🧵Another week, another thread by "Karl," @holger_r's and my Estonian whisperer. As usual, Karl offers many crucial insights.
“Russia’s offensive energy seems to be fading. Last week they lost at least 10 BTGs worth of equipment. That’s really significant. More difficult to assess how many KIAs but it can’t be good. Under these circumstances they can’t retain the offensive pace.”
“There are signs of Russian desperation. It’s not adequate for a top commander such as Gen. Valery Gerasimov [Russia's chief of the general staff] to lead units on the ground himself. It is fairly certain that he stayed there last week, Thursday through Saturday..."
"This means he wasn’t satisfied with the progress and went to take charge himself. This didn’t help at all.”
“Russia has had the most progress near Zaporizhzhia but Ukraine has now been able to stop that as well. Russian advances near Izyum, Severodonetsk and Slovyansk have been extremely minimal and have come with heavy losses.”
“Ukraine has had success in Kharkiv. The north side has been deblocked. The Russians can still shell the city only from the east. It might still have hold of the Belgorod-Izyum highway but Ukraine has the highway on artillery range. The Russian supply line is not safe.”
“Ten days ago there was a threat of the Russians’ surrounding Severodonetsk. There is no sign of anything as such happening now.”
“Russia’s massive losses, such as 40 tanks a day, still allowed them to advance only 2-3 km a day. There is no sign that they’re bringing in new units or equipment. There has been no such movement in several days.”
“Expect Ukrainian counter-offensives to scale up but I don’t want to speculate on when. In Kyiv it started 1.5 to 2 weeks after Russia’s strong offense stopped. According to that logic, there are still 1.5 weeks to go.”
“Ukrainian counter-offensives will not be so large-scale. They will need to go carefully so as not to weaken themselves so much that they’d need to retreat. We can expect counterattacks as in Kharkiv soon also in Izyum, Severodonetsk.”
“Russia’s main strength has been forcing Ukraine to leave ground with massive artillery fire. Ukraine has already received but maybe not deployed Western-supplied artillery that has a larger range than Russia’s. Ukraine will soon be able to shell Russian artillery positions.”
“Russian units in Moldova don’t have capability to change the situation in Ukraine but the risk is related to them going against Moldova. Doubtful if they could succeed even against an extremely weak Moldovan army. Doubtful, too, if Ukraine and Romania would allow it to happen.”
“It is also questionable if Transnistria’s elite would allow this. They have been able to export to the EU through Moldova and there is a certain degree of economic integration between Transnistria and Moldova.”
“Today is the anniversary of the 2014 Odessa Trade Union Building fire. No serious related provocations or terrorist acts have been recorded so far. The Ukrainian SBU has kept a close eye on this.”
“Russia’s targeting Ukraine’s infrastructure, supply lines has had an effect but the railway network in Central Ukraine is so dense, it allows rerouting. The Zatoka bridge (bombed 2 or 3 times now) isn't important militarily but it breaks Ukraine’s trade line to Romanian ports.”
“It’s noteworthy that there have been increased attacks on infrastructure and military objects inside Russia. It’s fairly certain that at least in Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk that has been Ukraine’s work. War is reaching Russia’s homes, it’s no longer just a TV war for them.”
“Also noteworthy is Russia’s childish mistakes such as leaving the Snake Island patrol boats as open targets or Lavrov’s statement on Jews. Israel has kept a very low profile until now but such statements didn't leave them an option but to react.”
“Russia will not get a notable win before May 9. A theoretical chance that there could be an agreement that Ukrainian troops leave Mariupol before that. They would need to be able to leave with guns in hands..."
"Can Putin show this as a win if they’ve already long ago declared conquering the city?”
“It would be emotionally important for Ukraine not to let the troops still in Azovstal die in the end of hunger. Such an agreement would allow Russia to move around 3-5 BTGs. Such agreement is possible but unlikely before May 9.”
“Putin has a few very bad hands to play. He can’t afford losing the war. One option is general mobilization which would be a blow to the economy. The reserve units would need training and equipment that they don’t have. Takes a lot of time.”
“I can’t exclude that he will use a tactical nuclear weapon. The risk for him: Russia’s General Staff will tell him to fuck off. Then he’d be a dictator without an instrument of power. It would be the end for him..."
"Militarily neither of the options would make sense but would hasten the end of the war.”
“It’s unclear how bad the losses for Ukraine have been. Earlier estimates said 2,500-3,000 men. By now this can be doubled. Such losses should still be manageable for Kyiv.”
“The thing to watch out for: talks in the West about the importance of peace while not saying anything about the aggressor. Considering what Russia is doing in Ukraine, such talk is a cynical crime..."
"Peace is not the most important thing right now but chasing the aggressor out of the country is.”
/END
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U.S. officials now confirmed what I wrote yesterday -- this whole thing was a Russian active measure, leaked to the press to sow panic and confusion and be conflated with U.S. policy in an administration where incompetence and dysfunction are evidently features, not bugs. macspaunday.substack.com/p/he-got-this-…
Utter fucking embarrassment for the United States, and it certainly explains the muted/cautious response by the Kremlin. I do hope Europe is paying close attention. *This* is the government they think they need to kowtow to.
Question now is who was pushing this "Russian wish-list" as a do-or-die plan of action to the Ukrainians from the American side? I think we know the answer. And why is the admin suddenly backing away from this thing?
New: I acquired the private memoir of Gen. Alexander Zorin, a senior GRU officer who was Putin's envoy to Syria and is now leading POW exchanges with Ukraine. A feature film, "Porcelain Soldier," is set to debut in Russia next month, all about Zorin's adventures -- sort of a Stierlitz meets Bourne production, which was green-lit by former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-…
In all, I've acquired over a thousand pages of documents: Zorin's 186-page memoir, which he titled "The Negotiator" (watch your back, Sam Jackson), some of the ancillary production material for the movie, and five iterations of the screenplay, each more cartoonish in plot and dialogue than the last. The first draft is actually rather nuanced and ends with Zorin weeping upon learning a rebel commander he persuaded to evacuate was subsequently killed by the Russian army after Zorin gave his word that would not happen. (Who says the GRU is a heartless organization?)
The memoir is a fascinating portrait of the life of a still-active Russian spy, made more fascinating because in his pursuit of self-aggrandizement Zorin inadvertently reveals things his masters in Moscow might not like. These include the sorry state of the Russian Air Force in Syria (as in Ukraine, jet pilots used store-bought Garmin GPS devices to navigate, causing near-miss mid-air collisions and much else). The shoot-first-ask-questions-never disposition of racist Russian military commanders. And the Mad Hatter illogic of Russian disinformation schemes about Syrian chemical weapons attacks.
Re: Trump's denial of the WSJ story, read this paragraph twice. Transferring authorization from Hegseth to Grynkewich is almost the scoop itself. Cuts Elbridge Colby out of the process, and one wonders how and why this decision was taken -- note, taken before the Ze visit to the WH -- given all Cheese's unflattering press. Trump recently called him "J.D.'s guy." (Second screenshot from prior WSJ piece on Colby pausing deep strike authorization under this review process.) wsj.com/politics/natio…
Not the first time Grynkewich v. Colby has popped up. When PURL was announced, Grynkewich was the guy named running point with DoD (logical enough given he's SACEUR). This was around the time of the Colby memo diverting USAI kit meant for Ukraine back into U.S. stockpiles. cnn.com/2025/08/08/pol…
Which led to articles such as this one in The Hill:
“The unannounced U.S. move to enable Kyiv to use the missile in Russia comes after authority for supporting such attacks was recently transferred from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth at the Pentagon to the top U.S. general in Europe, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, who also serves as NATO commander.”
Steve Witkoff's Public Financial Disclosure form, which he filed late, is unsigned by any ethics official. It also falsely states Witkoff held no federal position before June of this year. He did not divest from relevant assets before he started his diplomatic job, as he was supposed to. And note the company at the heart of the big @nytimes investigation into his questionable business dealings with the Emiratis concerning World Liberty Financial, "a cryptocurrency start-up founded by the Witkoffs and Trumps." On page 23 of Witkoff's disclosure, World Liberty Financial is given with no value listed. nytimes.com/2025/09/15/us/…
Why is this document unsigned or certified by any government ethics official? Does this mean that no one has actually conducted the conflict of interest assessment and associated divestitures normally required before an official can start the job?
Why does it only cover the period from 6/30 through now? Where is the disclosure for January through the end of June?
Elbridge Colby has hindered Ukraine's ability to defend itself at least four times since he joined the Pentagon. The most recent example: wsj.com/politics/natio…