A few thoughts on the current course of the war and the situation in the Donbas. Recent Russian gains offer a sobering check on expectations for the near term. Will use a few of Nathan’s maps. Thread. 1/
The initial Russian offensive sought to press Slovyansk/Kramatorsk from Izyum, and to envelop Severodonetsk at the same time, severing the two sectors from each other. This was not an attempt at a big operational envelopment in the Donbas, but nonetheless ambitious. 2/
Having been blocked south of Izyum, the thrust of the offensive shifted to Severodonetsk, where Russian forces hoped to achieve an encirclement. Izyum now seems to be a fixing action, designed to prevent UKR from moving substantial forces towards Severodonetsk. 3/
UKR successfully pushed Russian artillery away from Kharkiv, but Russian forces still hold a narrow strip of territory north of the city. That said, it is not clear that the UKR offensive in the north has the forces or momentum to threaten flow of Russian supplies to Izyum. 4/
Russian forces have broken through further south at Popasna. This now threatens to sever Sevorodonetsk/Lysychansk and create a pocket. UKR forces also conducted tactical retreats further south at Svitlodarsk. The Russian mil seems to be pushing towards Soledar. (Nathan's map) 5/
The extent to which this breakthrough at Popasna threatens Ukraine's overall position depends on whether or not Russian forces gain momentum. That in turn hinges on force availability, reserves, and logistics to support this advance. 6/
Russian forces have also begun encircling Lyman, and supposedly entered the city, which suggests they will probably consolidate control of terrain north of the Donets river. Meanwhile UKR forces will move to secondary defensive lines. 7/
@JominiW has good details on the recent movements, I will instead focus on the broader picture. I don't think the Russian offensive looks stalled, and while sluggish, there is no good way to predict when it will culminate. This is why I often say that outcomes are contingent. 8/
Recent Russian gains in the Donbas, despite a relatively weak military advantage, suggest that UKR forces have suffered significant attrition. Zelensky mentioned a range of 50-100 KIA per day. This is a high casualty rate. 9/
The overall military balance in this war still trends in Ukraine's favor, given manpower availability and access to extensive Western military support. That will show itself more over time. But the local balance in the Donbas during this phase is a different story. 10/
There are rumors that UKR is bringing in reinforcements to prevent a larger Russian breakout. Either way, the fight in the Donbas is much less significant for UKR than it is for Russia. If it must, Ukraine can trade territory for attrition, then hope to retake it later. 11/
Despite high Russian losses (I previously suggested 10-12k KIA), and issues with morale, the Russian military appears unlikely to easily give up terrain. Russian mil is also using fires more effectively, and to an extent has adapted, despite observable tactical failures. 12/
I think we shouldn't overstate the significance of the Russian breakthrough at Popasna, but also consider the implications. Are UKR forces going to be in position to conduct a major counteroffensive in the near term, or will both sides face a degree of exhaustion? 13/
Russian forces west of Kherson have also used the past few weeks to dig in and fortify their positions. They're not going to give up territory easily even in areas where they're at a relative disadvantage. 14/
Russian forces may not be prosecuting offensives with much enthusiasm, but it is equally difficult to expect them to rout or melt away. Similarly, the situation within Ukraine's army remains a major unknown, but it is clear the war is taking its toll. 15/
The battlefield is likely to stay dynamic, with territory changing control via advances and counter attacks. I doubt we will see a stalemate emerge, but rather operational pauses that folks will be tempted to declare a stalemate. 16/
In my view it is too early to make predictions on how the battle for the Donbas will go. Ukraine may lose territory in the short term, but Russia faces major problems with sustaining its military effort in the long term, or holding on to gains. The war could become protracted.
Will add, this is why I often refrain that it is difficult to tell where you are in a war. Big turning points are easiest to discern in hindsight. In the present many tactical events seem to take on outsized significance.
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Sometimes oft repeated numbers need revisiting. One example is Russian artillery fire rates. These have generally been overestimated going back to 2022, along with ammo consumption rates, with sensational 60k per day figures. A short thread. 1/
First, what are we counting? The numbers given out are typically for main caliber artillery types: 152mm, 122mm, MLRS (300, 220, 122), and 120mm mortars. This figure is not inclusive of smaller infantry mortars, anti-tank guns, tanks used indirect fire roles, etc. 2/
Russian fire rates for 2022 were probably in the 15,000-20,000 range. Likely ~18,000 (see forthcoming podcast discussion on this). There’s little evidence that Russian fires reached 60,000 per day in 2022. The peaks were likely double the figure above, at 35,000-40,000. 3/
Thoughts following a recent field study in Ukraine. Ukraine faces difficult months of fighting ahead, but the situation at the front is better than it was this spring. More worrisome is the state of Ukraine’s air defense, and the damage from Russian strikes to the power grid. 1/
Ukraine’s manpower, fortifications, and ammunition situation is steadily improving. Russian forces are advancing in Donetsk, and likely to make further gains, but they have not been able to exploit the Kharkiv offensive into a major breakthrough. 2/
The Kharkiv front has stabilized, with the overall correlation of forces not favorable to Moscow there. Russian operations are focused on the following directions: Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Ocheretyne-Pokrovsk, and to a lesser extent Kupyansk. 3/
Some brief thoughts following a recent field study trip to Ukraine. The current situation is difficult, but UA is working to stabilize the front. Much depends on whether the US provides support, and UA effectively addresses its manpower issues in the coming months. 1/
The main challenges are manpower, fortifications, and ammunition. These are interrelated problems. There is also the issue of sustainment, which needs to shift towards localization of maintenance, and spare parts production for a diverse park of Western equipment. 2/
Mobilization requires resourcing. Western assistance and UA manpower issues are connected. UA needs funding and training support. However, the lead times to resolve manpower issues are significantly greater than what it will take to ship ammo if the supplemental is passed. 3/
A few issues with that top line casualty number released, given it includes losses from convicts, and LDNR. On top of that a significant % are also mobilized personnel and contracted recruits. The total number cannot be applied to the original force in a meaningful way. 1/
Given prior estimates the range could be 270-315k on total casualties. It is fair to say the Russian army which existed on Feb 2022 has lost much of its original personnel, and ground force equipment, but the initial invasion force itself had sizable numbers of mobilized LDNR.
The initial invasion force was brittle. Since then Russia has had a structural manpower problem, which it has sought to resolve via piecemeal solutions, and partial mobilization. The issue of rotation, and a deficit of men to conduct it, remains a looming problem for next year.
A few thoughts on DPICM. Providing cluster munitions to Ukraine, at this stage, could have a significant impact beyond what other capabilities might achieve. Despite the drawbacks, unlocking this stockpile has important implications for the course of Ukraine's offensive. 1/
Ukraine's offensive is limited by the artillery ammunition available. The US, and other countries, provided a significant amount for this operation. Much of this was borrowed from South Korea. Without this ammunition it is difficult to imagine this offensive taking place. 2/
Progress has been slow, difficult, and without sustained breakthroughs thus far. While UA retains the bulk of its combat power, artillery use rate is likely higher than anticipated, especially as the past weeks have seen a largely attritional approach. 3/
A few thoughts on Prigozhin's armed insurrection/mutiny/rebellion. For now it appears over. Wagner seems to be standing down, and leaving Rostov for LNR. Prigozhin launched a mutiny that ultimately challenged Putin’s power, and the system. Thread. 1/
This was not a traditional coup, but with Putin’s video and FSB statements it became a challenge that would reveal the extent of brittleness in the regime. It wasn’t a good showing for Russian state capacity or competence to respond to this kind of challenge. 2/
I had long wondered whether Prigozhin understood something intuitively about the system, if the regime was fundamentally hollow, prominent members like Shoigu were weak, and Putin could be pressed into deals, etc. or if he was grossly miscalculating. 3/