Thread by @KuldkeppMart

Long thread.

Having read many articles in Western media and observed twitterati-led debates both during the run-up to the invasion and from February 24 onwards, I would like to make some critical points about blind spots that frequently prevent us from correctly assessing (1/30)

https://twitter.com/KuldkeppMart/status/1521999139206307841

the nature and likely outcomes of Russia’s war against Ukraine. It’s a lengthy thread, but hopefully a useful one.

As a disclaimer, I should say I’m not neutral – in fact, I couldn’t possibly be more pro-Ukraine. I also have a particular point of view as an Eastern (2/30)

European academic at an elite Western university. But having done a lot of research on political and military history, often focusing on ways that people have tried to make sense of ongoing conflicts, I feel I have something useful to contribute.

Most of the critical (3/30)

points below respond to the so-called realist discourse, which I would like to call out for its many moral and practical failures. I’m not referring thereby to academic (IR) realism (which has plenty of its own blind spots), but the kind of vulgar ‘realism’ we are all (4/30)

familiar with from our public space, and that is often indistinguishable from Russian propaganda.

Blind spot #1. Ukraine. More than two months into the invasion, it is still striking how little agency Ukrainians are habitually given in analyses of the events we are (5/30)

seeing unfold. The ‘realist’ (in reality, colonialist) understanding of Ukraine as a passive periphery, the fate of which must be inevitably decided by Russia and the West, has led to a massive underestimation, and indeed, ignorance of the role of the Ukrainian armed (6/30)

forces, civil society, national and local governments, and, most of all, its strong will to resist the occupiers. Russian aggression is not impersonal, Western assistance is not automatic, and T-72s don’t pop off their turrets by happenstance. This is Ukraine’s war of (7/30)

independence, and they have the central role in it.

What you should do to mitigate is to follow and read Ukrainian journalists, politicians, academics, and others commenting on the war. Amplify their voices and contributions. Don’t assume that they are untrustworthy (8/30)

because they must be biased, or always producing and repeating their own form of propaganda, as a party to the conflict. In fact, Ukrainians know what’s going on better than almost anyone else, because they are there, on the ground, in the thick of it. Furthermore, don’t (9/30)

think of them as passive victims of Putin’s aggression looking for Western pity and handouts. Ukrainians are amazingly impressive fighters who are defending not only themselves, but also the free world as a whole. Even you. The least you can do is support them.

Blind (10/30)

spot #2. Russia. Putin’s Russia believes itself to be a major economic and military power, feared and respected around the globe. It’s also obsessed with its glorious history, especially with the Great Patriotic War, and convinced that it can somehow never be defeated in (11/30)

battlefield. This is all Russian propaganda, and you should take it as such. Actual data about Russia’s economy is available and you can look it up. Information about what happened in World War II (not the Great Patriotic War, which is a propaganda lie in itself) is there (12/30)

for everyone to study. The dismal performance of Russia’s armed forces, undermined by corruption and incompetence, and the criminal nature of its authoritarian regime, are glaringly obvious for anyone paying attention. Throughout its history, Russia has been defeated in (13/30)

multiple wars, and there is nothing to make its defeat unthinkable in the current one.

But propaganda works in subtle ways, and Russian talking points are often repeated even by people who are pro-Ukraine and against the war. When you come across claims like ‘Russia will (14/30)

win in the end’, ‘this war will drag on for years’, ‘China will come to Russia’s help’, or ‘Russia will use weapons X and Y’, approach them critically. The overestimation of Russia’s military and economic strength (and underestimation of Ukraine’s) is a major reason why (15/30)

the West self-deterred before the invasion and did not provide Ukraine with the weapons that would have helped to save many lives, and maybe even avoid the war altogether. Unwarranted overestimation of the enemy and underestimation of the ally is not realism. In fact, (16/30)

it’s the opposite.

A particular mention should go to the idea that Russia would use nuclear weapons. Yes, you hear people say, maybe not the full nuclear barrage, but some form of a ‘tactical nuclear weapon’ against Ukraine, or the Baltic states, or Poland! Because Putin (17/30)

is a madman and will press the red button regardless of the danger of Western retaliation!

This sort of talk is scaremongering and needs to be approached without knee-jerk emotional reactions. Firstly, there are no ‘tactical nuclear weapons’ in this war because there are (18/30)

no tactical targets. Any Russian use of nuclear weapons will constitute strategic use and elicit a Western response in kind. Secondly, if you believe Putin to be a madman, then his madness is oddly rational if it only kicks in in certain circumstances. In fact, evidence (19/30)

strongly suggests that Putin is not a madman, but an elderly dictator, deathly afraid of Covid, who dearly cares about the survival of his regime and himself. Whatever danger a military defeat in Ukraine would entail for Putin, this danger would be easier to weather than (20/30)

a Western nuclear response. Thirdly and finally: but, somebody says, what if there is no Western response? And to that question, there can be only one answer: the West has a credible response capability, and a Western response will not fail to happen. Anyone who believes (21/30)

the opposite should really move to Russia to be safe, because who knows when Putin the madman will pull the trigger.

Blind spot #3. The West. Care needs to be taken to not to mischaracterise the role of the West in this war. The West is not, and should not be neutral, (22/30)

aloof from the war and equally disinterested in the cause of either side. Supporting Ukraine is a question of morality, and morality is a crucial factor in international affairs. Any ‘realists’ claiming otherwise are disregarding observable facts, and trying to impose (23/30)

their ideology on the reality, rather than letting the reality inform their thinking. Russia is fighting a blatantly criminal war of aggression, and moral condemnation is what it is getting. It should be unthinkable for the West to support Russia in this war, and to the (24/30)

extent it is still doing so (by buying Russian oil and gas, or by prevaricating about helping Ukraine), it is acting immorally.

Instead, the West is, at least for the time being, properly characterised as a nonbelligerent. This term was in use during World War II to (25/30)

designate countries that did not participate in the fighting, but openly supported and favoured one of the belligerent sides. The USA before Pearl Harbour was the best example of nonbelligerency. As its case also shows, a nonbelligerent can turn into a belligerent when (26/30)

circumstances so demand. So can the West, or individual parts of it. Whether this happens or not is a matter of strategic calculation but cannot and should not be precluded as a possibility. Self-deterrence is a mistake, and such mistakes are not ‘realism’ but daydreaming.(27/30)

In conclusion: everyone needs to exercise their critical and moral faculties when thinking and talking about Russia’s war against Ukraine. Be mindful of logical fallacies and propaganda, and of your own prejudices and stereotypes that might interface with them. (28/30)

Exercise source criticism: before lending credence to someone’s arguments, look into what position they are arguing from, what their expertise is in (actual, not made up, expertise), and who or what they are affiliated with. Trust the voices that have made accurate (29/30)

predictions in the past. And be brave like Ukraine.

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