Vladislav Surkov is reportedly arrested. For years he ran Russian domestic politics and later Kremlin's policy in Ukraine. On Feb 15 he published an article calling for the war to reannex Ukraine, Belarus and Baltics. Today I'll discuss his role in Putin's rise to Presidency🧵
Surkov has mixed heritage. His dad is Chechen - Andarbek Dudaev, his mom is Russian - Zoya Surkova. He spent his childhood in a Chechen village where he was known as Aslanbek Dudaev. But then his parents divorced and his mom took him to Russia proper, where he turned to Vladislav
After school Surkov served in army, in military intelligence. With the start of Perestroika, commerce was allowed in the USSR. In 1987 Surkov started working for Khodorkovsky, who would soon become the richest oligarch in Russia. Here you see Surkov, Nevzlin and Khodorkovsky
How did Khodorkovsky get so rich? This story reflects the origins of many oligarchic fortunes. Khodorkovsky was the chief of local NТТМ - Office for Scientific and Technological Initiatives of the Youth. NTTM was a department of Komsomol - the youth branch of the Communist Party
Until Perestroika positions in these NТТМ centres were not that lucrative. Komsomol functionaries serving there didn't have much leverage. But then everything changed. To understand why, we'll do a little trip into the Soviet monetary system and how did the Soviet money function
In 1929-1932 Stalin imposed total control over the Soviet economy. All enterprises were turned into state enterprises. To facilitate his statist model Stalin built new monetary system. In traditional system there was one circular flow of money. Stalin created two separate flows
The first one was the cash flow. The state used cash to pay wages to people and people used it to buy stuff from the state. Second flow was noncash. Government enterprises and agencies used it for transactions with each other. Cashing out noncash money was absolutely prohibited
Why would Stalin do that? Largely to pump money into the industry without triggering hyperinflation. Government created as much money as necessary for construction + subsidies, but made sure it won't be used by regular people for buying stuff. Hence prohibition for cashing out
Prices on retail market were quite arbitrary. For example public transport was far cheaper than it really costed to the state. Meanwhile cars were super expensive, the state selling them with like 200-300% profit. State earned money selling cars and thus funded the public transit
And yet noncash prices were *way* more arbitrary. For example, textile and aerospace industry production was valued in noncash roubles. But regarding the cost of production, the weight of a noncash ruble in the latter could be hundreds or thousands times higher than in the former
The system worked as long as the Soviet economy remained strictly statist. As long as the prohibition to cash out noncash money was enforced. But in Perestroika they experimented with introducing market elements to the statist economy and this new hybrid system didn't work at all
In 1988 the new Law on Cooperation officially allowed the commerce. In theory it would allow normal people to do business ("кооператив"). In practice however, Soviet/Russian "business" was mostly about government functionaries cashing out their administrative leverage
A government agency (factory, ship company, local government) would establish a private firm (cooperative) with the agency's CEO as the main beneficiary. CEO of a state agency would plunder it in order to transfer resources to his private firm. That's why they were so lucrative
In 1988 NTTMs were allowed to break a great Soviet taboo on cashing out the noncash money, making them a leverage for plunder. An NTTM chief would establish a private cooperative, cash out government noncash funds and transfer them to his cooperative, effectively privatising them
Of course, NTTM chiefs started cashing out as much noncash funds as they could. That triggered hyperinflation, destroying the frailing Soviet economy, but created some enormous fortunes. Such as the one of Khodorkovsky - the future richest oligarch in Russia
This shows why the NТТМ leadership is so overrepresented among the richest Russians. They used the crony opportunities Komsomol gave them and cashed out lavishly. Moreover, it shows why former Komsomol leaders in general are so overrepresented among the current Russian elites
Soviet propaganda portrayed Komsomol as idealistic youth faithful to the Leninism. This was often true in 1920-1960s. However, by the 1980s true believers were selected out. New leadership consisted of incredibly cynical and opportunistic folk - such as Khodorkovsky or Matvienko
Upward mobility within the adult Party was difficult by the 1980s. Frailing gerontocracy occupied all the positions of power and refused to leave. So young smart and cynical Komsomol guys waited for their chance, and exploited the collapse of Soviet system better than anyone else
Let me quote Dorenko:
"We'll live for 130 years. My kids and grandkids will live in my shadow. Only my great-great-grandchildren will see the sky. We'll fuck everyone. Why us? Cuz we've plundered the country. We killed, slandered our fathers. That's why our generation is unique"
So Surkov started working for a crony Komsomol official Khodorkovsky as his PR deputy. Khodorkovsky's star was rising and Surkov's too. Soon he was leading the PR service for the richest oligarch in Russia, controlling its largest oil company
Surkov was too smart too put all eggs into one basket. While working for Khodorkovsky he consulted the government. So in 1999 when Voloshin became the chief of Yeltsin's Presidential Adimistration, he chose Surkov as his deputy. So he left his former boss for the new Kremlin job
Surkov became Kremlin's deputy its domestic policy. His most important task was "drowning" the ousted ex-PM Primakov and advancing new Yeltsin's successor - Putin. Putin had full support of the Kremlin, but was totally unknown. You needed to make him electable
Putin had Kremlin, but Primakov had regional elites. 84 out of 89 governors supported Primakov. And governors used to have a lot of power back then, especially leaders of major cities like Moscow and St Petersburg. Meanwhile the unknown Putin's party "Unity" had zero governors
In early 1999 nearly 100% of the non-Kremlin political establishment supported Primakov seeing him as the obvious successor. Those who didn't were usually outcasts whom Primakov didn't accept for some reason. And yet, Kremlin did everything they could to prevent Primakov's rise
Surkov personally talked with governors and persuaded 39 of them to join Putin. So now Putin had 39 and Primakov only 45. How did Surkov accomplish it? First, he made it clear that Kremlin won't allow Primakov to win. The fact that Putin had dossiers on all of them might help too
Surkov also did fund-raising. Berezovsky and Abramovich were the two biggest donors for the Putin's campaign, but there were many others. On average businessmen would donate just 10 million dollars each - more like insurance in case Putin wins
A clique that pushed Putin to power was deeply interconnected. Berezovsky knew Putin since early 1990s when he worked in St Petersburg Government. Reportedly it was Berezovsky who first proposed to the Family that former Sobchak's deputy could become a heir to the Russian throne
Btw, watch this interview with Putin who just moved to Moscow in 1996. He talks as a shy nervous civil servant who owes everything to his superiors and thinks that the presidential household management is the work which suits his talents best
Let's discuss Berezovsky clique. Media tycoon Berezovsky was the mastermind. Voloshin, his former aide who would later lead presidential administration was a numbers guy. And Dorenko was a wordcel, or perhaps *the* wordcel. The most powerful reputation destroyer in Russia
I like the story of how Berezovsky hired Dorenko. In 1994 enemies tried to kill Berezovsky. They put a bomb into his car. The explosion killed his driver but only burnt shellshocked Berezovsky himself. He was hospitalised. A TV host Dorenko came immediately to make a report
Dorenko commented the assassination attempt
"I don't believe an honest man can become that rich. Ofc Berezovsky is a criminal and fights with other criminals. That's ok. Unfortunately, normal people suffer. Imagine if some regular woman, a teacher walked nearby and was killed?"
Dorenko told:
"Let's make a polygon where scumbags like Berezovsky will hunt each other. Let them shoot, blow up, flay each other alive and make belts out of leather. So normal people won't suffer"
Berezovsky, burnt and shellshocked, loved it:
"I need him". Dorenko was hired
Dorenko was the heavy artillery of Berezovsky. He worked closely with Voloshin who translates financial documents "on a human language" so Dorenko could understand them. In 1999 Berezovsky, now Kremlin's chief of staff Voloshin, and telekiller Dorenko cooperated to boost Putin
Consider how Dorenko drowned Primakov, by far the most popular politician in the country. He didn't *technically* attack him. He acted smarter. Primakov just had a knee surgery. So Dorenko discussed it on TV with all medical details and even broadcasted a footage of the surgery
Dorenko didn't criticize Primakov. He rather conveyed the idea that Primakov was too old and frail and thus a bad choice for the country. Even if viewers were appaled by Dorenko's take, they would still associate Primakov with the footage they saw. That undermined his election
While Surkov was pressuring governors to join Putin, his boss Voloshin was working on a national level. Three strongest parties in Russia were Communists, Fatherland (Primakov) and Unity (Putin). Voloshin made a secret pact with Communists, so that Primakov was isolated
Once Primakov's MPs realised they will be in a minority in the Russian parliament with Unity + Communists alliance controlling everything, they started leaving Primakov en masse. Primakov's party was destroyed not so much by voters choice as by the court intrigues
The transfer of power from Yeltsin to Putin went very easily. Look at this photo of Putin's campaign staff celebrating his election as a president. You see Voloshin, chief of Yeltsin's staff and his deputy Surkov. It wasn't a real election, it was a quasimonarchical succession
After securing Putin's succession, Voloshin considered his job done. He wrote a resignation letter, stating the "transition of power in the country" as a reason and handed it to Putin. Putin smiled and put it away. He decided to keep both Voloshin and Surkov in Kremlin. End of 🧵
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Many are trying to explain his success with some accidental factors such as his “personal charisma”, Cuomo's weakness etc
Still, I think there may be some fundamental factors here. A longue durée shift, and a very profound one
1. Public outrage does not work anymore
If you look at Zohran, he is calm, constructive, and rarely raises his voice. I think one thing that Mamdani - but almost no one else in the American political space is getting - is that the public is getting tired of the outrage
Outrage, anger, righteous indignation have all been the primary drivers of American politics for quite a while
For a while, this tactics worked
Indeed, when everyone around is polite, and soft (and insincere), freaking out was a smart thing to do. It could help you get noticed
People don’t really understand causal links. We pretend we do (“X results in Y”). But we actually don’t. Most explanations (= descriptions of causal structures) are fake.
There may be no connection between X and Y at all. The cause is just misattributed.
Or, perhaps, X does indeed result in Y. but only under a certain (and unknown!) set of conditions that remains totally and utterly opaque to us. So, X->Y is only a part of the equation
And so on
I like to think of a hypothetical Stone Age farmer who started farming, and it worked amazingly, and his entire community adopted his lifestyle, and many generations followed it and prospered and multiplied, until all suddenly wiped out in a new ice age
1. Normative Islamophobia that used to define the public discourse being the most acceptable form of racial & ethnic bigotry in the West, is receding. It is not so much dying as rather - failing to replicate. It is not that the old people change their views as that the young do not absorb their prejudice any longer.
In fact, I incline to think it has been failing to replicate for a while, it is just that we have not been paying attention
Again, the change of vibe does not happen at once. The Muslim scare may still find (some) audience among the more rigid elderly, who are not going to change their views. But for the youth, it is starting to sound as archaic as the Catholic scare of know nothings
Out of date
2. What is particularly interesting regarding Mamdani's victory, is his support base. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that its core is comprised of the young (and predominantly white) middle classes, with a nearly equal representation of men and women
What does Musk vs Trump affair teach us about the general patterns of human history? Well, first of all it shows that the ancient historians were right. They grasped something about nature of politics that our contemporaries simply can’t.
Let me give you an example. The Arab conquest of Spain
According to a popular medieval/early modern interpretation, its primary cause was the lust of Visigoth king Roderic. Aroused by the beautiful daughter of his vassal and ally, count Julian, he took advantage of her
Disgruntled, humiliated Julian allied himself with the Arabs and opens them the gates of Spain.
Entire kingdom lost, all because the head of state caused a personal injury to someone important.
One thing you need to understand about wars is that very few engage into the long, protracted warfare on purpose. Almost every war of attrition was planned and designed as a short victorious blitzkrieg
And then everything went wrong
Consider the Russian war in Ukraine. It was not planned as a war. It was not thought of as a war. It was planned as a (swift!) regime change allowing to score a few points in the Russian domestic politics. And then everything went wrong
It would not be an exaggeration to say that planning a short victorious war optimised for the purposes of domestic politics is how you *usually* end up in a deadlock. That is the most common scenario of how it happens, practically speaking
Global politics are usually framed in terms of kindergarten discourse (“good guys” vs “bad guys”) with an implication that you must provide “good guys” with boundless and unconditional support
BUT
Unconditional support is extremely corrupting, and turns the best of the best into the really nasty guys, and relatively fast
Part of the reason is that neither “bad” nor “good” guys are in fact homogenous, and present a spectrum of opinions and personalities. Which means that all of your designated “good guys” include a fair share of really, really nasty guys, almost by definition.
Purely good movements do not really exist
That is a major reason why limitless, unconditional, unquestioning support causes such a profound corrupting effect upon the very best movement. First, because that movement is not all
that purely good as you imagine (neither movement is),