lanes but not the horizontal ones.
23/ Madrid lacked clarity in its intentions, failing to find the verticality the opponent had done throughout the game & it stalled mentally from Madrid's side, failing to find players dropping deep without fully abandoning their zone. Absolute chaos.
24/Madrid sees Busquets and tracks him down for the vertical pass, but FdJ's slow (not sudden, important!) movement allows him to connect through the vertical pass that allows him to connect w/ Sergio. Eliminated half of Madrid's block by doing so.
25/ Madrid's loss can be explained through the tactico-mental deficiencies Carlo Ancelotti's side suffered:
-Vini Jr, usually a leader alongside Benzema, isolated like the rest of the forward line against Araujo (loses 1v1, mentally).
Araujo understood what to do against Vini.
25.a/ Modrić felt lost in a similar role to Benzema, but failing to see when to drop deep & when to attack space. Didn't help that he can't press as much as his colleague (translates into more defending, obviously detrimental to Madrid's block).
26/ Madrid lacked clarity in possession. Used to finding the transitions through communication, Los Blancos were suddenly isolated into two islands w/ nobody able to connect either & helped Barcelona in understand any one-sided threat that would be attempted.
27/ Madrid's Militao was doomed when forced to defend against a side that masters third-man runs (easily provoked into challenges w/ space behind him) & had a target in Auba that was almost impossible to defend (given Ferran/Alba/Pedri).
28/ It should be noted that the lack of interaction btw Pedri/FdJ should not be a worry as it is a natural cause of the system. Busquets acts as a distributor w/ time (as explained before) & therefore creates the bridge between either half-space both occupied.
29/Pedri dropping deeper than FdJ on average came as a consequence of his body turns that are different from FdJ, where the latter will be more efficient in attracting pressure & running late in behind (in the box). Very different roles that should be understood to be clear.
30/ Dembélé's game off and on the ball has massively improved and it's all patience y nada más. It's important to understand that wingers can control the game, too. And that's what Ousmane did in the first half, while Ferran + Auba distracted possible defenders.
31/It's important to note down that Araujo's ball-playing abilities are improving but that yesterday's match should not show it as his role was restricted to stop Vini (Busi/FdJ + Dembouz were tasked w/ progression on the right side w/ Piqué).
It's essential to see why the centre-backs have become so good under Xavi, most notably due to a midfield that find itself more available & that allows E.Garcia/Piqué to find their corresponding interior through a simple vertical pass as Madrid failed to close passing lanes.
End of thread.
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With now Traoré sitting wide as the lone right-winger, Xavi seeked to implement his quadruple in the center to overload the center, with now Dani Alves inverting.
Barcelona achieved absolute numerical superiority in the first phase against Atlético 2-men pressing scheme. Instead of relying on a regular 3v2, Dani Alves & Frenkie De Jong overloaded from both sides to create a 5v2 situation – ensuring numerical advantage from the beginning.
"What Simeone looks for is contrary to what we look for. He understands football in a different way. He feels comfortable without the ball, and I feel desperate on the touchline when my team doesn't have the ball".
Football was never a right or wrong, but differences.
On what he aimed to achieve:
"We want to achieve numerical superiority in the midfield and we worked for it with two different systems: the 3-5-2 and the 3-4-3."
This turned out to be perfect for Dani Alves, helping as the +1 man in the midfield.
The plan was well executed, as Araujo confirmed:
"We had a good game. We did what the manager told us to do, and it went as planned."
It was, for sure, one of the best games in recent months. The 'Xavi' effect hasn't faded out, whether it pleases Josep Pedrerol or not.
Barcelona intended to build-up as accustomed but unlike previous encounters, access was blocked as early as the first phase of build-up. Neither of Piqué/Araujo pushed back Athletic Club's first line. In turn, that meant no Busquets in build-up & relying on full-backs.
In other words, Barcelona relied on what they could not rely. Full-backs were free to receive but had a natural, physical disadvantage upon ball reception in the 1v1 that the opponent dominated. They did not have the angle nor the time to continue build-up. A mental barrier.
Tuned into Galatasaray-Kasimpasa to watch how Domenec Torrent's team is doing in his beginnings. Obvious issues but for sure something to retain is that there are ideas that will need implementation. Of course not a good look to lose 1-3 against Kasimpasa, 15th in the Süper Lig.
One experiment that however caught my eye & @QuanTue pointed out to me is the surprising role given to Patrick Van Aanholt. Found himself at the heart of every progression through the (weak) midfield as the Galatasaray's touchmap above portrays it. For sure an interesting idea.
Kasimpasa enjoyed attacking through the right-wing as Galatasaray were not able to defend well in transitions. Bit of a chaos but I'd assume that Aanholt's inclusion in the midfield is the consequence of Galatasaray being able to progress through the wings, but no the midfield.
"The smartest thing a player can do is interpret when to keep the ball for a bit longer and when to release it. Only a handful are able to decipher those moments. I always try to interpret what the game demands but many times I do it wrong."
Every decision of a footballer betrays their state of mind, their understanding, their intentions. In an advanced role like Boyé's where space is scarce, each decision matters as touches on the ball are limited; Which is why he prefers to involve himself in the build-up.
Q: Analysis of your game indicates that 80% of your touches result in threat creation and allows the team to advance. This suggests you tend to choose well.
A: The numbers of course please me. But it's relative. Maybe when we advance, we could advance in another, faster way.
1/ Real Betis cut off access to Busquets by playing two forwards between Araujo/Lenglet & Sergio. Full-backs were also man-marked, leaving Barcelona w/ the following question:
"How do we advance from there?"
They found the answer after a while: Patience to move Betis.
2/Barcelona exploited the principle of "Pass in front->receive->pass back-> advance", which resulted in a good occupation of space Real Betis left open, but the efficiency in the last few actions still lacks, unfortunately.