- Ban on seaborne crude and products by end of the year (2/3 EU supply)
- pipeline exemption, to be revised with unclear timeline
- guarantees for HU in case of pipe disruption
- insurance included, shipping services not included
Comments
The Družba exemption met a lot of criticism but isn't the big part of the story, as Družba north countries (DE,PL) will align with end of year ban. VDL says ban hits 90% of supplies. Question: beside Hungary, what will other Družba south countries (SK,CZ) do?2/7
HU guarantee: Beside commercial considerations, Hungary is probably afraid that if becomes the only Družba client, infrastructure security becomes much less of a concern for everyone else 3/7
long timeline leaves Russia time to re-organise. Already learning from the Iranian playbook how to circumvent secondary sanctions that might ensue once Europe will no longer buy Russian oil
+ high prices may compensate (partly?entirely?) 4/7
But still, the impact will be felt
- Russia will need to sell in the east at a discount (now about 30USD spread)=less income
- Output likely to be affected-most mature wells might go offline (forever)
Sufficient to stop war? Nope 5/7
political rationale for the delay should also be seen in a broader perspective. Concerns about global inflation, potential impact on US midterm - let's remind that the US Treasury wasn't particularly supportive of an EU ban 6/7
Quite concerning to see no mention of how Europe will prepare. EU should adopt coordinated conservation measures, instead member states still waste money on un-targeted subsidies to consumption 7/7
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1.#Turkmenistan is undergoing a presidential succession. Despite the isolation imposed by geography and its political system, this country has played an important role in Eurasian energy politics. A recapping thread 👇apnews.com/article/russia…
2.Through the lenses of Turkmen energy history, one can trace 30 years of shifts in international politics including the USSR collapse, the US unipolar moment, the war on terror, Russia’s resurgence (well…) and China’s rise.
3. At the collapse of the USSR, newly independent Turkmenistan was a peripheral, impoverished state. Yet, an untapped treasure lied beneath its soil: 13.6 tcm of natural gas reserves (7% of global reserves), making Turkmenistan the fourth in the world.
For months of skyrocketing prices we were gaslighted by the "it's underinvestment in fossil fuels, it's the fault of wind energy" narrative while Russia was deliberately undersupplying the EU and leaving Gazprom storage facilities in Europe empty as a preparation for war.
When Fatih Birol pointed at the anomaly of Gazprom's commercial behaviour, loads of media and expert reacted like "leave Russia alone, it's all about your silly climate scenario"
It was certainly possible to debate whether Russia was motivated by technical, commercial or political behaviour (I had tried to do it in this old thread).By abiding by existing contracts, Russia skilfully remained within the realm of plausible deniability
1. In occasion of Putin’s visit to Beijing, a major gas deal was finalized between Russia and China,portrayed as a sign of consolidation of relations between revisionist powers.But energy-wise, there is more than meets the eye. Thread. reuters.com/world/asia-pac…
2.First the deal.Gazprom and CNPC signed a deal to annually supply 10 bcm of Russian gas from the Sakhalin 3 fields to China via a pipeline connecting the domestic Sakhalin-Vladivostok pipeline to the main Power of Siberia trunkline. (source: Gazprom)
3.The deal will take Gazprom supplies to China (about 4 bcm in 2020) to 48 bcm in the second half of the decade, adding to the 38 bcm expected to be shipped through Power of Siberia as of 2025, following a major deal between the two countries in 2014 reuters.com/article/us-chi…
1.IEA’s chief Birol sparked intense debate by accusing Russia of orchestrating the current gas supply crunch in Europe. But why would Russia do that? A (long) thread ft.com/content/668a84…
2.First some background. There are two drivers through which Russia has influenced gas prices in Europe: the levels of storage in Gazprom’s facilities in Europe, and the level of spot sales to European markets
3. Historically low storage levels in Europe are recorded since July. But some facilities are emptier than others. It is the case of Gazprom’s facilities in Germany and Austria, which take down overall EU level
Italy's MFA undersecretary Di Stefano announces IT government intends to double TAP capacity to 20 bcm, also considering supplies from Turkmenistan "in the future"
Mentions 2 important caveats
- market tests (so far, not so good)
- Azerbaijan additional supplies (who knows?)
Interestingly, the undersecretary(M5S) does not mention EastMed/Poseidon. M5S sided with local protests against TAP in the past, and may have reservations to support a project that implies another pipeline landing on the same territory. Something an expansion of TAP doesn't need.
Any sudden rush to additional pipelines in Italy faces however some risks. First, imagine Russia changes policy at some point in the near future, and decides to flood EU markets (provided it has capacity to do so) taking prices abruptly down