Thread by @kamilkazani

How long will this war go?

Andrey Illarionov used to be Putin's economic adviser, advocating for liberalisation of Russian economic policies in early 2000s. Later he turned into one of Putin's most outspoken critics. I very much like his sober, realistic and informed analysis 🧵

In the course of this war various Western experts tried to make prognoses - how long could this war go? Illarionov collected some of those estimates and listed them in his ЖЖ (livejournal) in a chronological order. I think this list is very informative aillarionov.livejournal.com/1301538.html

March 5, 2022. @KofmanMichael gave Russian forces three weeks before they are exhausted in terms of combat effectiveness, which could lead to a a ceasefire or a settlement

March 10, 2022. @christogrozev predicts that the hot phase of the conflict may be frozen in 7-10 days. The cold phase when we won't even know if the war is already over could last longer but there will be no more bloodshed, that's the most important thing fakty.com.ua/ua/ukraine/202…

March 15, 2022. @general_ben concludes that the Russia's efforts to conquer Ukraine may culminate in the next 10 days

March 15, 2022. In his another interview published on the same day @general_ben predicts that Russia will run out of its capacity to attack within approximately 10 days

Does it mean those experts were totally wrong? No. Initial Russian invasion plan failed. They couldn't take Kyiv, they couldn't overthrow the government, the Blitzkrieg was beaten off. But Russia didn't exhaust its capacity to continue attacking anywhere as soon as they expected

From the Russian perspective, invasion indeed failed. What they expected to be a quick and easy pacification of an East European state Czechoslovakia-1968 style turned into a long and bloody war of attrition, Russia didn't really prepare for

From the Ukrainian perspective however, it might look differently. They're slowly retreating in the East:

1.04 – Izyum abandoned
18.04 – Kremennays abandoned
8.05 - Popasnaya abandoned
12.05 - Rubezhnoye abandoned
20.05 - Mariupol surrendered
23.05 - fighting for Severodonetsk

Let me get it straight. Ukrainian resistance is shockingly effective. Almost nobody predicted Ukraine can stand against Russia for so long before Feb 24. Russians expected to capture the entire country in a few days, but have to capture small towns and villages one by one

And yet, Russians didn't exhaust their capacity to keep on attacking yet, as many expected. The war didn't turn into a cold phase. The bloodshed didn't stop in 7-10 days, it continues. There is no ceasefire, no settlement. Those experts got overoptimistic in their prognoses

Illarionov concluded his post in the following way.

1. This war is bloody and can continue for long
2. A decisive turn in this war hasn't happened yet
3. Russians still have superiority in numbers, heavy weaponry, firepower and initiative ...

4. Something very important about the numbers and quality of the Russian forces remains unknown and ununderstood for many popular experts
5. Something very important about the numbers and quality of the Ukrainian quality remains unknown for the external observers

(Illarionov)

I find Illarionov's analysis (which I gave with my comments) interesting. He is a bright, informed and very nonconformist thinker. It was his nonconformity that hampered his career in the American expertocracy. He would do much better if he was just parroting the common tropes

I don't fully agree with the answer Illarionov has given. What I fully, 100% percent agree with is the question he is asking. And the question is. Why Russia is still able to keep on attacking Ukraine? That's is the most important question that isn't asked often enough

Now let me finish with Illarionov's analysis and give my own perspective:

1. This war will be a long war of attrition
2. Russia will keep on attacking for as long as it can
3. This war will end with Russia's defeat and Russia's collapse. It's way more fragile than many think

4. Like Illarionov I think that the Russian ability to keep on attacking presents a problem that isn't addressed often enough. We however differ in where to look for an answer. He thinks we don't know sth of Russian army. I think that we don't know sth about the Russian economy

Many are wondering how Putin can produce (some amount of) weaponry and ammunition under the most heavy sanctions regime. I'll ask however how he could produce any amount of weaponry ever, considering how much did the technological capacities of the USSR deteriorate by the 2000s

I'll address the question of how Putin's Russia has any military production capacities at all in my next text-form long read which I'm gonna publish within two weeks. End of🧵