Thread by @CiarliniKoerner

Warning: this is going to be rather controversial.

I've decided to talk a bit about common misconceptions about the "Taranto night", at least in the wider public.

Just a quick, general talk, nothing more.

#RegiaMarina #RoyalNavy #Tarantonight #FaireySwordfish

1st: As it served as an 'inspiration' for Pearl Harbour, people often exaggerate the losses the RM took, taking it as a mini-PH that pretty much knocked out the RM out of the war for a while.

This happens rather often, with people claiming three BB sunk and more ships damaged.

Yeah... not quite. Only one battleship ended up sunk (mostly because it wasn't beached in time), and the others returned to service in a matter of months; hardly the years it took for the USN battlewagons.

The halving of the Italian battle squadron thus was rather temporary.

The heavy cruiser Trento and the destroyer Libeccio were hit by bombs, but suffered negligible damage; a few seaplanes were destroyed, and the oil tanks suffered damage again defined negligible.

People at times exaggerate all this consequences.

2nd: Linked to the above, the Taranto night either 'knocked the RM out of the war' or was in any way a decisive strategic victory.

While a success and a further discouragement for more aggressive approaches with capital ship, strategically not that much changed.

The battle fleet was temporarily relocated to Naples, until Taranto's defenses were upgraded. This made intervening in the eastern Med more difficult, but not impossible.

Having just two battleships operational (the Andrea Doria wasn't ready) put a stop to that, for the moment.

True, the Mediterranean Fleet released a few ships; however, losing HMS Ramillies (the R-class were too slow to be useful against the Italians) and HMS Malaya (least modernized of the QEs) in my opinion wasn't that huge of a sacrifice.

An interesting consequence may be the influence it played in the RM's decision to go with Operation Gaudo - which would lead to the even more tragic Matapan debacle.

Smarting from this, and wanting to 'do something' also to meet pressure from the Germans. It makes sense.

In one case, though, Taranto itself had pretty much no effect: the convoy war, at least on the Italian side.

The RM's traffic remained stable, despite the ramping up of British effort. It would take Force K, much later, to make things go south.

The contemporary raid in the Strait of Otranto by the 7th Division, and the destruction of a small convoy for Albania, did more in this sense, as it led to the reinforcement of escorts to these convoys, further straining the limited Italian resources.

3rd: Taranto is often cited as proof that the controversial Pugliese torpedo defense system performed poorly.

I'll just put here what I wrote before, mentioning a resource mentioned a bit, when asked for proof for such assertions:

https://twitter.com/CiarliniKoerner/status/1516723619182915585

I'll also add that Adm. Carlo Bergamini, in his report on the damage to the battleships, remarked that the Littorio (the one ship in which the system was involved) also suffered from indifferent damage control practices (and this was a valuable lessons, that helped out)...

...and that the ship, built by Ansaldo at Genoa, didn't quite show the same degree of workmanship that her sister ship Vittorio Veneto, built by the CRDA at Trieste, showed instead.

Factors not found by earlier historians, whose thoroughness is... questionable.

This is it; just a brief touch on the main issues that are usually to be found, when the Taranto night is brought up.

Not a thorough analysis of what went down, by any means. Perhaps just a tiny provocation on my part; or a bit of a rant, maybe. 🙄

Kudos to @TheDreadShips for showing me how to use alt text for the pictures; really useful feature! 👍