AD thread 2: Immediately post the 1962 war, changes were made across three vectors – AD Command & Control structure, modern equipment from America & USSR and a Surface to Air missile defence system (SA-2). #IAFHistory (26/41)
IAF setup “Air Defence Area” HQs at Ambala, Jodhpur & Barrackpore headed by Air Cmde’s, responsible for all AD in the Area. In 1966, these were renamed as Air Defence Control Centre (ADCC) & co-located with Cmd HQ. These days the org is led by an AVM designated as AD Cdr. 27/
“Ex – Shiksha” was conducted in Nov 63. RAF sent Javelins, RAAF Canberras & USAF F-100s & two mobile radar units having MPS 11/ 16 radars. Javelins were deployed at Kalaikunda, Canberras at Agra, F-100s at Palam & the radar units (named 311 & 411 SUs) at Patiala and Rampurhat 28/
The performance of IAF pilots & controllers was appreciated. Best interceptions were done by “Charlie” Puranik from 411 SU. 6 x American Star Sapphire units (500 SU series) with FPS 89 & 100 radars & 12 x P-30 units (200 SU series) were approved for induction. 29/
FPS 100 was a 2-D Surveillance Radar & FPS-89 a Ht Finding Radar. These were huge and radomed.(Pak had its fore-runner version- FPS 20 & FPS 6). Originally, the installation was overseen by the engineers of Bendix Radio Corporation. US Assistance was withdrawn in Sep 65. 30/
Since only two SUs had been installed, No. 1 Electronic Engineering and Installation Unit (EE&IU) was raised for completing this task. The tech officers assigned to the task performed admirably. Much later the unit was renamed as 17 SU. 31/
Locations of Star Sapphire units were planned to counter both Pak & China. As per the US concept, complete works services for technical; admin and domestic accommodation were carried out simultaneously at each location to make the units self-sufficient in all respects. 32/
IAF switched over to the American terminology. SOC was renamed as Air Defence Direction Centre (ADDC), Controllers were now Directors, Chief Controller was Sector Director and so on.Trades of Rad/Opr and Ftr/Pltr were merged and renamed as ADSO. 33/
Plotting & display of info was done on big Perspex Vertical Plotting Boards. Brightly lit Ops rooms, were now dimly lit. Indep troposcatter com network was planned to reduce dependence on P&T lines. Rdr & Comm Project Office (RCPO) and Dte of Plan ADGES were created at AirHQ 34/
USSR agreed to provide SA-2 surface to missiles for 17 firing, 4 tech & one trg battalion. These were deployed - 5 in Chandigarh-Ambala, 6 at Calcutta, 6 at Delhi & one trg and support at Baroda. Eqpt arrived by Apr 64 and by Oct 65, USSR had delivered 144 SA-2 missiles. 35/
SA-2 purchase from USSR was not taken well by the USA. In now declassified CIA files, they tracked the move of the SA-2 systems as they left USSR & were installed in India. Soon after, USA left IAF in sep65 with only two radars installed, leaving us to deal with the rest. 36/
The SA-2 system had a V-750 missile and two-stage propellants. The control surfaces on the two fins were guided by radio command. The target was tracked by radar which fed a signal to a computer. It was designed to engage targets between the ranges of 7-40 km. 37/
Subsequent shipments after the 1965 conflict boosted the strength by an addl 8 sqns, to 48 launchers and 75 missiles, all of which were delivered between 1968-72. 34 Sqn became the first Trg sqn and 46 Sqn, commanded by ML Sethi (later Air Mshl) was the first combat sqn. 38/
SA-2 were organised as clusters. 6 SAM “Wings” were formed with sites around the wing in a 50km radius. The philosophy had remained the same – in addition to eyes, have missile protection for key cities & installations. 24 and 31 wings were disbanded in 1992, the rest remain. 39/
ML Sethi was a pioneer. He was amongst the first batch of Air Force personnel to be trained on a SAM system. As Officer Commanding of an operational SAM squadron , undeterred by hardships, he achieved the distinction of the first SAM unit in IAF to become operational. 40/
Having covered the birth of AD in India & the multi-spectral sweeping changes made in the 1960s, the next thread will focus on the “rubber hitting the road” – how the AD setup fared in the 1965 and 71 wars 41/41
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On 20 Nov 1957, Air Cmde PC Lal, then AOC Training Command, hung up his blues and moved to Indian Airlines as GM on a 5 year deputation, to steady a struggling carrier. Few knew this would almost cost India one of its finest Chiefs. (1/12)
#IAFHistory @IAF_MCC
As GM, Lal sat on the committee to choose a replacement for the Dakotas. Three contenders were in play: the Avro HS 748, the Fokker Friendship and a Lockheed design. Defence Minister Krishna Menon was keen that India pick the Avro. 2/
There was one problem. The Avro barely existed. No prototype. No flight record. No performance sheets. Not even complete drawings. Menon still wanted an immediate firm order. Lal, responsible for passenger safety, refused to sign. 3/
In 1973, when princely titles were history, Jamnagar’s ruler Shatrusalyasinhji D. Jadeja entered uniform as Honorary Wing Commander. The Indian Air Force did not honour a title; it honoured a man who kept serving after titles stopped mattering. (1/14)
#IAFHistory
In 1950, under H.H. Digvijaysinhji's guidance, Jamnagar opened an Indian Air Force station. Roads were laid, land and clearances came quickly, and the base was treated as a civic priority from day one. The bond began as stewardship, not ceremony. 2/
In 1952, Jamnagar gifted an eight-inch silver pilot on wood that went each term to the “most promising” trainee at Jodhpur’s No. 2 Air Force Academy. It rewarded potential over pedigree—an early sign of how the house chose to back the IAF. 3/
Meant to hide at a quiet base, the @IAF_MCC MiG-21 instead made a home at Chandigarh. A six-month stopgap became four decades. The place where the story begins and ends. Here’s how it unfolded. 🧵(1/16)
#MiG21Nuggets #IAFHistory
After Independence, the IAF used “type bases”: Pune had Tempests, Kalaikunda had Mystères, Ambala had Hunters. That tidy system was still in place when the MiG-21 came up for induction. 2/
Before the team left for the USSR, AVM Pinto told CO designate, (then) Wg Cdr Dilbagh Singh the first MiG-21 squadron would go to Adampur—quiet, remote and ideal for secrecy. 3/
This, right here 👇🏽—is the real reason the MiG-21 earned the "flying coffin" tag. No, it wasn’t the LCA delay. No it wasnt the machine or spares itself.
The real cause lies deeper. The data and context are all there. Few connect the dots. Read On. (1/19)
#IAFHistory
I wrote about this in a @timesofindia editorial a few years ago. The MiG-21 earned the “Flying Coffin” tag not because of its airframe—but because we made it carry the weight of our institutional failure between 1980s -2000s. 2/
The MiG-21 entered IAF service in 1963, our first supersonic jet. It demanded a steep learning curve—especially in landing, where speeds exceeded 300 km/h. That was 2–3x faster than subsonic jets like the Vampire. It was not beginner-friendly. 3/
1/ There's growing confusion between two important systems:
👉🏽 Akashteer
👉🏽 IACCS
Both play crucial roles in India’s air defence.
But let’s be clear — they operate at different altitudes — literally and metaphorically.
Here’s how 👇 (1/8)
#IAFHistory
But, let’s get some history, geography and law right.
History: The Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept was first developed by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (US Navy) and John Garstka in 1998. It envisioned linking forces digitally to enhance situational awareness and increase warfighting effectiveness.
2/
📕 Let’s talk law — the Union War Book is India’s master document on war responsibilities.
Until 1993, there was no single agency for air defence.
Each service did its bit, and consequently the Army built up significant frontline/terminal AD assets.
Then came a historic shift:
🛡️ “Air Defence of the country is the responsibility of the IAF.”