NEW: DOJ has announced a new charging policy in CFAA cases. It's just current DOJ policy, not law, so it's only advisory. Still interesting. Part of it is just an update for the Van Buren era, but part of it seems to add some new limits.
First, the press release about the policy says that DOJ won't charge "good faith security research" but will charge "bad faith security research." But wait, what does that mean, you're wondering? The press release makes that a little murky, I think. justice.gov/opa/pr/departm…
So you have to go beyond the press release to the actual charging policy. What it says seems pretty complicated, but here are the key parts, I think:
1) DOJ won't charge exceeding authorized access cases unless there's a violation of a code-based restriction.
2) On the other hand, DOJ does not appear to see that limit in "access without authorization" cases. (Which is tricky, as we don't know how DOJ sees the difference between the two!) Plus, DOJ thinks C&D letters are different -- that withdraws authorization, in DOJ's view.
3) Here's the specifics in the policy about what counts as "good-faith security research" that DOJ policy as of today won't charge.
The link of the standard is to a 356-page document from the DMCA rulemaking setting, and here's the cited page. cdn.loc.gov/copyright/1201…
If I understand the context, one really big difference between the DMCA and CFAA setting is who owns the machine. The DMCA setting was that you can do stuff on your own machine; the CFAA setting is what you can do on *someone else's* machine.
The charging policy doesn't address civil liability, of course. So if you hack in to someone's computer with a good-faith security goal, etc., they could still sue you. But if I'm reading this correctly, DOJ is saying they won't charge you.
One thing that makes this interesting is that, over the years, a fairly high % of people charged with hacking claim a good-faith security goal. (Even when it's a preposterous claim, that's the public claim.).
This now becomes a claim defense counsel can make to DOJ if they find out DOJ is considering charging their clients; defense counsel can make the case to the AUSA that the client was acting in good faith and under the policy shouldn't be charged.
If DOJ disagrees, though, they can still charge the case even if DOJ is wrong. It's just a policy, not a law, so it's just something to guide prosecutorial discretion and doesn't create any rights in court.
Anyway, interesting and notable development post-Van-Buren.
Also note that, in the nature of these things, DOJ policies can have 3 different lives; (1) The intent of the drafters (what they were trying to do); (2) what the language suggests (what the language seems to say should not be charged); and (3 ) what an AUSA may think it means.
We can mostly comment on (2), and try to get our best sense of (1) from (2), but (3) is harder to predict in any given case. Still, noteworthy.
/end
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For new law students wondering what makes studying law different from studying other subjects, I think a fair first-cut answer would be the focus on institutions and institutional roles.
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1st, some background. Before you have legal training, when you talk about different rules of law, the natural focus is on whether you like the rule. Is it a good rule? A just rule, based on your own values? That's naturally the focus.
The distinctive part of legal ed is to say that, in a complex world with gazillions of people, we have to channel the making of rules through institutions. The institutions have roles in that set-up, and what they should do isn't only answered by good results in that case.
When law professors are counsel to academic amicus briefs, should the counsel identification include their title and university affiliation? (That is, should the brief cover and signature line list counsel as “Professor X, Y Law School”)
Here are examples, one a prof who does this, and one who doesn't (1st example being a party brief, not an amicus, but same idea).
My view is that you generally shouldn't do this, as the university is not involved in the representation. If you're a professor acting as a lawyer, but you're not acting as a university representative (such as with a clinic) in your representation, it's just you.
* Thompson v. Clark doesn't really count, at least for purposes of this activist campaign to bring about greater awareness of the Court's criminal procedure docket.
Defenders of the status quo will whine about "percolation" and "waiting for a good vehicle." and under normal circumstances, I would agree. But these are not normal circumstances.
Dean Chemerinsky on what he tells students who plan protests against controversial speakers at @BerkeleyLaw: "I'll support you engaging in any protest [against the speaker] you want, so long as it's not disruptive. If you engage in disruption, then you will be punished." (14:30)
Chemerinsky: "I have a very strong position that all ideas and views should be able to be expressed within the university. And if you don't like the ones that are being expressed, bring in your own speakers and express your view. But you can't silence others." (14:45)
Prof. Glaude pushes back, saying that we also need to factor in that some of the speech is being pushed by antidemocratic forces. And Chemerinsky pushes back against the push back. An interesting dialogue, I think.
When hotel staff called 911 reporting unconscious man in hotel room, 3 hrs after checkout, & police came to scene and saw drugs, evidence is suppressed: The man retained 4A rights in the room, & officer's staying after medics came exceeded exigent circ. supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/6…#N
Dissent: The man no longer had an REP in the room. (I think the dissent is likely right on this.)
The hotel checkout cases are pretty interesting, I think. Last I looked into this, most courts say that there's a grace period, following typical social norms of hotel usage, so your REP doesn't expire immediately at checkout time. But some cases say checkout time controls.
It's sometimes said that because the Fourth Amendment does not mention the exclusionary rule, and that remedy did not exist at common law, that it is a weird judge-made rule that doesn't fit in with the Fourth Amendment.
I disagree, for a few reasons. (Thread.)
First, while the 4th Amendment does not mention the exclusionary rule, it mentions no other remedies, either. The language is all about what must not happen, not what remedy applies if it does.
Granted, the principles identified as the 4th Amendment usual had been famously identified in the context of civil claims, like Entick v. Carrington, where the warrant was asserted as a defense to liability. But that doesn't seem so important, for a few reasons: