Thread by @BrianKerg

And here... we... go! #FD2030 Read along :🧵1/

The nod to the 31st CMC reads like a reminder to a certain critic of FD2030 that it is rooted in a rationale for change that this very critic championed. The references to the articles also remind critics that the CMC has been very transparent and clear regarding his approach: 2/

Yet another reminder of the 'why' - using the PRC as the pacing threat isn't something that was pulled out of a hat, but was directed by the civilian administrations served by the military: 3/

An EABO capable force =/= an exclusively EABO force. We've still got plenty of MAGTF to go around. 4/

Refine, refine, refine. Wargames, analyses, experiments, and exercises are informing this process. If critics have data to offer to help with the refinement - they should offer it! But rigor is demanded. 5/

Here, we identify some key assumptions. Assumptions yield RFI's, and can become either facts or risk to be assumed. Is there risk here? Certainly. But the risk of remaining stagnant in the face of a changing threat is greater. 6/

For those still grappling with FD2030, it is essential that you dig into 'A Concept for Stand-in Forces' in tandem with the 'Tentative Manual for EABO' to appreciate everything going on here. Notice also the emphasis on RXR, whereas previously fires were emphasized. 7/

I missed 'A Functional Concept for Maritime RXR' - this will likely add greatly to the rationale, and layer well on top of 'A Concept for Stand-in Forces'. Also looking forward to 'A Functional Concept for MAGTF AMD'. This, indeed, is proving to be a campaign of learning. 8/

An essential element of adapting and experimenting in real time is the aspect of naval integration - similarly, the USMC could not have developed tentative landing operations without experimentation alongside the USN. This also serves as a driver for adaptation from the USN. 9/

A common critique of the MLR is that it was reorganized and activated while lacking necessary equipment - it isn't yet FOC. But waiting to change until conditions are perfect means waiting forever, and missing out on opportunities to gather valuable data. 10/

Most of the coverage of FD2030 has weighted heavily on the MLR and EABO - and yet this is just one piece of the pie. Infantry modernization is just as important - future reporting should examine this more deeply. 11/

I am deeply impressed by this unique employment of the deep reservoir of talent found among our Reserve Marines! If you know a reservist who fits the bill, encourage them to look into the Marine Innovation Unit. 12/

Many parallels between this experiment and strikes by Ukraine against Russian ships in recent days. In combination with other organic fires and effects, this is a key part of what 21st century combined arms looks like. 13/

Some valuable experimentation with logistics - described elsewhere as our pacing function - and information. Notably, we see how FD2030 efforts have informed forthcoming doctrine. 14/

SIF and EABO are theater agnostic - evidenced here by the revelation that FD2030 informed the design and employment of Task Force 61/2, which is currently operating in support of C6F and EUCOM. 15/

An important nod to modeling and simulation, involvement of NIWC-PAC and NIWC-LANT, and progress on the USMC's first #Wargaming and Analysis Center. 16/

A clear reference to the many critiques from retired GOs - here, the report is being over-generous. HQMC efforts to communicate FD2030 have been exhaustive, appearing in many outlets and media forms, and have in turn been discussed in these same outlets by younger leaders. 17/

This, perhaps, is a more fair self-criticism. MLR is just a piece of FD2030, though it has gotten the most airtime. Arguably, this is because the MLR presents the most radical shift in USMC organization. 18/

Broke: Every Marine a rifleman.

Woke: Every Marine a rocketman.

Bespoke: Every Marine a reconnaissance man.

Retaining more cannon artillery batteries based off of experiment results. 20/

Retaining additional VMM squadrons, albeit at a reduced number of aircraft in each. 21/

C2 is the king of battle. 22/

A direct connection between RXR and maneuver warfare philosophy. 23/

WARNO: 'A Concept for 21st Century Amphibious Operations' is forthcoming. 24/

Forthcoming updated 'Tentative Manual for EABO', as well as unclassified EXSUMs of ALL Service-level war games! 25/

WARNO: Standing up a Marine Corps Information Command (MCIC) to integrate with and access space and cyber capabilities. 26/

Much needed attention being brought to providing doctrine and training standards for OIE. The stand-up of the 17XX information maneuver occfield will also help drive demand for this next step. 27/

Littoral mobility and small craft - we're one step closer to the pirate's life! 28/

The question of the base unit for the MLR is not yet settled - it could be an artillery BN or a recon BN. The trend through the rest of the document, and the emphasis on RXR, suggests that a recon BN would be a good fit. 29/

Infantry is still going to infantry, but they'll adapt as the alternative is unacceptable. 30/

I read this as another admonition of certain retired FD2030 critics - this CMC is merely continuing a valuable legacy of experimentation and adaptation that is firmly rooted in our warfighting philosophy. 31/

The classic tension between decentralization and mass, here at play with the infantry BN's organic indirect fire support. #MortarPride 🧪🔥 32/

Unmanned Aerial Systems for days! 33/

If there is a central challenge inherent in FD2030, it is logistics - and that is acknowledged here in the demand for systemic change: 34/

Marines training in Navy schools, and vice versa. Marines participating in Navy exercises, and vice versa. Integrated training and education is a pillar of naval integration. 35/

WARNO: Forthcoming unclassed report on MWX, notable for its force-on-force experimentation. This will be a good one, so keep your eyes peeled! 36/

If you're heading to PME as a student or as faculty, get ready to up your game for all domain ops: 37/

More emphasis on retention over recruitment. I'd offer that retention efforts should also explore accommodating opportunities for consistent spousal employment, and spousal career progression. 38/

The 'golden path' model is a bottle neck that forces out Marines who want something different. Multiple pathways will be a huge plus. Ensuring selection boards comply with new precepts and don't succumb to learned habits will be critical. 39/

This is interesting - I recall TBS modifying this model many years ago, and a #Gazette article revealing that deviating from the 1/3s model to match more Marines with their MOS preferences resulted in greater retention. 40/

Investment priority #1 is amphibious warfare ships. This is a powerful signal that yes, MLR notwithstanding, the USMC will still be a crisis response force. This is echoed by the previous task to update amphibious operations doctrine. 41/

Just as commanders should focus on doing those things that only commanders can do, so too should the USMC focus on those things that only the USMC can do. Mission transfer logic is discussed here: 42/

And that's a wrap! The USMC will remain the nation's 9/11 force, built around a MAGTF, employing maneuver warfare. It will also adapt to the future, using SIF to optimize its role as a naval force. Fin/