Native Siberians and North Caucasians* are hugely overrepresented among the Russian casualties in Ukraine. Consider these estimates of the Free Buryatia Foundation. It looks like Russia is ready to fight till the last indigenous person, solving two problems at once
* There is however an exception in the North Caucasus. It is Chechnya. Compare two neighbouring regions Chechnya and Dagestan. Chechnya has 1,5 million people, Dagestan has 3,1 million. Despite being just about 2 times more populous than Chechnya it has 40 times more casualties
What does it mean?
1. Dagestanis fight in the regular Russian army, comprising disproportionate number of troops and of casualties in Ukraine 2. Chechens do *not* fight in the regular Russian army. Whatever badges they have, it doesn't matter. They're the Kadyrov's personal army
It's very important to understand the difference between the authority-based formalised and bureaucratic Russian army and the power-based informal Chechen army. Ofc Chechens have some kinds of documents and badges. But in the Chechen army it doesn't matter at all
Among from Kadyrov's three top aides it is Delimkhanov who is constantly seen in Ukraine. Notice that Kadyrov didn't send the Lord who commands his army or the Patriot who commands his personal guard. He sent Delimkhanov who leads his personal team of assassins in Moscow
In normal times the Lord and the Patriot stay with Kadyrov in Chechnya. They have job there. But Delimkhanov normally stays in Moscow as an MP of the Russian Parliament. He doesn't show up in parliament often, cuz he needs it for the formal status and legal immunity
Delimkhanov has been an MP of the Russian parliament since 2007. For 15 years he never ever gave a speech. But he was suspected in organising murders of:
- Movladi Baysarov
- Sulim Yamadayev
- Boris Nemtsov
and killing or trying to kill many others in Moscow, Dubai, Turkey, etc
What is interesting here is that Movladi Baysarov and Sulim Yamadaev were both Chechen rebels who switched to the Russians, like Kadyrov. Baysarov was formally an officer of FSB and Yamadaev - of GRU. It didn't help them. Both were killed and FSB did nothing
Why? Well, Carl Schmitt explained it far better than I ever could. He gave the most beautiful definition of a colony:
"A colony is country's territory from the perspective of the international law, but it is a foreign territory from the perspective of the domestic law"
From the perspective of the international law Chechnya is just a regular Russian territory. From the perspective of Russian formal law, too. BUT. Nobody in Russia thinks this way. Not a single person believes that Chechnya is really Russia
While Russian formal law and the international law, Chechnya is Russian territory, Russians *really* view it as a foreign territory. Which makes it a classic colony according to the Carl Schmitt's definition. It is a personal kingdom of Kadyrov in personal vassalage to Putin
It is personal Kadyrov's vassalage to Putin that explains the special status of Chechnya within the Russian Federation. Kadyrov proclaimed himself a "Putin's infantryman" and stressed that he is loyal only personally to Putin and to nobody else. That's personal informal relation
It's clear why Kadyrov needs this relationship. It's the sole basis of his power. Without Putin he won't live for long. But why Putin needs it? Well, Russia is so formal and authority-based structure that you *need* some informal power-based element within to keep power
This guy on the left, Zelimkhan Israilov, had been constantly based in Moscow. Where was he based? In President Hotel ofc
President Hotel serves as the main Chechen barracks in Moscow. Up to 200 militants are living here permanently. FYI, it's not just a regular hotel. It's a hotel located across the Moskva river from Kremlin. It belongs to the Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation
Location of a Chechen barracks in the hotel belonging to the Directorate of the President so close to the Kremlin doesn't look like a random decision at all. It looks very deliberate. They're purposefully located so near, so that they would be always available
Available for what? Well, first of all obviously for the everyday business - for the assassinations. They have to do assassinations for Kremlin and I'm not sure how well they're compensated. In return, they are allowed to do "business" = violent entrepreneurship purely for profit
More importantly however, I strongly suspect that they're kept in Moscow for a much more important reason. They're the last line of defence for the regime. Purely formal structures are super fragile. You must have an informal element within to make the system more robust
Consider the following. In 1917 Russian Empire had the largest army in the world all of whom swore to give their life for their Tsar. Did it help him? It didn't. When general Alexeev telegrammed Russian generals with a question would they support his abdication, 100% supported
I lied. In fact, two generals rejected the plans of abdication and offered their services to drown the mutiny in blood:
Khan Hussein of Nakchevan
Count Fyodor Keller
Not a single Russian general remained loyal to the beloved Tsar. Only an Azeri Shia and a German Lutheran did
Now consider 1991. Where were the Soviet officers who swore to give their life for the socialism? Here you see as they are dismantling Dzerzhinsky's monument in front of the KGB/FSB HQ. It's full of armed KGB officers who worshipped Dzerzhinsky. Not a single one intervened
We have a paradox. In 1917 Russia had the largest army in the world and in the 1991 the second largest. In 1991 it also had the largest and strongest state security with the entire Moscow and nearby filled with operatives and Special forces. Not a single one lifted a finger
That's a paradox of a hyper centralised regime. It looks robust on a surface. But it's not robust, it's just hard. In reality, it's fragile. And the more centralised it is, the more fragile it becomes. Centralisation extirpates *any* agency, be it pro- or against the regime
Let me give you an example. During the Korean War my grandpa who was a young Komsomol member came to the local office and told that he wants to volunteer:
- How do you dare to offer yourself as a volunteer. If the Party wants, it will send you as a volunteer, - was the answer
Some presume that centralisation extirpates anti-system agency. That's wrong. It extirpates any ability for agency at all, be it pro- or anti regime. Formalised, centralised systems turn their members into the army of droids who just can't show any initiative themselves
Some presume that Bolsheviks won Russia with millions of soldiers during the major fields battles of the Civil War, 1918-1921. That's wrong. In in early 1918 Lenin declared:
"We must bring to the village the Civil War that just finished in our cities"
He thought the war is over
And it was over. In late 1917 Bolsheviks took over the major urban centres, most importantly Moscow and St Petersburg with only hundreds of militants. After they did that it was almost impossible to defeat them. After that they had total superiority till the end of the war
Interestingly enough, Moscow, St Petersburg and other major cities had tens of thousands of decommissioned or serving officers, not counting the file and rank. They were many times more numerous than the Bolsheviks. And they did nothing. Most of them were shot later
Reading the memories of the very first days of the Soviet era is funny. Like Bolsheviks took control of a southern city. The Cheka secret police ordered all the officers to register. And they indeed came to the Cheka to register!
"It was winter. The queue for the registration was long. Officers argued and quarrelled for the places in that queue. They were many times more numerous than Cheka operatives. If they just dared, they could capture the Cheka. But they didn't. I couldn't look at those cowards"
Calling them cowards may not be fair. Most fought in a war and risked their lives. But they did it under a formalised and centralised system which extirpated their agency. Once the system has fallen, the military turned into sheep and obediently came to register for the execution
Let's sum up. Observers are wrong about the super centralised regimes when they think they command loyalty. Nope. They command obedience, which is totally opposite. An obedient person will be obedient to anything as 1917 and 1991 showed most spectacularly
Mughals understood that. Consider that there were too large ways of promoting the Hindus to the upper ranks: first under Akbar and then under Aurangzeb. What is interesting is that Akbar predominantly promoted Rajputs and Aurangzeb - Marathas. The promoted those they fought with
Of course Akbar and Aurangzeb's decision to promote their hard enemies was largely motivated by the desire to get rid of such an enemy. But it could be also motivated by a desire to gain truly useful vassals (worked with Rajputs). Ultimately, you can rely only on what can resist
Putin's decision to create a vassal kingdom out of Chechnya can be motivated by very similar considerations. Chechens proved they can resist. Therefore, they can be relied upon. Russians on the other hand are too obedient and this are unreliable. They'll be obedient to anyone
This line of reasoning could explain the decision to quarter the Chechen barracks across the river from the Kremlin. When Putin's power is shaking the army won't help. And even the FSB & FSO might not help, not in a sense that they rebel but in a sense that they'll wait who wins
Yeah, they can give their word that they'll support you under any circumstances. But they or their fathers took an oath of fealty to defend the socialism at the cost of their life. And?...
The oath of a Russian officer is a white noise. It's not worse a damn and Putin knows it
Chechens in President Hotel are different. Not in a sense that they worship Putin, that's simply not true. They're often mocking him privately. But they:
1) have agency, unlike Russians 2) have no choice, unlike Russians
Which makes them Putin's last line of defence. End of🧵
If you are interested in Chechnya, you can look up my earlier thread with a very short introduction into its history
I have repeatedly pointed out that the modern Russian military industry has little continuity with the Soviet one. Destroyed in the 1990s, it was effectively created anew in the Putin's era. Still, it may sound too abstract, so I will zoom in on one specific example:
Stankomash
Located in Chelyabink, Stankomash industrial park hosts major producers for the nuclear, shipbuilding, oil & gas and energy industries. It also produces weaponry, including mine trawls and artillery ammunition (based on the open sources)
All under the umbrella of Konar company
Some examples of the Stankomash manufacture. These photos well illustrate the philosophy of Soviet/Russian dual use industry. In the peace time, you focus primarily on civilian products, in the war time you convert it all to the production of weaponry.
No offence, but this is a completely imbecile, ignorant, ridiculous framing. I have no explanation for all this debate except for a complete & determined ignorance of the foreign policy making class, and their refusal to learn literally anything about the material world.
"Components" framing makes sense when we are discussing drones. Why? Because drones are literally made from the imported components. You buy like 90% of them in China, and may be you make like 10% domestically. For the most part, you just assemble what you bought in China.
Not the case with missiles. Most of what the missile consists of, including its most critical, hard to make parts is produced domestically. Why? Because you cannot buy it abroad. More often than not, you cannot buy it in China. You can only make it yourself, domestically.
Contrary to the popular opinion, Andrey Belousov's appointment as a Minister of Defense makes perfect sense. From the Kremlin's perspective, war is primarily about industry & economy. Now Belousov is the central economic & industrial thinker (and planner) in the Russian gov.
Born into a Soviet Brahmin economist family, Belousov is an exceedingly rare case of an academician making a successful career in the Russian gov. Even more noteworthy, he rose to the position of power through his academic work and publications.
This is unique, ultra rare.
Belousov's career track:
1976-1981 Moscow State University ("economic cybernetics"). Basically, economics, but with the heavy use of then new computers.
1981-1986 Central Economic Mathematical Institute
1986-2006 Instutute of Economic Forecasting
2006-2024 Government
If you want to imagine Russia, imagine a depressive, depopulating town. Now on the outskirts of a town, there is an outrageously over-equipped, overfunded strategic enterprise that has literally everything money can buy in the world. It feels like a spaceship from another planet
Strategic industry is extremely generously equipped. Western companies look scoundrels in comparison. That’s why I am so sceptical about the whole “corruption” narrative. Not that it’s wrong. It’s just that it is the perspective of a little, envious bitch.
What needs to be funded, will be funded. It will actually be overfunded and most literally drowned in money. Obviously, overfunding the strategic sector comes at the cost of underfunding almost everything else (like urban infrastructure). That’s why the town looks so grim.
We have successfully documented the entire Russian missiles industry, mapping 28 of its key enterprises. Read our first OSINT sample focusing on the Votkinsk Plant, a major producer of intercontinental ballistic missiles. How does it make weaponry?
The strategic missiles industry appears to be highly secretive and impenetrable to the observers. And yet, it is perfectly OSINTable, based on the publicly available sources. This investigation sample illustrates our approach and methodology (31 p.)
Our first and invaluable source is the state propaganda, such as the federal and regional TV channels, corporate media, social media and so on. It provides abundant visual evidence, particularly on the hardware used in the production of weaponry.
In August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed his FSB Chief Putin as the new Prime Minister. Same day, he named him as the official successor. Yet, there was a problem. To become a president, Putin had to go through elections which he could not win.
He was completely obscure.
Today, Putin is the top rank global celebrity. But in August 1999, nobody knew him. He was just an obscure official of Yeltsin's administration, made a PM by the arbitrary will of the sovereign. This noname clerk had like 2-3% of popular support
Soon, he was to face elections
By the time of Putin's appointment, Russia already had its most favoured candidate. It was Primakov. A former Yeltsin's Prime Minister who broke with Yeltsin to contest for power. The most popular politician in Russia with massive support both in masses and in the establishment.