A thread on narrative & military change.
So @almurray generously referenced my book on small arms in this podcast.
One outcome was a great question from @MarkofCalth on false analyses & military change. That was in relation to SLA Marshall, the infantry & winning firefights.
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So @almurray generously referenced my book on small arms in this podcast.
One outcome was a great question from @MarkofCalth on false analyses & military change. That was in relation to SLA Marshall, the infantry & winning firefights.
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https://twitter.com/almurray/status/1523940535232348161
Since then I discovered this fascinating analysis by @AdrianBonenber1.
In it he pulls apart 3 different narratives of the 2014 Battle of Zelenopillya.
This involved a Russian bombardment of a Ukrainian rear area that led to serious casualties.
2/ 7969.home.blog/2020/12/02/the…
In it he pulls apart 3 different narratives of the 2014 Battle of Zelenopillya.
This involved a Russian bombardment of a Ukrainian rear area that led to serious casualties.
2/ 7969.home.blog/2020/12/02/the…
The narratives break down into three: a US description, a Ukrainian and a Russian.
The US narrative of the battle started off as an anecdote in draft analysis and ends up in US Army FM 3-0.
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The US narrative of the battle started off as an anecdote in draft analysis and ends up in US Army FM 3-0.
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According to the US telling, Russian forces use a combination of drones & Electronic Warfare to locate & prevent the comms of a moving force of Ukrainian troops.
This is then struck by Russian (not separatist) artillery & leads to significant casualties.
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This is then struck by Russian (not separatist) artillery & leads to significant casualties.
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From interviews with Ukraine's armed forces, however, a different story emerges.
Troops were tired. They were poorly dispersed with little entrenchment. They did not expect a Russian intervention. The location was understood by the Russians to be a transit point & camp.
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Troops were tired. They were poorly dispersed with little entrenchment. They did not expect a Russian intervention. The location was understood by the Russians to be a transit point & camp.
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The US version reflected the US nightmare scenario.
Drones spotting overhead. EW used to isolate battlefield comms. The capacity to direct remote fires on a moving target.
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Drones spotting overhead. EW used to isolate battlefield comms. The capacity to direct remote fires on a moving target.
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The Ukrainian version is probably more accurate according to @AdrianBonenber1 given his analysis.
But the interesting thing is the effects that the different narratives appear to have produced.
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But the interesting thing is the effects that the different narratives appear to have produced.
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In the first instance, the US military have clearly sought to master this new combined drone/EW 'nightmare scenario'.
However, it also seems to have led analysts to conclude that Russian capabilities were more sophisticated than they are actually ARE even in 2022.
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However, it also seems to have led analysts to conclude that Russian capabilities were more sophisticated than they are actually ARE even in 2022.
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The Ukrainian military have very obviously been working hard to apply techniques that make it possible to inflict the 'nightmare scenario' on the Russians.
We've seen lots of images of this on here.
Maybe the most famous is at Bilohorivka
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We've seen lots of images of this on here.
Maybe the most famous is at Bilohorivka
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https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1526353126265167872?s=20&t=_GV1mirJ7JQm1P9IiGHOLA
And that got me thinking about how inaccurate history effects military change.
Clearly we have lots of people watching the war in Ukraine. There's more information available too. I've been banging on about that in relation to my 2nd book #radicalwar
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Clearly we have lots of people watching the war in Ukraine. There's more information available too. I've been banging on about that in relation to my 2nd book #radicalwar
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But we also have loads of false or counternarratives being spun out where tracing causality or identifying the sequence of events is out of kilter.
Western analysts over-estimated Russian capability in 2014.
It will be important to avoid repeating that mistake in 2022.
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Western analysts over-estimated Russian capability in 2014.
It will be important to avoid repeating that mistake in 2022.
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