Last time #Transnistria made to the headlines was when Sheriff Tiraspol defeated Real Madrid. This time around it is not #championsleague which catapults Transnistria in, but geopolitics. Let me weigh in as the news about imminent escalation of the conflict multiply. 1/38
For years Russia used Transnistria as a multipurpose vehicle against Moldova. 1st, building image of more viable and prosperous entity than MD proper. In the past it was not rare to hear on the right bank talk abt cheap household heating & higher pensions in Transnistria. 2/38
Transnistria was also supposed to be an example - the closer one sticks to Russia, the better one lives. Over the last years, “Transnistrian model” lost the lustre. Chisinau report since 2017 increasing number of ppl from Transnistria applying for pension in Moldova proper. 3/38
The second function is to punish Moldovan government for “wrong” foreign policy choices. Russian controlled power plant in Transnistria cut out electricity deliveries to Moldova proper in autumn 2005 as government in Chisinau signed memorandum on EU border mission (EUBAM). 4/38
It did not however pay off. EUBAM turns 17 & is more relevant for Moldova’s security today than ever before. 5/38
The third function is to slow down Moldova’s integration with the EU. In early 2010s Russia tried to leverage Transnistria to derail EU-Moldova negotiations over DCFTA & implementation of visa free road map. 6/38
The efforts turned to be futile. After Moldova got visa free with the EU, Chisinau reported increasing number of applications for biometric passports from Transnistria. As of 2022 there are 313.000 Moldovan biometric passports in the region & the number keeps growing. 7/38
In 2014 Transnistria claimed to have population of 475.373; in reality, it is lower due to massive immigration. 8/38
In 2015 after Tiraspol agreed to meet certain conditions, the EU decided to extend DCFTA to entire territory of Moldova. This move deepened Transnistria’s dependence on European market (around 70% share of exports, which may become higher in 2022). 9/38
Last but not least, the ultimate prize for Russia is reinsertion of Transnistria on its terms into Moldova proper, with aim to obtain veto power and shape domestic and foreign policy of central authorities in Chisinau. 10/38
Last time around, Moscow tried to pull something like that was in autumn 2021. Resumption of gas deliveries to Moldova (drastically reduced in October) was conditioned by a quick “resolution” of the Transnistrian conflict; “offer” rebuffed repeatedly by Chisinau. 11/38
One provisional conclusion to retain: Russia despite numerous attempts over the last decade failed to get solid returns from its asset called Transnistria. 12/38
In 2010s, the use of Transnistria went beyond Moldova. Russia presented Transnistria as a place in the neighbourhood where the EU & Russia can make progress. This illusion was quite appealing to some in Europe, and remained so at least until the February 24. 13/38
Since 2014, Transnistria has become increasingly important for Russia’s agenda in Ukraine too. It has been used to launch destabilization campaigns in Southern Ukraine. The region provided also shelter to Russian proxies who failed the mission in Odesa. 14/38
Russia increased the number of military exercises in Transnistria too, to compel Ukraine to keep some troops in south, away from eastern front. 15/38
More to that, on the diplomatic front Russian preferred settlement in Transnistria should have set the precedent of how the conflict in Eastern Ukraine shall be solved. This was valid before February 24. 16/38
After February 24 the chances for escalation in Transnistria went significantly up. Russian troops were making fastest progress in the south & it was not clear whether the Mykolaiv (on the road to Odesa) wld hold on. 17/38
All of the sudden land corridor to Transnistria became a real possibility. 18/38
The risk was also high that Russia will annihilate Ukraine’s air defence in south and may build air corridor to Transnistria, using its airport in Tiraspol. 19/38
Reinforcement of military contingent in Transnistria would diversify Russia’s options: violent regime change in Chisinau or piercing attack towards Odesa. 20/38
But the war dragged on. Russia failed to destroy Ukraine’s air defence and land offensive in south bogged down. Russian aviation did not perform well too. Paratroopers took heavy loses in Ukraine. 21/38
Two months into war, the threat of land/air corridor to Transnistria has receded. Both remain a possibility, but less probable, at least for now. 22/38
Ukraine is literally serves as air and land shield of Moldova. Thus, survival of Ukraine in its internationally recognized border is vital for Moldova. 23/38
It is not the end of the story. Transnistria as Russia’s lever on Moldova might become weaker not stronger in the coming months. Because border with Ukraine is closed it totally depends now on imports (food, medicine) via Moldova proper. 24/38
Moldova frantically looks for alternatives to electricity from Transnistria and to gas from Russia (one gas pipeline entering Moldova crosses separatist region). The success is not guaranteed but Russia’s energy tools in Moldova may become weaker. 25/38
The overall impact of war on Moldova: on the one hand weakens its economy (no access to Russian market, decrease of remittances), on the other hand, precipitates its almost total economic disconnection from Russia. In other words, Moldova slips away. 26/38
All this taken combined may dictate an urgent course of action to destabilize Moldova & with Transnistria (somehow reluctantly) playing its part. 27/38
The separatist region does not have military capabilities or enough troops to seize alone Moldova. When ppl make a military balance, they often forget abt sizable police force in Moldova. Police undergoes not only public order but also military training. 28/38
Reminder: in 1992 Moldovan police actively participated in the military conflict with Transnistria. 29/38
Geography shall be factored in too. Moldova proper and Transnistria are separated by river (with some exceptions), which is a natural barrier in any military operation. 30/38
If not conventional military attack then what? Projection of sabotage and provocation operations inside Moldova proper. Targets: critical infrastructure, monuments to WWII, representatives of national minorities. Anything what can hurt and inflame. 31/38
In the past Transnistrian security forces crossed the river to abduct citizens from the right bank of river. In 2020 police reported 81 such cases during the last ten years. 32/38
More provocations inside TN to create sensation in Moldova proper of an imminent conflict. This may go hand in hand with Russian political clients in Chisinau attacking the government for allegedly bellicose posture towards Russia and blaming for unravelling peace. 33/38
Such actions will go hand in hand with new wave of disinformation (re urgent conscription to the army, movement of heavy weapons from one region to another, etc.) to inflame panic. 34/38
Russia’s attempt to deploy “reporter” from RIA Novosti to Transnistria (who was not allowed to enter Moldova and sent back home) is another sign of intention to up the ante. 35/38
How effective Russia’s destabilization operation in Moldova is will depend if and to which extent local proxies will coalize and will play the part. As well to which degree local elites in Transnistria will get involved or manage to sabotage themselves Russia’s efforts. 36/38
I am not going to predict how things will play out in the coming weeks. But I can point out to few things to watch: 37/38
any piece of information on high level resignations/rotations among TN elites; public posturing of Russia’s political clients in Moldova; manifestations in Chisinau on May 9; extension/non-extension of contract on electricity deliveries from Transnistria after June 1. 38/38
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